In re Keenan
| Decision Date | 14 September 1943 |
| Citation | 314 Mass. 544,50 N.E.2d 785 |
| Parties | In re KEENAN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding in the matter of the petition of Wilfred B. Keenan that he be readmitted to practice as an attorney at law in the courts of the commonwealth after being previcusly disbarred. To review an order of the superior court reinstating petitioner, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, the Bar Association of the City of Boston, and the Massachusetts Bar Association filed separate informations which by order of the Supreme Judicial Court were consolidated, and the case is before the court on the entire record and all papers filed in superior court and the evidence there taken.
Order reinstating petitioner annulled.
See, also, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12.
Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, and COX, JJ.
R. T. Bushnell, Atty. Gen., and W. B. Luther, Sp. Ass't. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
E. O. Proctor, of Boston, for Bar Ass'n of City of Boston.
M. A. Shattuck, of Boston, for Massachusetts Bar Ass'n.
F. L. Simpson, of Boston, for respondent.
Wilfred B. Keenan was disbarred by a judgment entered by a single justice of this court on October 19, 1934, after the rescript in Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65, 96 A.L.R. 679. On December 28, 1939, he filed in the Superior Court a petition wherein, as later amended, he prayed that he be admitted to practice as an attorney at law in the courts of the Commonwealth. We held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction of petition to readmit Keenan to the practice of law notwithstanding the fact that he had been previously disbarred by this court. In re Keenan, Petitioner, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516, 137 A.L.R. 766. Thereafter his petition for readmission was heard at length in the Superior Court and was opposed by the Bar Association of the City of Boston. On December 31, 1941, the Superior Court ordered Keenan reinstated to the office of attorney at law in the courts of the Commonwealth. In May, 1942, three separate informations were respectively offered for filing in this court sitting for the Commonwealth by the Attorney General, the Bar Association of the City of Boston, and the Massachusetts Bar Association. Each information called the attention of this court to the situation created by Keenan's reinstatement by the Superior Court and to the question whether a mistake had been made affecting public confidence in the administration of justice. On June 24, 1942, we ordered that the informations be received and entered; that Keenan appear and plead to them; and that upon completion of the pleadings the three informations and the pleadings be presented to the full court for the determination of all issues raised not involving the actual trial of issues of fact. Upon the coming in of the pleadings we held that the informations presented substantial questions worthy of judicial inquiry, and that inquiry should be made by this court into the action of the Superior Court in reinstating the respondent, and for that purpose we ordered that the three informations be consolidated, and that the entire record and all papers filed in the Superior Court and the evidence there taken be transmitted to this court. Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12. The record, papers, and evidence are now before us for inquiry into all questions of law and fact and for such action thereon as we deem appropriate. Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 222, 47 N.E.2d 12.
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as is the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a pecular privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it. To those who acquire and who retain the necessary qualifications is granted a monopoly of the honors and emoluments of a profession which more than any other is public in its nature and intimately connected with the highest functions of the State. Such a monopoly in a quasi public occupation is in no sense promoted and fostered for the personal advantage of individuals. It can be justified only on the ground that long experience has shown it to be absolutely essential to the public welfare. All this is familiar enough. It is adverted to here only for the purpose of emphasizing at the outset that in deciding a case of this kind considerations of public welfare are wholly dominant. The question is not whether the respondent has been ‘punished’ enough. To make that the test would be to give undue weight to his private interests, whereas the true test must always be the public welfare. Where any clash of interest occurs, whatever is good for the individual must give way to whatever tends to the security and advancement of public justice.
The public aspects of this case cannot be fully apprehended without noticing its unusual history and background before entering upon a discussion of the offense for which the respondent was disbarred and of the evidence which has been thought sufficient to justify his reinstatement. On December 1, 1931, a petition was filed in this court on behalf of a committee of citizens of the Commonwealth alleging, in substance, that abuses and unprofessional conduct on the part of members of the bar in connection with actions of tort for personal injuries and property damage were creating a widespread belief that unprofessional conduct was common among members of the bar in such cases, and that such abuses were seriously shaking public confidence in the administration of justice. The prayer of the petition was for an inquiry to the end that the court might be informed and might take such action as it should deem expedient ‘in the interest of the public welfare.’ The court ordered an inquiry and appointed commissioners for the purpose, who investigated and held many hearings, and who have filed in all fifty reports during a period of about ten years in relation to various attorneys. As a result of the inquiry brought about at the instance of the committee of citizens and of reports of the commissioners nineteen attorneys, some of whom were prominent in trial work, have been disbarred by this court for different offences, and several other attorneys have been disciplined in ways short of complete disbarment. See Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65, 96 A.L.R. 679;Matter of Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 165, 3 N.E.2d 248, 105 A.L.R. 976. Necessarily the activities of the commissioners and the...
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Brown, In re
...imprisonment involve moral turpitude." Much these same thoughts were expressed in another reinstatement case, In re Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 548-49, 50 N.E.2d 785, 787-88 (1943), where the attorney had been disbarred for bribing a "It is difficult to conceive of any offense that could strike ......
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Hiss, In re
...serious that the attorney committing them can never again satisfy the court that he has become trustworthy' (Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 548--549, 50 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1943); see, e.g., Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 219, 47 N.E.2d 12 (1943); Centracchio, petitioner, 345 Mass. 342, 34......
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In re Curry
...of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156, 448 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 55, 429 N.E.2d 1150 (1982); Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 547, 50 N.E.2d 785 (1943). Without the public's trust that lawyers and judges act in good faith and strictly within the bounds of our laws and p......
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Prager, Matter of
...the true test must always be the public welfare." Matter of Allen, supra at 421, 509 N.E.2d 1158, quoting Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 547, 50 N.E.2d 785 (1943) (Keenan II ). A prior conviction is not an absolute bar to admission. We have stated that no offense is so grave as to preclud......
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Opinions
...are so serious that an 'attorney committing them can never again satisfy the court that he has become trustworthy,' Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 548-549 [1943] [it is] recognized that offense "is so grave that a disbarred attorney is automatically precluded from attempting to demonstrat......