In re Jason T., 3164.
Decision Date | 22 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 3164.,3164. |
Citation | 340 S.C. 455,531 S.E.2d 544 |
Parties | In the Interest of JASON T., a minor under the age of seventeen (17), Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda H. Haile, of SC Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Holman C. Gossett, of Spartanburg, for respondent. HEARN, Chief Judge:
Jason T. appeals, asserting the family court was without jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to receiving stolen goods. We agree and vacate.1
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
While outside his school's gym, Jason observed another juvenile stealing a coat and jewelry from a car. The other juvenile gave Jason the coat, presumably to ensure his silence. Jason was later seen wearing the coat.
An assistant solicitor filed a juvenile petition charging Jason with petit larceny. When Jason appeared before the family court, however, he pled guilty to receiving stolen goods.
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Jason's appellate counsel filed an appeal and a petition to be relieved as counsel. This court denied counsel's petition to be relieved and ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept Jason's guilty plea.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Jason contends the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate him delinquent on the charge of receiving stolen goods when the juvenile petition charged him with petit larceny. We agree.2
In a court of general sessions,3 with the exception of certain minor offenses, the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea unless there is an indictment sufficiently stating the offense, there is a waiver of indictment, or the charge pled to is a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998). Any waiver of presentment must be in writing. See Summerall v. State, 278 S.C. 255, 294 S.E.2d 344 (1982)
; see also S.C.Code Ann. §§ 17-23-130 to -140 (1985).
For an indictment to be valid, it must state the offense with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer. Carter, 329 S.C. at 362-3, 495 S.E.2d at 777. This requirement that a defendant receive notice of the charges against him is rooted in due process. See State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 456, 290 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1982),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69 n. 5, 406 S.E.2d 315, 329 n. 5 (1991).
These same due process concerns extend to juvenile proceedings. Our supreme court has held that the fairness and due process requirements that ensure an adult criminal defendant will receive sufficient notice of the charges against him also apply to juvenile matters. In re Corey B., 291 S.C. 108, 109-10, 352 S.E.2d 470 (1987) ( ); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-33, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)
( ); In re Arisha K.S., 331 S.C. 288, 293, 501 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct.App.1998) ().
Based on the due process protections governing juvenile proceedings and the exemplary procedure employed in courts of general sessions to preserve adults' due process rights, we now hold that a family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent for a charge not alleged in the juvenile petition unless the adjudication is for a lesser included offense or there has been a written waiver of notice.4 Consequently, the notice requirement is not satisfied by merely serving notice of a delinquency proceeding without notifying the juvenile and his parents of the charges to be considered at the family court hearing. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428
. To hold otherwise would violate a juvenile's due process right to notice. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428 ( ); In re Corey B., 291 S.C. at 109-10, 352 S.E.2d at 470.
In the present case, Jason appeared before the family court on a petition charging him with petit larceny. However, Jason pled guilty to receiving stolen goods. There is no indication in the record that Jason or his parents waived his right to notice. Furthermore, receiving stolen goods is not a lesser included offense of petit larceny. See State v. Martin, 278 S.C. 256 n. 1, 294 S.E.2d 345 n. 1 (1982)
(. ) Therefore, the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept Jason's guilty plea and adjudicate him delinquent for receiving stolen goods.
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