In re John C.M.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 4-07-1030.,4-07-1030.
• Citation: 382 Ill. App.3d 553,904 N.E.2d 50
• Parties: In re JOHN C.M., Alleged to be a Neglected Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ashleigh Meginnes, Respondent-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

904 N.E.2d 50

382 Ill. App.3d 553

In re JOHN C.M., Alleged to be a Neglected Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ashleigh Meginnes, Respondent-Appellant).

No. 4-07-1030.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

May 12, 2008.

Adele M. Saaf, Bloomington, for appellant.

William A. Yoder, State's Attorney, Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

Justice MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 2007, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of respondent, Ashleigh Meginnes's son, John C.M. (born December 14, 2005), alleging he was abused. In August 2007, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding John to be neglected and placed him in the custody of his father, Alan Carter. On November 13, 2007, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit. The court found Carter fit, placed John in Carter's custody, and closed the case. Carter is not a party to this appeal.

Respondent appeals, contending (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed at the dispositional hearing, which took place more than six months after John was removed from respondent's home; the court's dispositional order finding her unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding Carter fit. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of February 5, 2007, respondent took John to his pediatrician. John had bruising to the back of his head, extending from ear to ear. Respondent told the pediatrician that she placed John in bed the previous night at approximately 8 or 8:30 p.m. On February 5, at approximately noon, respondent asked Andrew Mack, her then paramour, to wake John and change his diaper, at which time the bruising was discovered. Respondent and Mack denied causing the injury. Respondent could provide no explanation to the pediatrician as to how John sustained the injuries. The pediatrician referred John to BroMenn Hospital in Bloomington, Illinois. John was immediately transferred to St. Francis Hospital in Peoria, where a computerized tomography (CT) scan showed a subdural hematoma to the brain.

On February 13, 2007, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was abused, in that respondent or someone she entrusted inflicted on him physical injury by other than accidental means, which caused disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss of impairment of any bodily function, in that John had bruising and swelling across the back of his head from ear to ear with no plausible explanation for the injury (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2066)), and (2) John was neglected in that he was residing in an environment injurious to his welfare as respondent had unresolved issues of domestic violence creating a risk of harm for John (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (1)(b) (West 2006)).

On February 14, 2007, a shelter-care hearing was held. The trial court found probable cause that John was abused as respondent had (1) no plausible explanation for the bruising and swelling to John's head and (2) unresolved issues of domestic violence. A temporary custody order was issued placing guardianship of John with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). John was placed by DCFS with Carter, who lived apart from and was not involved in a current relationship with respondent. Respondent had no prior involvement with DCFS and a law-enforcement-agencies-data-system (LEADS) check was negative. Carter had no prior involvement with DCFS, but a LEADS check was positive for residential burglary-criminal trespass to a residence in 2005, and the manufacture or delivery of cannabis in 2002.

Respondent's paramour, Mack, had no prior involvement with DCFS, but he had several charges with no convictions for assault and drug possession. Two of those assault charges involved respondent.

At a pretrial hearing on March 15, 2007, all parties waived the requirement that the adjudicatory hearing be held within 90 days of the child being taken into custody. Additional pretrial hearings were held in April and May.

In August 2007, the State amended the petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was neglected and residing in an environment injurious to his welfare in that he suffered injuries to his head, (2) respondent acknowledged she was the primary caretaker for the minor, and (3) respondent had no plausible explanation consistent with the medical evidence to explain the injuries (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (1)(b) (West 2006)). On August 2, 2007, the adjudicatory hearing was held. Respondent admitted the allegation in the amended petition, and the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding John neglected. At the adjudicatory hearing, the parties waived the right to hold the dispositional hearing within 30 days of the adjudicatory hearing. The dispositional hearing was scheduled for September 12, 2007.

On October 17, 2007, the State filed a notice that the dispositional hearing had been reset for November 13, 2007. Nothing in the record indicates why the dispositional hearing was continued from September 12 to November 13, 2007, or whether it was agreed to by respondent.

In November 2007, DCFS filed a dispositional report that recommended guardianship of John be placed with Carter, the court find respondent unfit and Carter fit, and the case be closed. In the dispositional report, DCFS outlined the parties' progress with service plans. Respondent's goals included the following: (1) successful completion of domestic-violence assessment and counseling, (2) maintenance of stable housing for herself and John, (3) counseling, (4) successful completion of parenting classes, and (5) obtaining and maintaining employment. As part of her domestic-violence assessment, respondent reported a history of domestic violence in her relationship with Carter, including that Carter physically abused her and was manipulative and controlling. While respondent was cooperative with services and deemed to have achieved or was satisfactory in her service-plan goals with the exception of housing, the report stated respondent did not seem to understand or apply the lessons from counseling as represented by her relationship with Mack. At the time of the dispositional report, respondent no longer resided with Mack but was living with Michael Barnes, a new paramour.

Carter's goals included the following: (1) successful completion of outpatient treatment for drugs and alcohol, (2) cooperation with DCFS, and (3) successful completion of parenting classes. No domestic-violence or anger-management goals were established for Carter. Carter was cooperative with services, and he was deemed to have achieved all of his service-plan goals. John was reported as having adjusted well to living with Carter.

A psychological evaluation of respondent was conducted, and the report was filed with the court as part of the service plan. The psychologist, Joel Eckert, noted that the alleged perpetrator remained unknown and that caused him great concern as to respondent's ability to protect John or any other child from abusive or nonnurturing men. Eckert recommended that if John were returned to respondent's care, it be done slowly and be monitored to ensure "such a process proceeds safely."

On November 13, 2007, a dispositional hearing was held. Respondent did not object to proceeding with the hearing. At the hearing, the State recommended that respondent be found unfit, Carter be found fit, the minor remain in Carter's custody, and the court close its file on the matter without proceeding to a best-interests hearing. Respondent requested the court keep the file open for additional time to prove her fitness to parent. The trial court denied respondent's request for additional time to prove her fitness, entered an order finding respondent unfit, found Carter fit, and granted custody and guardianship of John to Carter. The court closed the file.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Trial Court Had Subject-Matter Jurisdiction at the Dispositional Hearing

1. Requirements of Statutory Scheme Limit Time To Hold Dispositional Hearing to Six Months

Respondent argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition as more than six months elapsed after the removal of the minor from respondent's home, and as such, the trial court's order was void. The temporary custody order was entered on February 14, 2007, the adjudicatory hearing was held August 2, 2007, and the dispositional hearing was held November 13, 2007. Respondent argues that because section 2-22(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2006)) limits the time to hold a dispositional hearing to a maximum of six months after removal of the minor from the home, the court was required to hold the dispositional hearing no later than August 14, 2007.

Under the Act, the adjudicatory hearing must be commenced within 90 days of the date of service upon the minor, parents, or guardian. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2006). Upon motion of the parties and a finding by the trial court that a continuance is in the child's best interests, the adjudicatory hearing may be continued for up to 30 days. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 2006). There is no question that the parties waived the 90-day time period to hold the adjudicatory hearing and the court found it in the child's best interests to do so, although the hearing was continued for more than 30 days. Respondent did not object to the adjudicatory hearing being continued for more than 30 days.

The dispositional hearing must be set within 30 days after an adjudicatory order is entered. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2006). By consent of the parties and with approval of the court consistent with the health, safety and best interests...