In re Jeisean M.

Decision Date27 July 2004
Docket Number(SC 17012).
Citation852 A.2d 643,270 Conn. 382
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesIN RE JEISEAN M.[*]

Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

William S. Bingham, for the appellant (respondent mother).

Michael J. Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom were Eliot D. Prescott, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Elisabeth Borrino, for the minor child.

Shelley A. White, Claudine Siegel and Royal Stark filed a brief for the Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

The respondent mother1 appeals from the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights with respect to her son, Jeisean M.2 She contends that in light of this court's decision in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431 (2002), General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)3 is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the present case under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. She also contends that the trial court improperly found, in its February 15, 2002 memorandum of decision, clear and convincing evidence sufficient to conclude that she had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation and that terminating her parental rights was in the child's best interest. In addition, she claims that: (1) the trial court violated her due process rights by finding, on May 17, 2001, that efforts to reunify the respondent and Jeisean were no longer appropriate; (2) the trial court, in its February 15, 2002 memorandum of decision, improperly took judicial notice of the May 17, 2001 finding; (3) the trial court's May 17, 2001 order to extend Jeisean's commitment amounted to an unconstitutional summary proceeding because there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the respondent had notice of the proceeding and because she did not know that she was not represented by counsel and she was not informed of the proceeding's gravity; and (4) the trial court, at the May 17, 2001 hearing, failed to assess Jeisean's best interest, as required by General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (2). Finally, the respondent contends that General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) §§ 17a-111b and 46b-129 (k) (2), regarding the propriety of efforts to reunify the parent and child, are facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case because the statutes, at the time of the May 17, 2001 hearing, did not include a requirement that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that efforts to reunify her with Jeisean were no longer appropriate.4 We reject these claims and affirm the trial court's judgment.

The record reveals the following procedural history and facts. On July 24, 2001, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner) filed a petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights. The following evidence was presented at trial on November 26 and December 13, 2001. Jeisean, who was born December 3, 1999, is the respondent's only child. Following Jeisean's birth, the respondent lived with her sister in New Britain and relied on both her sister and her aunt to assist her in caring for Jeisean. On the evening of March 14, 2000, the respondent left Jeisean in her aunt's care. The respondent did not return that evening, however, and also failed to return the following morning. On the morning of March 15, Jeisean became congested and experienced difficulty breathing. The aunt telephoned the department of children and families (department) to obtain help for Jeisean because she was unable to bring him to the hospital and was unsure of the respondent's whereabouts. The department sent Wanda Milledge, a department investigator, to the aunt's home, and the child was treated at a hospital. Later that day, the respondent informed Milledge that "her head wasn't straight" because she had recently ingested illicit drugs. More specifically, the respondent stated that she had not returned to her aunt's house on the evening of March 14 or the morning of March 15 because she had "pass[ed] out" after ingesting Ecstasy. On March 15, the commissioner exercised a ninety-six hour administrative hold over Jeisean. See General Statutes § 17a-101g. On March 17, the court granted an order of temporary custody and placed Jeisean in emergency foster care. See General Statutes § 46b-129 (b). On March 24, 2000, the trial court, pursuant to § 46b-129 (e), sustained the order of temporary custody when the respondent failed to appear at the hearing. On April 14, Jeisean was placed in a licensed foster care home, where he has remained throughout the pendency of this action.

On April 16, 2000, the department provided the respondent with an intern to assist and encourage her in meeting with service providers. The respondent failed to take advantage of this assistance and missed several appointments, which she later failed to reschedule.

The respondent also was assigned a social worker, Elisa Warga, who, on the respondent's behalf, made several referrals to treatment and counseling organizations, including Catholic Family Services, the Institute for Hispanic Families, and the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center. Although Warga advised the respondent repeatedly that her cooperation during treatment and counseling was necessary for her to be reunited with Jeisean, the respondent did not cooperate with these programs.

Catholic Family Services attempted to assist the respondent from May, 2000, through September, 2000, but it reported that the respondent had put minimal effort into her treatment and recovery and had missed four sessions out of ten. The report also indicated that on three occasions—June 2, June 9 and August 28, 2000she had tested positive for marijuana. When Warga confronted her with these reports, the respondent became angry, cursed at Warga, accused her of lying, and indicated that she would no longer listen to her.

On June 11, 2000, Warga referred the respondent to the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center. On that date, the respondent submitted a urine sample that tested positive for marijuana. She never attended the program because she stated that it was located too far away from her residence in Springfield, Massachusetts.

On June 20, 2000, the trial court concluded that Jeisean was uncared for and required specialized care and ordered him committed to the custody of the commissioner through June 20, 2001. See General Statutes § 46b-129 (j). In response to the allegations, the respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere pursuant to § 46b-129 (d) (5). In addition, the court ordered specific steps to facilitate the respondent's reunification with Jeisean. The court ordered the respondent to keep all appointments set by the department, to participate in parenting and individual counseling toward certified treatment goals, to submit to substance abuse assessment and to follow recommendations for treatment, to submit to random drug testing, to secure and maintain adequate housing and income, to visit the child as permitted and to discontinue her substance abuse.

On October 11, 2000, Warga referred the respondent to the Institute for Hispanic Families (institute). The respondent was uncooperative at the institute as well. She was discharged for noncompliance after she tested positive for marijuana and phencyclidine, and failed to attend several counseling sessions despite efforts by the institute and Warga to help her to attend the sessions. The institute's discharge summary indicated that the respondent's status and symptoms had not changed, and the institute concluded that she still needed treatment.

The respondent completed a parenting class at the family preservation program at Child and Family Services of Pioneer Valley in Springfield. Donna Heap, a coordinator of the family preservation program, testified during the trial on the commissioner's petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights that the respondent was an active participant in the class and that she had attended nine out of ten sessions during the fall of 2001. She earned a certificate of completion in the class, which focused on parenting and other skills relevant to caring for a child under the age of twelve.

The respondent also initiated a substance abuse treatment program at the Gandara Mental Health Center (Gandara) in Springfield. The respondent's progress at this program, however, was inconclusive. A Gandara report indicated that the respondent missed a session on December 3, 2001. Although she tested negative for illegal substances on December 7, the respondent represented inconsistently the extent of her drug use. For example, the respondent claimed to have been sober for two years, but that claim was clearly inconsistent with the evidence introduced regarding her substance abuse record at other treatment facilities. The Gandara report also indicated that the respondent may have been depressed and included the respondent's admissions that she had experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.

The department ordered the respondent to keep it informed of her location, but she failed to comply. Although she had informed Warga that she was residing with her father in New Britain, the respondent did not notify Warga when she moved to a friend's home in Hartford. She subsequently informed Warga that she had returned to live with her father, but unannounced visits revealed that she was not in fact residing there. At the time of trial, the respondent was living with another woman in Springfield, but she had not demonstrated an ability to maintain her own apartment or to live independently.

The respondent also failed to secure and maintain adequate income, as ordered by the trial court on June 20, 2000....

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    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
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    ...could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 397, 852 A.2d 643 (2004). Nor do we substitute a party's "speculative inferences . . . for the contrary finding[s] of the trial court." State v. ......
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