In re Jajuga Estate
| Decision Date | 20 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 322522. |
| Citation | 312 Mich.App. 706,881 N.W.2d 487 |
| Parties | In re JAJUGA ESTATE. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Valerie Kutz–Otway, PLC (by Valerie Kutz–Otway), for Susan Veith.
Martineau, Hackett, Romashko, O'Neil & Klaus, PLLC, Clare (by Jeffrey J. Klaus ), for Joann Chelenyak.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and STEPHENS and RIORDAN, JJ.
RIORDAN
, J.
Respondent, Joann Chelenyak, who is the personal representative of the estate of Shelby Jean Jajuga, appeals as of right a probate court order granting the petition for exempt property filed by petitioner, Susan P. Veith. We affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed in this case. Petitioner is the sole surviving child of the decedent, Shelby Jean Jajuga. The decedent drafted her last will and testament on January 16, 2002, under which her estate was to be divided in equal parts among three beneficiaries: (1) Mike and “Joanne Chelenysk,”1 who constituted a single, joint beneficiary, (2) Jeanette Mullins, and (3) Sherry Snyder. The decedent further directed that petitioner and the decedent's other children, who were still living at the time, were to “inherit nothing from [her] estate.” The decedent explained in the will that her decision to disinherit her children was “not because of any lack of love and affection I hold toward them but because they have either received compensation in advance of my death or because I do not believe it would be in their best interest that they inherit.” The decedent later filed a codicil to her will, appointing respondent as personal representative and directing that her estate be divided equally between two, rather than three, named beneficiaries. The codicil reaffirmed the remainder of the will and did not alter the provision that disinherited petitioner.
Following the decedent's death, petitioner filed an objection to the final account “on the basis that the Personal Representative has refused to pay Petitioner the exempt property allowance as required by MCL 700.2404
....” Petitioner asked the court to award the exempt property that she had selected from the estate (i.e., a car valued at $4,500, a tractor valued at $2,500, and $7,000 in cash) or, in the alternative, $14,000 in cash, plus $1,000 in attorney fees. In response, respondent contended that petitioner was not entitled to exempt property because she was specifically disinherited under the will.
After holding a hearing on petitioner's objection to the final account and requesting supplemental briefing from the parties, the probate court held, as an issue of first impression in Michigan, that petitioner was entitled to the exempt property that she had requested. In light of the statutory language of MCL 700.2404
, other provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and cases from other jurisdictions construing similar statutory language, the court concluded that a testator cannot preclude a child from taking exempt property through a disinheriting provision in a will. The Court found that the meaning of “entitled” as used in MCL 700.2404 was ambiguous, but concluded, based on the definition of “entitle” in Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), that the Legislature intended to establish a legal right to exempt property under MCL 700.2404 for a surviving spouse or the children of a decedent in the absence of a surviving spouse. In support of its conclusion that the word “ entitled” referred to a legal right, the court found that the phrase “in addition to” used in MCL 700.2404(3)
means “supplemental” and, therefore, did not establish a condition precedent that a child must be eligible to receive a distribution from the estate in order to claim exempt property.
The court acknowledged respondent's argument that the statute does not expressly “ ‘require exempt property to be distributed to an adult child in contradiction to the express language’ ” of the will, but it further noted that the statute does not directly “prohibit exempt property from being distributed” when a child has been disinherited, concluding that the Legislature would have included such a provision if it had intended to implement that limitation. The court also recognized that a semantic difference exists between an “allowance” and an “exemption” under EPIC, but held that the distinction was not dispositive with regard to the construction of “entitled,” noting that (1) both an allowance and an exemption can constitute a right, (2) Michigan caselaw has traditionally recognized that allowances are rights and personal privileges, and (3) the similarity between MCL 700.2402
, MCL 700.2403, and MCL 700.2404 clearly indicated that the Legislature intended for those provisions to operate in a parallel manner. Additionally, the court rejected respondent's argument that interpreting the exempt-property provision as a right would conflict with MCL 700.2102(2) and MCL 700.2302(2)(a), or render those provisions inconsequential. The court also held that the public policy underlying the exempt-property statute was the protection of spouses and children, and that the statute was a remedial statute that should be liberally construed in favor of those benefitted under the statute. Finally, the court concluded that the rights of surviving children to exempt property are equal to those of a surviving spouse.
This Court reviews de novo an issue of statutory interpretation as a question of law. In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich.App. 122, 128, 748 N.W.2d 265 (2008)
. However, “appeals from a probate court decision are on the record, not de novo.” Id., citing MCL 700.1305 ; MCL 600.866(1) ; MCR 5.802(B)(1); In re Webb H. Coe Marital and Residuary Trusts, 233 Mich.App. 525, 531, 593 N.W.2d 190 (1999). We review the probate court's factual findings for clear error and its dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion. Id. A “court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id.
On appeal, respondent asserts that the probate court erred by granting petitioner's claim of exempt property. The gravamen of respondent's arguments is that a decedent may—through a provision that expressly disinherits a child under a will—eliminate an adult child's claim to exempt property under MCL 700.2404
when there is no surviving spouse. On the facts of this case, we disagree and conclude that the disinheriting language in the decedent's will did not eliminate petitioner's statutory right to exempt property under MCL 700.2404.
This is an issue of first impression under Michigan law, which requires this Court to interpret
in the context of EPIC.2 We restated the following principles of statutory interpretation in Book–Gilbert v. Greenleaf, 302 Mich.App. 538, 541–542, 840 N.W.2d 743 (2013) :
The judiciary's objective when interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. First, the court examines the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent, the language of the statute itself. When construing statutory language, [the court] must read the statute as a whole and in its grammatical context, giving each and every word its plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined. Effect must be given to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and the court must avoid a construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted. Generally, when language is included in one section of a statute but omitted from another section, it is presumed that the drafters acted intentionally and purposely in their inclusion or exclusion. The courts may not read into the statute a requirement that the Legislature has seen fit to omit. When the Legislature fails to address a concern in the statute with a specific provision, the courts cannot insert a provision simply because it would have been wise of the Legislature to do so to effect the statute's purpose. Statutes that address the same subject matter or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read collectively as one law, even when there is no reference to one another. [Quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original.]
delineates specific rules of construction that should be applied when interpreting EPIC:
pertains to exempt property. It states:
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