In re J.D.T., A19-1253

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: CHUTICH, Justice.
• Citation: 946 N.W.2d 321
• Parties: IN RE the Matter of the WELFARE OF the CHILDREN OF: J.D.T. and J.M.O., Parents.
• Docket Number: A19-1253
• Decision Date: 15 July 2020

946 N.W.2d 321

IN RE the Matter of the WELFARE OF the CHILDREN OF: J.D.T. and J.M.O., Parents.

A19-1253

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: July 15, 2020

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

946 N.W.2d 324

This case considers the effect of a parent's petition to voluntarily terminate parental rights on a county's petition for involuntary termination under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1 (2018). Appellant J.D.T. filed a petition under subdivision 1(a) to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her two young children after Grant County filed a petition for involuntary termination under subdivision 1(b). The district court denied J.D.T.’s petition and granted the County's petition for involuntary termination of her parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a parent's voluntary petition does not automatically supplant a county's petition for involuntary termination, and that the district court did not err by denying J.D.T.’s voluntary petition. Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that a parent's voluntary petition does not supplant a county's petition for involuntary termination of parental rights, we affirm.

FACTS

J.D.T. and J.M.O.¹ are the biological parents of C.K.O. and B.R.O., who were about 3 years and 2 years old, respectively, at the time of trial.² J.D.T. is also the biological mother of two other children who are not the subject of this appeal, one of whom was in utero when this termination proceeding occurred.

In 2015, J.D.T. transferred custody of her oldest child to the child's biological father following a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding in Pope County. In January 2016, J.D.T. gave birth to C.K.O., one of the children at issue here. Pope County removed C.K.O. from the home of J.D.T. and J.M.O. when he was 2 months old "due to the presence of drugs" in the home. Case plans were established, the parents complied with the case plans, and C.K.O. was returned to their home in September 2016. J.D.T. gave birth to the second child at issue here, B.R.O., in August 2017.

In May 2018, Grant County Social Services received a Child Protection Report when C.K.O. and B.R.O. were about 28 months and 9 months old, respectively. The report raised concerns that the parents were using drugs and inadequately supervising the children. The County investigated, and J.M.O. admitting to smoking methamphetamine while the children were in the home. J.D.T. stated that she would not comply with a case plan unless it was court ordered, and she also refused a drug test.

The County filed a CHIPS petition on May 16, 2018. Law enforcement officers removed the children from the parents’ home after the district court ordered hair follicle testing and J.D.T., J.M.O., and B.R.O. all tested positive for methamphetamine. The district court held a pre-trial hearing on June 26, 2018, and J.D.T. admitted that her children were in need of protective services because of her methamphetamine use. The court ordered an out-of-home

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placement plan for J.D.T. that focused on maintaining sobriety; completing assessments of parental capacity, mental health, and chemical dependency and following the resulting recommendations; finding employment; and completing parental education courses.

The district court held three intermediate disposition review hearings to assess J.D.T.’s progress with her case plan. After the first hearing, the district court found that by October 1, 2018, J.D.T. had seen her children for "just 4 hours in 78 days." She had no contact with her children's case worker for the one-month period preceding the County's pre-hearing report. She refused or failed to show up for several drug tests, and of the tests that she did complete, at least three had abnormal creatinine levels, "raising serious concerns" that the submitted samples had been altered. By the second hearing, J.D.T. had missed the last seven consecutive parenting time visits, despite her children's need for consistent contact with their parents based on the trauma that they had suffered.

In December 2018, J.D.T. entered in-patient treatment. She was discharged in January 2019. J.D.T. tested positive for methamphetamine within 1 month of her discharge, when she was 4 months pregnant. She either failed to show up for a drug test or tested positive four more times before trial. Throughout the CHIPS proceeding, the County arranged several appointments, assessments, and courses for J.D.T. and made several referrals to help J.D.T. comply with her case plan.

The County filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights on March 11, 2019. The County asserted that its reasonable efforts at reunification failed to correct the conditions leading to the children's out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Specifically, the County alleged that J.D.T. had not consistently participated in parenting time visits and failed to adequately engage with the services that the County provided. At the time of the County's petition, both children had been in an out-of-home placement for at least 272 days.

At a pre-trial hearing on April 22, J.D.T. offered to voluntarily admit to the allegations in the petition. The County asserted that if J.D.T. did so, her admission would be "on an involuntary petition." Three days before trial, J.D.T. filed a petition for voluntary termination of her parental rights to C.K.O. and B.R.O. for good cause, along with an affidavit of consent. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a).

The County objected to J.D.T.’s petition, asserting that she had not established good cause for voluntary termination of her parental rights. The County also suggested that even if the district court granted J.D.T.’s petition, the court could simultaneously grant the involuntary petition.

After a 2-day trial, the district court denied J.D.T.’s voluntary petition, finding that she did not demonstrate good cause for termination. The district court granted the County's petition for involuntary termination of J.D.T.’s parental rights because J.D.T. failed to comply with her case plan and failed to correct the conditions that led to out-of-home placement despite the County's attempts at reunification. J.D.T. appealed.

On appeal, J.D.T. asserted that the district court abused its discretion by denying her petition. She also contended that, as a matter of law, her voluntary petition automatically supplanted the involuntary petition.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court on both issues. In re Welfare of Children of J.D.T. , No. A19-1253, 2020 WL 290507 (Minn. App. Jan. 21, 2020). First,

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the court of appeals concluded that the district court did not err in denying J.D.T.’s voluntary petition. Id. at *5. Second, the court of appeals concluded that a parent's voluntary petition does not automatically supplant a county's involuntary petition. Id. at *7. Instead, the court stated that a district court in that scenario may grant one or both of the petitions. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that J.D.T.’s proposed interpretation "would usurp the district court's authority to provide for the best interests of children." Id. (quoting In re Welfare of Child of N.E.R. , No. A17-1112, 2018 WL 492654, at *5 (Minn. App. Jan. 22, 2018) ).

J.D.T. sought review, asking us to determine whether "the filing of a voluntary petition for termination of parental rights converts an existing action for involuntary termination of parental rights into a voluntary action."³

ANALYSIS

J.D.T. does not argue that the district court erred by terminating her parental rights. Rather, she asserts that the termination should have been voluntary rather than involuntary because, as a matter of law, her voluntary petition superseded the County's involuntary petition. This outcome matters in part because an involuntary petition affects future termination proceedings involving other children. If a district court involuntarily terminates a parent's rights, that parent faces a rebuttable presumption that he or she is "palpably unfit" to be a parent if a subsequent termination proceeding for another child should occur.⁴ Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). By contrast, a parent whose parental rights have been voluntarily terminated by a district court is not presumed to be unfit in subsequent proceedings.⁵ See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a).

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The relationship between petitions for voluntary and involuntary termination of parental rights—including whether a parent's voluntary petition supplants a county's involuntary petition—involves questions of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 2004).

The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature's intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). First, we "determine whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous." State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). A statute is unambiguous if it has only one reasonable...