In re K.N.
Decision Date | 24 January 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 110A19,110A19 |
Citation | 373 N.C. 274,837 S.E.2d 861 |
Parties | In the MATTER OF: K.N. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Mercedes O. Chut, Greensboro, for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.
K&L Gates, LLP, Charlotte, by Erica Hicks for Guardian ad Litem.
Jeffrey William Gillette for respondent-appellant father.
In this case, we consider whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of respondent-father (respondent) to K.N. ("Keith")1 on the basis of neglect. Because we conclude that the findings in the trial court's order are insufficient to support a determination that respondent had neglected Keith, we vacate the termination order and remand this case to the District Court, Guilford County, for further proceedings.
Respondent and "Maria"2 are the biological parents of Keith, who was born on 17 September 2016. On or about 26 December 2016, the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received a report that Keith's parents were involved in a verbal dispute during which respondent claimed Maria was attempting to suffocate the child. Maria accused respondent of being intoxicated and holding onto Keith "too tightly" while they argued. Both Maria and Keith were taken to the hospital, but no injuries were discovered to either of them. Maria reported that respondent's relatives had "jumped" her the previous night and also disclosed several incidents of domestic violence between her and respondent.
On 10 January 2017, a safety plan with DHHS was updated and, as part of that plan, Maria agreed to keep Keith in a safe environment. However, on or about 29 January 2017, she violated the safety plan by returning to her mother's residence, which DHHS considered unsafe due to prior involvement with Child Protective Services and a history of domestic violence between Maria, her mother, and her brother. On 6 February 2017, DHHS obtained nonsecure custody of Keith and filed a juvenile petition in District Court, Guilford County, alleging that Keith was a neglected and dependent juvenile.
On 28 August 2017, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Keith to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. Pursuant to a case plan entered into with DHHS, respondent was ordered to participate in an anger management evaluation and follow all recommendations. He was allowed weekly visitations with Keith. Respondent was also ordered to comply with his case plan, which required him, among other things, to (1) secure and maintain appropriate housing suitable for Keith and to notify DHHS accordingly; (2) provide verification of his Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits; (3) participate in and successfully complete the Parent Assessment Training and Education (PATE) program; (4) submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations; (5) participate in the Domestic Violence Intervention Program (DVIP); (6) notify DHHS of any incidents of domestic violence; (7) comply with the terms of his probation; and (8) refrain from incurring any new criminal charges. Keith remained in DHHS custody.
On 14 November 2017, the trial court entered a permanency planning hearing order. The court found that respondent was living in a boarding house and was on probation for thirty months, effective January 2017. He had completed a parenting evaluation but refused to engage in individual counseling—despite having received a recommendation to do so—due to the cost of the sessions. He had successfully completed the Treatment Accountability for Safer Communities (TASC) substance abuse program.
The trial court further found that respondent had indicated that he would take part in anger management classes, but then refused to participate in the DVIP program because "he had not been ... charged as an abuser." As a result of his failure to "actively engage in his case plan," the court determined that respondent was "acting in a manner inconsistent with the health and safety of the juvenile." The trial court ordered that the permanent plan be reunification with a concurrent secondary plan of adoption.
The trial court entered a subsequent permanency planning hearing order on 5 February 2018. The court found that respondent was living in a location unsuitable for Keith and was continuing to refuse to participate in individual parenting counseling due to cost. Although he completed anger management classes, he had attended only one DVIP class and remained uninterested in the program. The trial court changed the primary permanent plan to adoption with a concurrent secondary permanent plan of reunification. DHHS was ordered to proceed with filing a petition for termination of respondent's parental rights within sixty days.
On 15 March 2018, DHHS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2).3 The termination hearing was conducted on 27 and 28 November 2018. On 7 January 2019, the trial court entered an order finding that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights on the basis that respondent had neglected Keith and that such neglect was likely to recur if the juvenile was returned to respondent. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).4 The trial court also determined that the termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of Keith. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Respondent gave notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1).
On appeal, respondent contends that (1) the trial court made various findings of fact that were not supported by the evidence; and (2) the court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion that Keith was neglected pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for the termination of parental rights—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2017). During the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" the existence of one or more grounds for termination pursuant to subsection 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f) (2017).
If a trial court finds that a ground exists for termination, it then proceeds to the dispositional stage at which it must "determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).
We review a trial court's adjudicatory findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 "to determine whether [they] are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law." In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984). "The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal." In re C.B.C. , 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (N.C. 2019) ( ).
In its termination order, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact in support of its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) :
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