In re J.J.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–FS–352.,14–FS–352.
• Citation: 111 A.3d 1038
• Parties: In re Petition of J.J.; T.R., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

111 A.3d 1038

In re Petition of J.J.; T.R., Appellant.

No. 14–FS–352.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Dec. 2, 2014.

Decided March 26, 2015.

Ronald A. Colbert, Washington, DC, for appellant T.R.

Gary P. Jacobs filed a statement in lieu of a brief, for appellant J.B., supporting appellant T.R.

Anthony R. Davenport, for appellee J.J.

Dennis Eshman, Washington, DC, for appellee J.R.

Aisha Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. Alikahn, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee District of Columbia.

Before GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and REID, Senior Judge.

Opinion

BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judge:

This case involves a challenge to a court-ordered waiver of parental consent to the adoption of child J.R. by appellee-foster parent J.J., after a magistrate judge found that appellants, T.R. and J.B., the biological mother and father, had withheld their consent against the best interests of the child. T.R. contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate judge's decision to waive her consent to adoption, and that the reviewing associate judge therefore abused her discretion by affirming. J.B. joins without making additional claims.¹ We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

J.R. was born on February 28, 2008, to mother T.R. and father J.B., but has lived continuously with her adoptive mother J.J., a licensed foster parent, since October 28, 2008. J.R. came into J.J.'s care at approximately eight months old, after J.R. was committed to the custody of the District of Columbia upon allegations that T.R. failed to provide proper formula, used a sanitary napkin for a diaper, and engaged in an act of prostitution with J.R. present. J.B. is not actively involved in J.R.'s life, but has provided occasional financial support and visited J.R. several times before and after his incarceration for second degree assault from June 2011 through October 2012.

At J.R.'s adoption hearing, three social workers who have worked with J.R. testified in support of J.J.'s adoption petition. Dr. Seth King, a psychologist qualified as an expert witness, also testified in favor of J.J.'s adoption petition after individually evaluating T.R. and J.J. and observing their interactions with J.R. The magistrate judge presiding over the hearing concluded that J.J. had established by clear and convincing evidence that T.R. and J.B. had withheld their consent to adoption against J.R.'s best interests,² and granted J.J.'s petition for adoption on May 8, 2013. A final decree of adoption followed.

T.R. and J.B. filed motions for review of the magistrate judge's order in the trial court, pursuant to D.C. Fam. Ct. R. D(e)(1). Specifically, T.R. alleged that the magistrate judge granted J.J.'s adoption petition without making sufficient factual findings, pursuant to D.C.Code § 16–2353(b) (2012 Repl.), to establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (i) T.R. withheld her consent to J.R.'s adoption contrary to J.R.'s best interests, (ii) T.R. suffers from physical, mental, or emotional impairments that prevent her from parenting, or (iii) J.R. has an opinion regarding her custodian. Additionally, J.B. alleged that the magistrate judge granted J.J.'s adoption petition without first finding that he was unfit or adequately considering his request to place J.R. with him, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to maintain a relationship with J.R.³

On review, the associate judge concluded that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in finding clear and convincing evidence to waive T.R.'s consent to adoption, pursuant to D.C.Code § 16–304(e) (2012 Repl.).⁴ In reaching this conclusion, the associate judge noted the following findings of the magistrate judge: J.R. has lived with J.J. for most of her life, and that J.J. provides “excellent care” and a stable environment in a “clean and ‘kid-friendly’ ” two-level home, where J.R. is an integrated part of J.J.'s family. J.J. meets J.R.'s educational and medical needs, including administering epilepsy medication, takes J.R. to dance and music lessons, and makes an effort to facilitate interaction with T.R. and J.B. Dr. King testified that J.R. was accustomed to the stability of J.J.'s care, and social worker Kimberly Beard testified that J.R. needed the permanency of living with J.J. J.J. has maintained J.R.'s physical, mental, and emotional health, and properly responded to an incident in which J.R. sustained a serious burn injury in T.R.'s care by taking J.R. to the hospital for treatment, whereas T.R. did not do so.⁵

On the other hand, the associate judge noted that T.R.'s relationship with J.R. is less developed and her visits with J.R. have been inconsistent.⁶ Dr. King individually assessed J.J. and T.R., and their respective relationships with J.R., and opined that T.R. did not demonstrate insight into the need to comply with mental health treatment, in spite of her history of mental health treatment and therapy and her ongoing “emotional distress and impulse control problems.” Dr. King observed that T.R. seemed to focus on her own needs when interacting with J.R. and that J.R. did not readily comply with T.R.'s instructions and demonstrated a less secure attachment with T.R., even asking for “mommy” during their interaction. On the other hand, Dr. King concluded that J.J. demonstrated emotional stability and an ability to be a positive role model. J.R. regards J.J. as her “mother figure,” and their interaction was natural and “bi-directional.” After reviewing these findings of the magistrate judge, the associate judge inferred J.R.'s preference to remain with J.J., and concluded that T.R. suffers from various “physical, emotional, and mental health impairments that would prevent her from parenting [J.R.].”

The associate judge also reviewed the magistrate judge's findings related to J.B. Prior to J.B.'s incarceration in June 2011, his visits with J.R. were limited, and he made no effort to contact J.R. during his incarceration. After his release in October 2012, J.B. waited for two months to visit J.R., and did so only twice before the adoption hearing, although eleven visits were offered. Other than visitation, J.B. has made minimal effort to contact J.R. As a result, J.B.'s relationship with J.R. is “less well-developed” than J.J.'s relationship with J.R. Further, J.B. has provided little financial support and has never attempted to become familiar with addressing J.R.'s epilepsy. Accordingly, the associate judge concluded that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in determining, based on clear and convincing evidence, that J.B. waived his consent to J.R.'s adoption. The associate judge further concluded that J.B. had “failed to grasp his opportunity interest”⁷ after his incarceration and that the magistrate judge was not required to make an explicit finding that J.B. was “unfit” in order to waive his consent to adoption. See In re C.L.O., supra note 7, 41 A.3d at 512 ; In re J.C.F., 73 A.3d 1007, 1015 n. 4 (D.C.2013) (affirming waiver of biological father's consent “even though the magistrate judge did not mention [the father's] opportunity interest in the written findings of fact and conclusions of law [because] the record supplied clear and convincing evidence supporting the waiver”). On this same basis, the associate judge concluded that the magistrate judge did not need to make a finding with regard to J.B.'s request that J.R. be placed with him, and determined that J.R.'s best interests lay with J.J. rather than her father, “with whom she had never lived and whose contact was limited.” This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Procedurally, our role is to review the ruling of the associate judge, in which it reviewed the magistrate judge's order for errors of law, abuse of discretion, and clear lack of evidentiary support. In re C.L.O., supra note 7, 41 A.3d at 510 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, we are not limited to the associate judge's ruling and may review the trial court as a whole, “look[ing] to the findings and conclusions of the fact finder on which that ruling is based.”Id. at 510 (citation omitted). Thus, in reviewing the trial court's determination, we apply the same standard of review that the associate judge applied to the magistrate judge's order and may “review the magistrate judge's factual findings as the findings of the trial judge ... for abuse of discretion or a clear lack of evidentiary support.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).⁸ Our review of legal conclusions, however, is de novo. Id. (citations omitted).

“The determination whether a birth parent's consent to the adoption of a child has been withheld contrary to the child's best interest is confided to the trial court's sound discretion.” In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992, 999 (D.C.2003) (citation omitted). In our review, we determine whether the trial court exercised that discretion “within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor,” and supported its decision with “substantial reasoning drawn from a firm factual foundation in the record.” In re S.L.G. & S.E.G., 110 A.3d 1275, 1291 (D.C.2015) (citations omitted).

B. Applicable Law

Generally, a trial court may not grant an adoption petition without the consent of both biological parents. See D.C.Code § 16–304(a) –(b) (2012 Repl.); In re C.L.O., supra note 7, 41 A.3d at 510. Yet the trial court, in its discretion, may grant an adoption petition without parental consent if, after a hearing, the prospective adoptive parent meets the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parents withheld their consent “contrary to the best interest of the child.” § 16–304(e) ; see In re C.L.O., supra note 7, 41 A.3d at 510–11 (citation omitted). In making a “best...