In re Jayden G.

Decision Date16 July 2013
Docket NumberSept. Term, 2012.,No. 84,84
Citation433 Md. 50,70 A.3d 276
PartiesIn re ADOPTION/Guardianship OF JAYDEN G.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nenutzka C. Villamar, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Ann M. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD) for Respondents.

Cherie J. Jones (The Legal Aid Bureau Inc., Riverdale, MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J.,*HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD JJ.

ADKINS, J.

There is a presumption in our parental rights' jurisprudence that a continuation of the parental relationship is in a child's best interests. Yet, again, in this case, the child and the parent pursue antagonistic goals. The mother argues her parental rights should not have been terminated, while the child seeks adoption by his foster parents, with whom he has lived three quarters of his life.

To be sure, this case presents an unusual situation. After the child spent twenty-seven months in foster care without progress by his parents toward reunification, or a consistently active involvement by other relatives, the court decided it was time to pursue a plan of adoption by non-relatives. This order—changing the permanency plan to adoption—triggered the filing of the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) petition. The mother, however, appealed the plan change and sought a stay of the TPR case. She succeeded on appeal but not on the motion to stay. As a result, by the time the Court of Special Appeals ruled in the mother's favor on the plan change, her parental rights had been terminated.

She argues the court should not have terminated her parental rights while her appeal of the permanency plan change was pending. But whether to stay a TPR case is within the juvenile court's discretion. In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion because a stay would not have been in this child's best interests. Nor did the court err when—in terminating parental rights—it took into account the child's attachment to his foster parents.

BACKGROUND

At the heart of this case is a five-year-old boy, Jayden G., born on September 26, 2007. Surrounding him, in the context of this case, are his two older siblings—Daeshawn E. and Victoria G.; and three adults—Jayden's mother, Jennifer S.; his father, Justin G.; 1 and Jayden's paternal grandmother, Darlene G. We will refer to Ms. S. as the Mother,” Mr. G. as the Father,” and Darlene G. as the “Grandmother.”

On February 17, 2009, the three children were found to be Children in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) and placed in foster care. Daeshawn and Victoria went to live in one foster home, while Jayden was placed in another. The Department worked long and hard toward the children's reunification with the Mother or the Father. When it became clear, however, that reunification was not likely, the juvenile court ordered a plan of adoption by a non-relative for Jayden and granted limited guardianship over Daeshawn and Victoria to the Grandmother. The Mother appealed the plan of adoption, but while the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights. The Mother's appeal of Jayden's plan change, however, was successful. This is somewhat of an anomalous result: the Mother won her CINA appeal, but only after her parental rights had been terminated.

The CINA and TPR Statutes

Two intricately connected, yet separate legal mechanisms, come into play in this case. CINA proceedings are governed by sections 3–801 through 3–830 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), and TPR proceedings are governed by sections 5–313 through 5–328 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). Before we delve into the facts and the procedural history of the case, we give a brief overview of this statutory framework.

CINA Proceedings

When a local department of social services receives a complaint of child abuse or neglect, it is required by statute to file a petition with the juvenile court for a determination of whether the child is CINA. CJP §§ 3–801(f), 3–809(a). If the allegations turn out to be true, and the child is committed to an out-of-home placement, the court must hold a hearing to determine a “permanency plan” for the child. CJP § 3–823(b)(1). We explained in In re Damon M. that a permanency plan “sets the tone for the parties and the court and “provides the goal toward which [they] are committed to work.” 362 Md. 429, 436, 765 A.2d 624, 627 (2001). In this regard, the permanency plan is “an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to expedite the movement of Maryland's children from foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangement.” Id.

There are five permanency plans to choose from “in descending order of priority:” (1) reunification with a parent or guardian; (2) placement with relatives for adoption, custody, or guardianship; (3) adoption by a non-relative; (4) custody or guardianship by a non-relative; or (5) another planned permanent living arrangement. CJP § 3–823(e)(1)(i). In determining which plan would be in the “best interests of the child,” courts consider the child's emotional, developmental, and educational needs. See CJP § 3–823(e)(2); FL § 5–525(f)(1).

After the initial permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court is required to review the permanency plan at least every six months. CJP § 3–823(h)(1). At those review hearings, the court makes findings as to “the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the commitment,” “whether reasonable efforts have been made to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect,” and “the extent of progress that has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating commitment.” CJP § 3–823(h)(2). The court must [c]hange the permanency plan if a change ... would be in the child's best interest,” and must be cognizant of the statutory requirement that [e]very reasonable effort ... be made to effectuate a permanent placement for the child within 24 months after the date of initial placement.” CJP § 3–823(h)(2) (vi) & (h)(3).

The TPR

Many CINA cases do not end with reunification with a parent. But even if “it is determined that reunification is not possible and that adoption is in the child's best interests, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to finalize this plan.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 106, 642 A.2d 201, 205 (1994) (citing In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235, 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980)). [U]nless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is required to petition the circuit court for guardianship pursuant to F.L. § 5–313.” Id.

To obtain guardianship, the local department files a TPR petition, which “seek [s] to terminate the existing parental relationship and transfer to itself, hopefully for re-transfer to an adoptive family, the parental rights that emanate from that relationship.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 496, 937 A.2d 177, 188–89 (2007). Like with the permanency plan considerations in the CINA context, in ruling on a TPR petition, the juvenile court is guided by the child's best interest. Compare CJP § 3–823(e), with FL § 5–323(d).

The CINA Journey of Jayden and His Siblings and the TPR

Three separate CINA cases overlap in this case: Jayden's, Daeshawn's, and Victoria's. There was also a TPR proceeding, which resulted in the termination of the Mother's parental rights to Jayden. Then, there were two appeals with respect to Jayden: one of the permanency plan change and the other of the TPR proceeding. We examine this complex procedural history below, focusing on the facts pertinent to this appeal and saving some details for the analysis section.

How Jayden and His Siblings Became CINA

The involvement of the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”) in the lives of Jayden and his older siblings began in May of 2008. At that time, the Mother requested and was granted a protective order against the Father, “alleging that [he] had punched and kicked her, and jabbed a car key into her leg,” and “had put a cutter to her throat, stating that he wanted to kill her.” These allegations prompted the Department to open an investigation to determine whether the children were receiving proper care and attention.2

On January 30, 2009, while the Department's investigation was ongoing, Montgomery County police received phone messages from the Mother, in which she stated that the Father “was trying to poison her and her children were trying to communicate with her by underlining certain sentences in certain books.” The next day, while staying at the Betty Ann Krahnke Center, the Mother jumped out of a window, claiming they were after me.” She was later found in the woods behind the Center by the police. After that incident, she was placed in the psychiatric unit at Washington Adventist Hospital.

On February 2, 2009, the Department met with the Mother at the hospital to discuss possible placement options for the children. The Mother “adamantly requested that the children not be placed with [the Father or the Grandmother],” alleging that they “had been trying to poison her.” She suggested two relative placement options, neither one of which was acceptable, however.3 With no viable family placement options, the Department placed the children in shelter care and filed CINA petitions.

The CINA petition involving Jayden was heard on February 17, 2009 by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as Juvenile Court. Based on the facts stipulated by the parties, in which the Mother and the Father agreed that they were unable or unwilling to care for Jayden, the court found Jayden to be a Child in Need of Assistance. Specifically, the court stated that “it is not currently possible to return the child to the home of the Mother because she is unable to give the Child proper care and attention, and the...

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