In re Jorge M

Citation4 P.3d 297,23 Cal.4th 866,98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466
Decision Date31 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. S074270.,S074270.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
PartiesIn re JORGE M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jorge M, Defendant and Appellant.

J. Courtney Shevelson, Carmel, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Lorraine L. Loder, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Benenson & Kates, Don B. Kates, San Pedro; Trutanich Michel, CD. Michel, San Pedro; Stephen P. Halbrook, Fairfax, VA; Law Offices of Donald E.J. Kilmer and Donald E.J. Kilmer, Jr., San Jose, for International Wound Ballistics Association, Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Eugene J. Wolberg and Dwight Van Horn as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Sanjay T. Kumar, John R Gorey and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Jorge M, a minor, was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court and ordered into a juvenile camp program, in part because he was found to have been in possession of an assault weapon, in violation of Penal Code 1 section 12280, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 12280(b)). The Court of Appeal reversed that finding on the ground the record contained insufficient evidence the minor knew the firearm had the characteristics bringing it within the definition of an assault weapon under the Assault Weapons Control Act (§§ 12275-12290 (hereafter the AWCA)), a mental element the Court of Appeal found implicit in section 12280(b) despite the absence of any express scienter language in the statute itself.

We agree with the Court of Appeal that section 12280(b), an alternative felony/misdemeanor punishable by up to three years in state prison (see §§ 17, subd. (b), 18), was not intended to define a strict liability offense. We disagree, however, that actual knowledge regarding the firearm's prohibited characteristics is required. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the public safety goals of the AWCA. Effective enforcement of that law demands, instead, that a conviction be obtainable upon proof of negligent failure to know, as well as actual knowledge of, the weapon's salient characteristics; the People must prove, that is, that a defendant charged with possessing an unregistered assault weapon knew or reasonably should haveknown the characteristics of the weapon bringing it within the registration requirements of the AWCA. Because the record of this case contains sufficient evidence to prove the requisite mens rea, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 5, 1996, while the 16year-old minor was on in-home probation for possession of a controlled substance, law enforcement officers conducted a probation investigation at the minor's home. The main room of the house had bunk beds in one corner; a door led off this main room to the minor's parents' bedroom. Probation Officer Brian Tsubokawa asked the minor where he kept his personal possessions. The minor pointed to the bunk bed area in the main room. Los Angeles Police Department Officer Manuel Ramirez went to the bunk bed and found three rifles on the top bunk, which the minor told Officer Ramirez was his bed. On a clothes cabinet three feet or less from the minor's bed, Officer Ramirez also found an unregistered SKS-45 semiautomatic rifle with a detachable "banana clip" magazine.

The present petition was then filed against the minor under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, charging him with possession of an assault weapon (§ 12280(b)) and with firearm possession in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation (§ 12021, subd. (d)).

At the adjudication hearing, the officers testified as described above. The minor testified he slept on the floor of his sisters' bedroom and that the weapons belonged to his father. He denied ever "playing" with the weapons. The minor's brother testified that all the rifles belonged to him and his father, not to the minor. He said that he slept on the top bunk bed and that the minor slept in a bedroom used by their sisters. The minor's mother corroborated the brother's account.

The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true. The minor was adjudged a ward of the court and placed in a camp community placement program for a period not to exceed three years and eight months. The maximum period of confinement was calculated as follows: three years for the violation of section 12280(b); three years, stayed pursuant to section 654, for the violation of section 12021; and eight months, consecutive, for the drug possession charge for which the minor was on probation at the time of the current offenses.

The Court of Appeal reversed the section 12280(b) finding for insufficient evidence. Relying heavily on the persuasive authority of Staples v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (Staples ), in which the United States Supreme Court held conviction under a federal firearms possession law required proof the defendant knew the features of the gun that brought it within the criminal prohibition, and People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271 (Simon), in which this court held conviction under a law proscribing the sale or purchase of securities by misrepresentation required proof the defendant knew or should have known the false or misleading nature of the representation, the Court of Appeal held that conviction under section 12280(b) requires proof the defendant "knew that the weapon possessed characteristics which brought it within the statutory definition of an assault weapon." The Court of Appeal, without elaborating the point, further asserted there was "no evidence" of such knowledge in this case.

We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.

Discussion

The AWCA, inter alia, requires registration of assault weapons, sets time periods for such registration, prohibits the possession of unregistered assault weapons, restricts the circumstances under which even registered assault weapons may be possessed (including a prohibition on their possession by minors) and allows exceptions to these restrictions by permit on good cause shown. (§§ 12280, 12285, 12286.) At the time of the minor's charged offense, the restricted firearms included only those defined as assault weapons in section 12276 and those declared to be assault weapons pursuant to section 12276.5.2 The definition in section 12276, subdivisions (a) through (c), consists of a list, one item of which is "SKS with detachable magazine." (§ 12276, subd. (a)(11).) The question on review, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeal correctly held that the finding the minor possessed an unregistered assault weapon, in violation of section 12280(b), required proof the minor knew the weapon was an SKS with a detachable magazine.3 To answer that question we must decide whether knowledge of the characteristics bringing a firearm within the AWCA is an element of section 12280(b)'s bar on possession.

Section 12280(b) provides in pertinent part: "[A]ny person who, within this state, possesses any assault weapon, except as provided in this chapter, is guilty of a public offense and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail, not exceeding one year."

That the statute contains no reference to knowledge or other language of mens rea is not itself dispositive. As we recently explained, the requirement that, for a criminal conviction, the prosecution prove some form of guilty intent, knowledge, or criminal negligence is of such long standing and so fundamental to our criminal law that penal statutes will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it. "Generally,'"[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." ...' (People v. Simon[, supra,]

9 Cal.4th 493, 519,

37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278,

886 P.2d 1271, citations omitted.) In other words, there must be a union of act and wrongful intent, or criminal negligence. (Pen.Code, § 20; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, 299 P.2d 850.) `So basic is this requirement that it is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication.' (People v. Vogel, supra, at p. 801, 299 P.2d 850, fn. omitted.)" (People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 876, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970.)

Equally well recognized, however, is that for certain types of penal laws, often referred to as public welfare offenses, the Legislature does not intend that any proof of scienter or wrongful intent be necessary for conviction. "Such offenses generally are based upon the violation of statutes which are purely regulatory in nature and involve widespread injury to the public. (People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1057-1058, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348.) `Under many statutes enacted for the protection of the public health and safety, e.g., traffic and food and drug regulations, criminal sanctions are relied upon even if there is no wrongful intent. These offenses usually involve light penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to reputation. Although criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation rather than punishment or correction. The offenses are not crimes in the orthodox sense, and wrongful intent is not required in the interest of enforcement.' (People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 801, fn. 2, 299 P.2d 850.)" (People v. Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 876-877, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970.)

Whether section 12280(b) can properly be categorized as...

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