In re Jaime P.

• Citation: 40 Cal.4th 128,146 P.3d 965,51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430
• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. S135263.,S135263.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: In re JAIME P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jaime P., Defendant and Appellant.

51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430

40 Cal.4th 128

146 P.3d 965

In re JAIME P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jaime P., Defendant and Appellant.

No. S135263.

Supreme Court of California.

November 30, 2006.

Diana M. Teran, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Newport Beach, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Lael R. Rubin, Head Deputy District Attorney, Brentford J. Ferreira and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, we consider the continued vitality of In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (Tyrell J.), upholding a warrantless search of a juvenile probationer by an officer who lacked reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity and was unaware that the juvenile had consented to such a search as a condition of his probation. We conclude that developments subsequent to Tyrell J., including the recent high court decision in Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (Samson), our own decision in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496 (Sanders), and lower court cases and scholarly comment critical of Tyrell J., have convinced us that it should be overruled.

FACTS

The following uncontradicted facts are taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in this case. Minor Jaime P. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the court's sustaining of the allegations that he drove a vehicle without a license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) and carried a loaded firearm (Pen.Code, § 12031, subd. (a)(1); further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), while associated with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)

On April 27, 2004, Fairfield Police Officer Moody detained minor and three other persons after observing what he believed to be traffic violations. The officer first observed the driver of the car turn corners without signaling and then pull over to the curb, again without signaling. (The People conceded these violations standing alone would not have justified a vehicle stop, as no other vehicles were affected; see Veh.Code, § 22107.)

Moody pulled in behind the car and saw two passengers exit. The officer detained and questioned them, testifying later that he did so because a home on the block had recently been the target of gang violence. Minor, who was driving the vehicle, and another person remained seated in the front seat. After a backup officer arrived, Moody turned his attention to the individuals remaining in the car. Minor could provide only a school identification and said he did not have a driver's license.

While talking to minor, Officer Moody observed a box of ammunition in plain view on the front floorboard. Moody then ordered minor and his passenger to exit the vehicle and pat-searched all four individuals. The only weapon located at that time was a padlock tied to a bandana, found on one of the passengers who initially exited the vehicle. After determining that none of the four individuals had a valid driver's license, Moody called a tow truck to remove and store the car. An inventory search of the vehicle revealed a loaded .44 caliber handgun beneath the rear passenger seat.

Minor was arrested and, after being advised of his constitutional rights at the police station, he admitted that he was a member of the Calle San Marco (CSM) gang. He indicated that he had given a ride to the other three occupants of the vehicle and that one of them had produced the gun, which they passed around but did not take out of its holster. At the jurisdictional hearing, Detective Golez testified that CSM is a gang of 150-200 members in Fairfield and is a subset of the Sureno gang; its members are "foot soldiers" of the Mexican Mafia, a prison gang. Golez indicated that she believed minor to be an active member of CSM, based upon his admission, his associates, his style of dress, and graffiti found at his residence.

Based upon this and other evidence not relevant here, the juvenile court denied minor's motion to suppress the firearm, relying upon minor's probation search condition to justify the officer's action. The record shows minor was on probation with the condition, among others, that he submit his person and property, including his vehicle and residence, to a warrantless search and seizure by any peace officer at any time, with or without probable cause. The juvenile court then sustained the delinquency petition, finding true the allegations that minor drove a vehicle without a license, was a gang member and carried a loaded firearm. The juvenile court continued minor as a ward of the court and placed him on further probation.

Among other issues, minor contended on appeal that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeal, acknowledging the scholarly criticism of Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, but deeming itself "bound by its precedent," rejected the contention and reached the remaining appellate issues. We will reverse.

DISCUSSION

Does a juvenile's probationary search condition justify an otherwise illegal search and seizure if the officers conducting the search are then unaware that the juvenile is on probation and subject to the search condition? Our decision in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, held that the officers' prior knowledge of the probation condition was not necessary in a juvenile case. We reasoned, in part, that "imposing a strict requirement that the searching officer must always have advance knowledge of the search condition would be inconsistent with the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme. That scheme embraces a goal of rehabilitating youngsters who have transgressed the law, a goal that is arguably stronger than in the adult context. [Citations.] ... [T]he condition of probation permitting police ... to conduct warrantless searches is imposed by the juvenile court to serve the important goal of deterring future misconduct." (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86-87, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, italics added.) We also relied upon the reduced expectation of privacy that probationers, as a general matter, hold, and reasoned that suppressing the evidence under the circumstances presented would not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86, 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)

Justice Kennard dissented in Tyrell J. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 90, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Her dissent found no significant differences in the purposes for, and rationale supporting, search conditions imposed on adult parolees (see In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 646, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734; People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176, 178, 41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174), and those imposed on juvenile probationers. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 96, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In the dissent's view, the holdings in Gallegos and Martinez, "that a search may not be justified by a parole search condition of which the searching officer is unaware, should be dispositive of this case." (Ibid.)

We recently considered whether prior knowledge of a search condition is required to uphold an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee, concluding the search "may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was conducted." (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, italics added, fn. omitted.) This is so, we reasoned, because "whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted." (Id. at pp. 332, 334, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, italics added.) Sanders explained that the "primary purpose of the exclusionary rule [is] to deter police misconduct" (id. at p. 332, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496), and that to admit evidence seized during a search that the officer had no reason to believe was lawful, merely because a search condition had been imposed, "would legitimize unlawful police conduct" (id. at p. 335, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496).

Much of the foregoing Sanders analysis would seemingly apply to searches of juvenile probationers. Although Sanders noted that a number of commentators had criticized our ruling in Tyrell J., nonetheless "[b]ecause this case does not involve a juvenile, we need not, and do not, decide," whether the reasoning of Tyrell J. is correct. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 5, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496.) We will address that question here.

We have recognized that reexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration. (E.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296-297, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58, and cases cited.) As we explain below, developments occurring subsequent to our Tyrell J. decision convince us that it was incorrectly decided, and that it has generated and will continue to generate inequitable and legally unjustified results unless we overrule it.

As noted, Tyrell J. justified its holding on three broad grounds: (1) "the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme" (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519); (2) "the important goal of deterring future...