In re Jewell's Estate

Decision Date19 February 1912
Docket Number310
Citation83 A. 610,235 Pa. 119
PartiesJewell's Estate
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued January 11, 1912

Appeal, No. 310, Jan. T., 1911, by Claudius Buchanan Jewell et al., from decree of O.C. Phila. Co., Jan. T., 1911, No 19, dismissing appeal from collateral tax appraisement in Estate of Leonard Jewell, deceased. Affirmed.

Appeal from collateral tax appraisement. Before LAMORELLE, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Error assigned was decree dismissing the appeal.

The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Court below is affirmed.

E. O Michener, for appellant. -- It is submitted that the law as it existed at the time of the death of the testator in 1876 should govern this case: Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa. 72; Com. v. Smith, 20 Pa. 100; Com. v. Eckert, 53 Pa. 102; Mellon's App., 114 Pa. 564; Commonwealth's App., 127 Pa. 435; Commonwealth's App., 128 Pa. 603.

The Act of 1887, as to its third section, if it does attempt to alter the law as it existed prior to its passage, as to estates in which the collateral inheritance tax had already accrued and could be paid, is unconstitutional in that the title does not give any notice of any such intention nor is it broad enough to cover any such action of the legislature: Com. v. Hazen, 207 Pa. 52; Potter County Water Co. v. Austin Boro., 206 Pa. 297; Com. v. Kemort, 212 Pa. 289; Brown's Estate, 152 Pa. 401; Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. 573.

In re Hancock St., 1 W.N.C. 112; Commonwealth v. Nihil, 4 Pa. D.R. 582; Barnes v. Phila., &c., R.R. Co., 27 Pa.Super. 84; Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. 55; Gackenbach v. Lehigh County, 166 Pa. 448; Payne v. Coudersport Borough School District, 168 Pa. 386; In re Otto Township Road, 181 Pa. 390; Weiss v. Swift & Co., 36 Pa.Super. 376.

J. Lee Patton, for appellee. -- The act of 1887 controls: Coxe's Estate, 193 Pa. 100; Strode v. Com., 52 Pa. 181; Mellon's App., 114 Pa. 564.

The act is constitutional: Campbell's Registration, 197 Pa. 581; Phoenixville Borough Road, 106 Pa. 44; Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. 433; Allegheny County Home, 77 Pa. 77; Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa.Super. Ct. 5; Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa.Super. Ct. 362; Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pa.Super. Ct. 162.

Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MOSCHZISKER:

The testator died in 1876, owning certain real estate in the city of Philadelphia which he devised to a daughter for life with remainder over; the life-tenant died in 1910. The questions are, (1) Must the remaindermen pay collateral inheritance taxes on the value of their estates in this property as of 1876 plus interest at six per cent., or on its value at the time they entered into possession in 1910? (2) Is the Act of May 6, 1887, P.L. 79, unconstitutional because of defect in title?

The third section of the statute in question reads as follows: "In all cases where there has been or shall be a devise, descent or bequest to collateral relatives or strangers, liable to the collateral inheritance tax, to take effect in possession, or come into actual enjoyment after the expiration of one or more life-estates, or a period of years, the tax on such estate shall not be payable, nor interest begin to run thereon, until the person or persons liable for the same shall come into actual possession of such estate, by the termination of the estates for life or years, and the tax shall be assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of possession accrues to the owner as aforesaid: Provided, That the owner shall have the right to pay the tax at any time prior to his coming into possession, and, in such cases, the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the time of the payment of the tax, after deducting the value of the life-estate or estates for years: And provided further, That the tax on real estate shall remain a lien on the real estate on which the same is chargeable until paid . . . ."

The Act was before this Court in Coxe's Estate, 193 Pa. 100, and after quoting its third section, we said (p. 105): "It is desirable . . . to consider the plain meaning of the foregoing words . . . The act says, 'The tax on such estate shall not be payable, nor interest begin to run thereon, until the person or persons liable for the same shall come into actual possession of such estate.' If the tax shall not be payable until that event it does not arise, it has no beginning, and hence the Commonwealth has no title to it and cannot demand its payment until the estate itself 'comes into actual possession' of the person entitled. And such coming into actual possession must be 'by the termination of the estates for life or years.' And again, in the same direction, it is positively provided that, 'the tax shall be assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of possession accrued to the owner aforesaid.' That is, although the estate in remainder may have had a definite value at the time of the death of the testator . . ., it is not that valuation that is to be the test of the tax, but the valuation of the estate at the time it comes into possession. This is the plain, actual, common-sense meaning of the words we are considering, and this meaning is not at all impaired by the language of the proviso . . .: 'Provided that the owner shall have the right to pay the tax at any time prior to his coming into possession, and in such cases the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the time of the payment of the tax, after deducting the value of the life-estate or estates for years . . .' (p. 111). We are clearly of the opinion that the tax . . . will not become due and payable until (after the expiration of the life estates) . . ., and that it is the value of the property as it will then appear to be, that must constitute the basis upon which the tax must be declared."

After considering all the prior legislation and the numerous cases called to our attention in the most excellent paper-book of counsel for the appellant, we are not convinced of any error in the construction placed upon the Act of 1887 in the case just referred to. It is true that in Coxe's Estate, the decedent died after the Act of 1887, but the statute by its express terms applies not only to future devises, but also to those...

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