In re JB

• Decision Date: 24 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 93453.,93453.
• Citation: In re JB, 789 N.E.2d 1259, 204 Ill.2d 382, 273 Ill.Dec. 827 (Ill. 2003)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: In re J.B. et al., Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Wanda B., Appellant).

789 N.E.2d 1259

204 Ill.2d 382

273 Ill.Dec. 827

In re J.B. et al., Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Wanda B., Appellant).

No. 93453.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 24, 2003.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Evelyn G. Baniewicz, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Grauer Kisicki and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Patrick T. Murphy, Charles Perez Golbert, Deborah Pergament, Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, Chicago, for appellee minors.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Cook County found that the respondent, Wanda B. (mother), was an unfit parent based on section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)). As amended, this section creates a presumption that a parent is unfit based on a conviction for any of the specified crimes. The mother had previously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child, one of the listed crimes. The circuit court subsequently terminated the mother's parental rights. She appealed but failed to seek a stay of enforcement of the termination order. While the appeal was pending, the children were adopted. More than a year after the entry of the children's final adoption orders, the appellate court filed its judgment affirming the termination order. 328 Ill.App.3d 175, 262 Ill.Dec. 485, 765 N.E.2d 1093.

In this appeal, the mother raises constitutional challenges to amended section 1(D)(q), but prior to reaching these issues, we must consider the threshold issue of whether her appeal is moot pursuant to our recent decisions in In re Tekela, 202 Ill.2d 282, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002), and In re India B., 202 Ill.2d 522, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224 (2002). We hold that it is and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 1992, the mother pleaded guilty to aggravated battery of one of her children and was sentenced to 70 days' imprisonment, receiving credit for the time she had already served. Subsequently, in March 1993 and March 1995, she gave birth to the two children at issue in this appeal, J.B. and T.B., who were taken into state custody shortly after birth and were later adjudicated wards of the court. In 1998, the court entered permanency orders setting the goal of substitute care for the children, pending a decision on the termination of parental rights, and the State filed supplemental petitions to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to their adoptions.

The State then sought summary judgment on the issue of the mother's fitness based on amended section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)) because she had previously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child. The amendment took effect after the mother's conviction, and, in her answer, she challenged the amended section's retroactive application and constitutionality. The circuit court granted the State's motion, finding that the retroactive application of the amended statute was proper because the mother's interest in her children was not an absolute vested right. Applying the amended statute, the trial court found the mother unfit as a matter of law. On August 10, 1999, the mother's parental rights were terminated following a best interests hearing. The mother filed a timely notice of appeal but did not seek to stay the enforcement of the termination order in either the circuit court or the appellate court.

On February 26, 2002, the appellate court affirmed, finding that the amended statute could be applied retroactively and did not violate the mother's due process and equal protection rights. The mother then sought leave to appeal to this court, but she did not raise the issue of retroactivity. After her petition was granted, the public guardian reported that J.B. and T.B. had been adopted by their foster parents on December 17, 1999, and February 9, 2000, respectively.

Prior to filing its brief, the State, joined by the public guardian, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot based on this court's decision in In re Tekela, 202 Ill.2d 282, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002). A petition for rehearing was pending in Tekela when the State filed its motion, and the motion was denied.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State reiterates the argument that this court should not address the merit of the mother's claims because the appeal is moot. Thus, the threshold question before us is whether we may decide the issues raised in this appeal on their merits in light of our recent holdings in In re Tekela, 202 Ill.2d 282, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002), and In re India B., 202 Ill.2d 522, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224 (2002).

In Tekela, 202 Ill.2d at 296,269 Ill.Dec. 119,780 N.E.2d 304, this court held that the filing of a notice of appeal does not act as a stay of an order terminating parental rights. We reasoned that after the passage of the one-year period to challenge an adoption in section 20b of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/20b (West 1998)) any challenge to the validity of a termination order would be rendered moot since our ruling could have no practical effect on the controversy or the parties' rights in the matter before the court. Tekela, 202 Ill.2d at 292-93, 269 Ill.Dec. 119,780 N.E.2d 304. See also In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill.2d 362, 364, 238 Ill.Dec. 124, 710 N.E.2d 1226 (1999).

Similarly, in this case the mother did not seek a stay of the termination order, and the adoption orders had been in place for far more than one year before the appellate court filed its decision. Applying the rationale in Tekela, 202 Ill.2d at 292, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304, to this case, the mother's challenges to the termination order were moot at the time the appellate judgment was filed and remain moot in this court.

Initially, the mother argues that Tekela is inapplicable because it did not involve a constitutional challenge. We disagree. This court recently applied the reasoning in Tekela to dismiss as moot an appeal of a termination order challenged on constitutional grounds. India B., 202 Ill.2d at 544, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224.

In India B., the mother was barred from presenting either a defense or further pleadings because she failed to appear at her parental fitness hearing. On appeal, she maintained that the sanction violated her constitutional rights to due process and counsel. She also argued that if her appeal was deemed moot, this court should apply an exception to the mootness doctrine.

In this case, the mother claims that this court may hear her appeal under only one such exception, the public interest exception. This exception was also raised by the mother in India B. In that case, we explained that the public interest exception is applicable only if it is clearly shown that: (1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative decision to provide future guidance; and (3) the situation is likely to recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 395, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). In rejecting the mother's argument in India B., we noted that the exception must be narrowly construed and each of its criteria must be clearly established. India B., 202 Ill.2d at 543, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224. We concluded that the case did not meet those "rigid standards." India B., 202 Ill.2d at 543, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224.

We declined the mother's invitation to apply the public interest exception in India B. because there were no conflicting precedents requiring authoritative resolution. India B., 202 Ill.2d at 543, 270 Ill. Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224. Here, the mother cites no conflicting case law requiring authoritative resolution. Since we are confronted with the same scenario as in India B., we are compelled to apply the same rationale. The exception is inapplicable in this case because at least one of the criteria for the public interest exception is absent. India B., 202 Ill.2d at 543, 270 Ill.Dec. 30, 782 N.E.2d 224.

The mother, however, raises additional arguments refuting the applicability of the India B. rationale. She briefly argues that the State may not rely on our mootness holding in that case because it did not previously raise the one-year statutory limitations period on contesting adoptions in this case. This argument ignores the basic principles that questions affecting a court's authority to hear a given controversy may be raised at any time (see In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill.2d 188, 192-93, 237 Ill.Dec. 755, 710 N.E.2d 385 (1999)) and that reviewing courts have a duty to raise such issues sua sponte if they are not raised by the parties (Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 182 Ill.2d 234, 238, 230 Ill.Dec. 954, 695 N.E.2d 444 (1998)). We reject the mother's waiver argument. The mother next attempts to distinguish her appeal from India B. because, in that case, this court observed that the respondent was unlikely to be subjected to the same penalty a second time. We note that this contention addresses the third prong of the public interest exception, the likelihood of recurrence. We need not address this claim because, pursuant to our rationale in India B., we have already determined that this case fails to satisfy another prong of the public interest exception. Unless a case meets the "rigid standard" requiring each element of a mootness exception to be clearly established, the exception is inapplicable. See India B.,202 Ill.2d at 543,270 Ill.Dec. 30,782 N.E.2d 224.

Although the mother explicitly acknowledges that this case may be procedurally similar to Tekela and India B., she maintains that it is substantively...