In re Jefferson
Decision Date | 25 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. S07G1208.,S07G1208. |
Citation | 283 Ga. 216,657 S.E.2d 830 |
Parties | In re Sherri JEFFERSON. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Sherri J. Jefferson, Riverdale, pro se.
Stephen D. Kelley, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Charles Callison Olson, Prosecuting Attys. Counsel of Ga., for appellee.
Carl P. Greenberg, Metro Conflict Defender, Atlanta, Rhonda Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Jimmonique R.S. Rodgers, Ga. Public Defender Standards Council, Atlanta, amicus appellant.
In In re Jefferson, 284 Ga.App. 877, 645 S.E.2d 349 (2007), the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split opinion a criminal contempt adjudication rendered in Glynn County Juvenile Court against attorney Sherri Jefferson arising from statements she made while representing a minor client in a delinquency proceeding. We granted certiorari to clarify the proper standard for determining whether a lawyer's comments during trial constitute contempt of court. Having set forth that standard below, we now vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings.
On August 9, 2005, Jefferson appeared in the last of a series of delinquency hearings in Glynn County Juvenile Court on behalf of a minor client, B.W. B.W. was charged as a party to the crime of aggravated battery and related offenses in connection with a shooting in which B.W. was alleged to have supplied the weapon and "egged on" the shooter. The record reflects that Jefferson repeatedly challenged the trial court's rulings upholding the prosecutor's hearsay objections to questions Jefferson posed regarding the contents of statements the alleged shooter made to police. At the conclusion of the August 9 hearing, B.W. was adjudicated delinquent, and a dispositional hearing was set for August 15, 2005.
At the end of the August 15 hearing, the trial judge issued a Notice of Contempt and Show Cause Order charging Jefferson with contempt, citing eight instances of allegedly contemptuous conduct during the course of the delinquency proceedings, including inappropriate facial expressions, disrespectful tone of voice, and improper statements. Soon thereafter, the trial judge recused himself, and another judge was designated to hear the contempt citation. The contempt hearing was held on February 14, 2006, at which Jefferson was represented by both a public defender and a local attorney. After hearing testimony from Jefferson and reviewing the transcript from the delinquency proceedings, the judge found two of the eight statements in question to have been contemptuous on the basis that the statements impugned, disparaged, and attacked the impartiality of the court and thereby undermined its authority, respect, and dignity. Jefferson was sentenced to a total of 30 days' imprisonment in the Glynn County Jail (10 days for the former statement and 20 days consecutive for the latter) and a $500 fine.
The Georgia Constitution provides that "[e]ach court may exercise such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, § 1, Par. 4. Premised on this constitutional foundation, this Court has long held that the contempt power is inherent in every court and, as such, is not subject to abridgement or restriction by the Legislature. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168 (1, 2), 36 S.E. 630 (1900). Although there do exist various statutory provisions purporting to define the parameters of contempt, "[t]he broad authority of a judge to preserve good order in the courtroom by the use of contempt power is well recognized and must be preserved if the courts are to perform their public duty." Garland v. State of Georgia, 253 Ga. 789, 791(2), 325 S.E.2d 131 (1985).1
We have previously held that statements by counsel may be found contemptuous where they pose a Garland, supra, 253 Ga. at 790(2), 325 S.E.2d 131. Both the majority and the dissent below relied on the "clear and present danger" language in Garland, supra, but they disagreed on whether this standard was actually met. In re Jefferson, supra, 284 Ga.App. at 880(2), 881, 645 S.E.2d 349 (Bernes, J., dissenting). The fractured result is unsurprising given the variable outcomes in prior reported cases in this State. Compare White v. State of Georgia, 218 Ga. 290(2), 127 S.E.2d 668 (b, c) (218 Ga. 290, 127 S.E.2d 668) (1962) (affirming contempt conviction for "ill-chosen" remark and comment implying counsel questioned judge's impartiality); Crudup v. State of Georgia, 106 Ga.App. 833(2), 129 S.E.2d 183 (1962) ( ); Salem v. State of Georgia, 101 Ga.App. 905(5), 115 S.E.2d 447 (1960) ( ); White v. State of Georgia, 71 Ga.App. 512, 31 S.E.2d 78 (1944) ( ), with Calhoun v. Findley, 168 Ga.App. 634, 636-637, 309 S.E.2d 907 (1983) ( ); In re McLarty, 152 Ga.App. 399 (2, 4), 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979) ( ).2
Not only does the "clear and present danger" standard lead to inconsistent results, its focus on balancing the need for courtroom order with the attorney's right to free expression fails, in the context of courtroom advocacy, to adequately consider the represented party's rights to counsel and due process of law, the raison d'etre of such advocacy. See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962) ( ). We therefore deem it necessary to articulate a more complete standard for contempt in the context of courtroom advocacy. At the outset, we note that "[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201(II), 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). "Like all crimes, contempt has an act requirement (actus reus) and a mental component (mens rea)." Ronald J. Rychlak, Direct Criminal Contempt and the Trial Attorney: Constitutional Limitations on the Contempt Power, 14 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 243, 265 (Fall 1990). Thus, we find it useful to examine these two elements separately.
As to the "act" element, our extensive examination of the law of contempt reveals some debate regarding the extent to which a contempt finding requires proof of some actual interference with a litigant's ability to receive a fair trial or actual obstruction of the judge's ability to administer justice. The federal courts and some state jurisdictions purport to require actual obstruction, see, e.g., In re McConnell, supra, 370 U.S. at 234, 82 S.Ct. 1288 ( ); State v. Harper, 297 S.C. 257, 376 S.E.2d 272 (S.C., 1989) ( contempt conviction because no obstruction); Hawthorne v. State, 611 So.2d 436 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ( ), while other states require a mere imminent threat to the administration of justice. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Kitchen, 128 Ohio App.3d 335, 714 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1998) () ; State of West Virginia v. Boyd, 166 W.Va. 690, 276 S.E.2d 829, 832-833 (1981) (). However, as one observer has noted, in practice,
there may be no meaningful distinction between an actual obstruction, as defined by the federal courts, and an imminent threat of obstruction, because even an actual obstruction rarely consists of a consummated harm. If we limit definition of actual obstruction to harms such as physical disruptions of a trial, or misconduct actually affecting the trial's outcome or requiring a mistrial, we could clearly distinguish between an actual interference with justice and the imminent threat of such interference. However, the definition of obstruction, as presently and properly applied by those jurisdictions using it, is not so limited. Rather, the actual obstruction standard responds, in relation to advocacy, for the most part, to the probabilities of harm befalling the administration of justice from conduct such as disrespect, failure to heed an order to stop argument, and the revelation of improper information to the jury.
Raveson, Part One, supra, 65 Wash. L.Rev. at 517. Thus, in recognition of the blurred and perhaps nonexistent distinction in the context of courtroom advocacy between a so-called "actual" obstruction and the "imminent threat" of one, we are persuaded that the "imminent threat" standard is the more cogent approach to defining the "act" element of contempt.
Regarding the "intent" element, some courts have purported to require a finding that the attorney actually intended the offending statements to be obstructive, or at least knew that the statements would have an obstructive effect. See, e.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1971). This approach is problematic because of the difficulty in proving an attorney's subjective ill intent when the contemnor can almost always argue that the offending statements were...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. Pace
... ... No. SC 90425 ... Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc ... May 11, 2010. 313 S.W.3d 125 COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED 313 S.W.3d 126 Bruce Galloway, Daniel Brogdon, Bruce Galloway LLC, Ozark, for Petitioner ... Timothy Anderson, Jefferson City, Thomas W. Cline, Gainesville, for respondents ... Talmage E. Newton IV, Evans & Dixon LLC, St. Louis, for Missouri Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ... Anthony E. Rothert, St. Louis, for ACLU of Eastern Missouri ... Stephen D ... ...
-
In re Johnson
... ... is not just administrative; it is a ruling that has substantive consequences for the contemnor, which may include ... incarceration, as well as collateral consequences such as professional discipline.").4 See generally In re Jefferson , 283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008) (articulating a more complete standard for contempt in the context of courtroom advocacy).5 See footnote 2, supra.6 Specifically, in his motion, Johnson quoted language from Mondy , 303 Ga. at 777 (4), 815 S.E.2d 70 : "Assuming [the appellant's] motion to recuse ... ...
-
Hillman v. ALDI, Inc.
... ... Accordingly, in that case, we vacate the order of contempt and remand for reconsideration and, if warranted, entry of a new contempt order that complies with the requirements set forth in In re Jefferson , 283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008). On appeal from a judgment entered on a jury's verdict, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict. Smith v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. , 337 Ga. App. 604, 605, 788 S.E.2d 508 (2016). So construed, the relevant facts are set forth ... ...
-
In re Hatfield
... ... 19. Supra ... 20. Supra ... 21. Maples, supra at 203(2), 299 S.E.2d 906 (punctuation omitted), citing Dowdy ... 22. Maples, supra (punctuation omitted), citing Dowdy ... 23. Supra, 215 Ga.App. at 374-377(1), 450 S.E.2d 851 ... 24. See Maples, supra ... 25. See generally In re Jefferson, ___ Ga. ___, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008) (reviewing prior cases and then enunciating a more complete standard for adjudication of attorney contempt in context of courtroom advocacy); compare Crute v. Crute, 86 Ga.App. 96, 98, 70 S.E.2d 727 (1952) (discretion of superior court judges in all matters ... ...
-
9 Contempt
...or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy." [In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 SE2d 830 (2008)]. 3. Factors to consider in considering contempt from courtroom advocacy: a. extent to which the attorney was put on noti......
-
9 Contempt
...or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy." [In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 SE2d 830 (2008)]. 3. Factors to consider in considering contempt from courtroom advocacy: a. extent to which the attorney was put on noti......
-
Legal Ethics - Patrick Emery Longan
...Morris v. State, 295 Ga. App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (2009); Wilson v. McNeely, 295 Ga. App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (2008). 180. In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008). 181. Wilson, 295 Ga. App. at 43, 670 S.E.2d at 848. 182. See id. at 43-44, 670 S.E.2d at 848. 183. Id. at 44, 670 S.......
-
9 Contempt
...or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy." [In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 SE2d 830 (2008)]. 3. Factors to consider in considering contempt from courtroom advocacy: a. extent to which the attorney was put on noti......