In re Jibb
| Decision Date | 26 April 1937 |
| Citation | 191 A. 552 |
| Parties | In re JIBB et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Court of Chancery |
Proceeding in the matter of Robert E. Jibb and George E. Stupalsky, charged with contempt.
Respondent George E. Stupalsky found guilty of contempt. Milton M. Unger, of Newark, requested by the court to prosecute the petition and order. Norbury C. Murray, of Newark, for defendant Stupalsky.
STEIN, Vice Chancellor.
The respondent, Robert E. Jibb, being without the jurisdiction of the court and therefore not served with the petition and order to show cause, the hearing on the return of the order to show cause was proceeded with against the respondent, George E. Stupalsky, alone.
The situation which gave rise to the petition to hold the respondent in contempt is substantially this: A bill of complaint supported by affidavit was filed on August 20, 1934, alleging mismanagement, fraud, and insolvency, and praying for the appointment of a receiver for the National Finance Corporation of America. The respondents, Jibb and Stupalsky, were respectively president and vice president of the defendant corporation. An order to show cause was issued and served, and upon the return thereof, Jibb and Stupalsky jointly made an affidavit on behalf of the corporation which, as appears from the opinion of the court (Panzer v. National Finance Corporation, 117 N.J.Eq. 231, 175 A. 188), moved the court to decline the appointment of a receiver.
It is deemed unnecessary to set forth in detail all of the charges made in the petition and the proof before the court to sustain the same. Suffice it to say that the petitioners, Charles Robinson and Israel Greene, the receivers of National Finance Corporation of America, allege that after the aforementioned bill of complaint for the appointment of a receiver for the company was filed and the appointment of a custodial receiver denied, and pending final hearing on the bill of complaint, a supplemental bill of complaint was filed on November 26, 1935, whereupon the petitioners were appointed as receivers.
Entering upon the duties of their office, petitioners charge that assets of more than $300,000 which existed at the time the original order to show cause was dismissed, had been dissipated with the exception of an interest in an equity resulting from the discount of the company's small loans (in which small loan business it was engaged), leaving practically no assets. Further, the petitioners allege that the records, books, and minutes of the company upon examination by them revealed the fact that material statements made in the answering affidavit of respondents were untrue in fact and that such statements were "wilfully and corruptly" made to mislead the court, "and impede, hinder, and delay the administration of justice."
Specifically, one of the allegations in the original bill of complaint was that the capital of the company was impaired as a result of excessive dividend payments. This charge was met by the respondents in their joint answering affidavit by the statement that "All dividends which have been paid have come out of the surplus or net earnings of the company and never out of capital or the appropriated surplus." The evidence shows that this statement was untrue to the knowledge of respondents, and that dividends, as a matter of fact, had been paid out of capital. The corporate minutes of the company show that its capital was reduced in order to avoid further impairment of capital.
Another allegation in the original bill of complaint was that Jibb and Stupalsky sold on subscription contracts and for cash, more than $1,000,000 face value of National's securities to the public through companies in which the respondents were financially interested in violation of their fiduciary duties as officers and directors, and that respondents profited by participating in commissions paid as a result of such sales. This, respondents denied in their affidavit thus: ...
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Kerr S.S. Co., Inc. v. Westhoff
...and whenever defendant's deliberate and unjustifiable acts offend the court within the intendment of the rules and statute. In re Jibb, 121 N.J.Eq. 531, 191 A. 552, rev'd on other grounds 123 N.J.Eq. 251, 197 A. 12 (N.J.Err. & App.1937); In re Caruba, 139 N.J.Eq. 404, 51 A.2d 446, aff'd 140......
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Franklin v. Franklin.
... ... 1341.It is universally established that the power to punish for contempt is inherently necessary to enable courts to preserve their own dignity and to administer justice. State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 A. 1057, 125 Am.St.Rep. 141, 13 Ann.Cas. 501; In re Jibb, 121 N.J.Eq. 531, 191 A. 552.Contempt presupposes and order of a court of competent jurisdiction, since an adjudication of contempt may be predicated only on contumacious disregard of some writ, precept, decree, order or command. In re Roberts, 133 N.J.Eq. 122, 30 A.2d 900. And contempts have been ... ...
- In re Jibb