In re Jackson
| Decision Date | 17 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 93-02222. |
| Citation | 169 BR 742 |
| Parties | In re Wade JACKSON, Debtor. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Florida |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Charles Wynn, Marianna, FL, for Shelley.
Doug Smith, Panama City, FL, for debtor.
William Miller, Trustee, Tallahassee, FL.
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS
THIS MATTER is before the court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the debtor, and by the Trustee and Genola Shelly, a judgment creditor (collectively the "Objectors") with respect to objections to the debtor's homestead exemption claim. The debtor also claims a peanut quota as exempt, to which objections have been filed. Having considered the pleadings, supporting documents, and argument of counsel, I find that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the debtor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to his homestead exemption claim and that the Objectors are entitled to judgment with respect to the peanut quota issue.
On July 15, 1993, Wade Jackson filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. In his schedules, the debtor claimed as exempt two adjoining tracts of farmland consisting of 140 acres1 in Washington County, Florida (the "County"). A graded roadway passes through the 120-acre tract, bifurcating the debtor's claimed homestead into two distinct parcels: the 80 acres on which debtor's residence is located (comprised of the 20-acre tract plus half of the 120-acre tract), and the remaining 60 acres of farmland.
According to the uncontroverted affidavit of a 78-year resident of the County, the roadway was originally a "three trail path" created by passing carriages and maintained by the people who resided alongside it. The County subsequently graded the path, and has maintained the roadway since then. Public records do not reflect either the existence or ownership of the roadway.
Under the Florida homestead exemption provision, Fla. Constitution, Art. X, § 4, the debtor is entitled to claim a homestead exemption of a maximum of 160 acres of contiguous land located outside of a municipality. The Objectors assert that the road running through the debtor's property destroys the contiguity with respect to the 60 acres, and that the debtor should be allowed an exemption only as to the 80 acres on which his house is located. Both parties agree that the debtor meets all other requirements for the homestead exemption, and that absent the presence of the roadway, the debtor would be entitled to claim the entire 140 acres as exempt under Florida Law.
Summary judgment motion is to be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 7056, Fed.R.Bankr.P. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. American Management Corp. v. Dunlap, 784 F.Supp. 1245, 1250 (N.D.Miss.1992); Savage v. Snow, 575 F.Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c), a party objecting to an exemption bears the burden of proving that the exemption is not properly claimed.
Bankruptcy exemptions for Florida residents are governed by Florida law. Bankruptcy Code § 522(b); Fla.Stat. § 222.20 (). The Florida homestead provision exempts from forced sale, judgment, or lien any property which consists of a person's homestead to the extent of 160 acres of contiguous land outside of a municipality. Fla. Const., Art. X, § 4. Florida courts hold that the homestead exemption shall be liberally construed "in the interest of protecting the family home." In re Israel, 94 B.R. 729, 730 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1988) (citing Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Insurance, Inc., 207 So.2d 431 (Fla.1968)).
It is undisputed that (i) the house located on the land is the debtor's residence; (ii) the property is farmland located outside of a municipality; and (iii) the 140 acres falls within the constitutional limitation of 160 acres. The sole issue with regard to the claimed homestead land concerns whether a public road bisecting a debtor's property destroys the contiguity requirement of the homestead exemption.
In Clark v. Cox, 80 Fla. 63, 85 So. 173 (1920), the Florida Supreme Court indicated that contiguity is destroyed where the fee title to a right of way is vested in someone other than the owner of the adjoining lands. In Clark, the owner of the homestead had conveyed by deed a 100-foot strip of land for a railroad right of way. The owner enjoyed free passage over the right of way and continued to own and use the land on both sides for "homestead purposes." Id., 85 So. at 175. Prior to 1968, the Constitution did not expressly require contiguity of land for the exemption of a homestead:
"A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of land . . . owned by the head of a family residing in this State . . . shall be exempt from forced sale. . . . "
Fla. Const., Art. X, § 1 (1885) (). Nevertheless, the Clark court determined that an element of contiguity was requisite to the homestead character of land. "A detached tract of land separated from the homestead by other parcels of land `neither owned nor occupied by'" the debtor may not be considered part of the homestead. Clark, 85 So. at 174 (quoting Brandies v. Perry, 39 Fla. 172, 22 So. 268, 270 (1897)); Buckels v. Tomer, 78 So.2d 861 (Fla.1955). If adjoining lands are separated by a perpetual easement, however, and fee title to the underlying land remains in the homesteader, this does not "destroy the actual contiguity or impair the homestead exemptions." Clark, 85 So. at 174; see also Di Virgilio v. State Rd. Dep't, 205 So.2d 317, 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) ().
Since a mere easement does not destroy actual contiguity, it follows that conveyance of a fee title does destroy actual contiguity because the homestead would thus be separated by land not owned by the homesteader. Therefore, a fee simple roadway running through and bisecting a landowner's property creates two separate tracts and destroys the contiguity of the homestead.
The Clark court further held that since contiguity was not expressly required by the Constitution, the question of whether actual contiguity was required in each case had to be determined by the particular facts of the case. Clark, 85 So. at 174. The court found that under the narrow facts of this case, there was no evidence that the homestead owner abandoned his right to claim any part of the remaining land as a homestead, and that conveyance of the land for a right-of-way did not deprive the remaining real estate of its homestead character. In an equitable decision not to penalize the homeowner through loss of homestead protection on his remaining property, the court held that actual contiguity was not required "under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 175.
The present case is governed by the 1968 revisions to the Constitution, under which the revised homestead provision, Art. X, § 4, now expressly requires contiguity of land. "The following property owned by a natural person" is exempt from forced sale:
"A homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon. . . . "
Fla. Const., Art. X, § 4 () (emphasis added). Courts no longer have the discretion to review, on a case-by-case basis, whether actual contiguity is required. If the facts support a finding that someone other than the debtor owns fee title to the land beneath the roadway, then the requisite contiguity is destroyed, and the debtor is not entitled to claim as part of his homestead a tract of land detached from that on which he resides.
The debtor seeks to prove that the County does not own fee title to the land beneath the roadway. He asserts that since the County neither owns the land nor seeks to assert any claim of title to the land, fee title belongs to him. Regardless of the County's intentions, however, the land may have been dedicated to the County by common law or statutory dedication. See City of Miami v. Jansik, 89 So.2d 644 (Fla.1956) (). Common law dedication, by which an owner of an interest in land transfers either ownership or privileges for public usage, requires both an intention to dedicate and an acceptance of the offer of dedication. Bonifay v. Dickson, 459 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). "An intention to dedicate may be implied from the acts of the landowner," such as the filing of a map or plat of the property indicating thereon the roadway or public land at issue. Id. at 1094. One significant feature of common law dedication is that it "leaves ownership of the land in the dedicator, giving to the public rights of easement only." Id. at 1095 (). Nothing in the record evidences the debtor's or any of his predecessors in interest express intention to dedicate the roadway, and no map or plat has been filed showing the existence of the roadway from which an intention to dedicate might be implied. Therefore, there has been no common law dedication of the roadway.
The public may also acquire a prescriptive right to use the land as a roadway if there is "actual, continuous, uninterrupted use by the public of the lands of another, for the prescribed period" of twenty years. Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57, 64 (Fla.1958); Gibson v. Buice, 394 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The use must be (i) "adverse under claim of right," (...
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