In re Keller
Citation | 642 F.2d 413 |
Decision Date | 12 February 1981 |
Docket Number | Appeal No. 80-573. |
Parties | In re John W. KELLER, Jr., Reese S. Terry, Jr., and Gomer L. Davies. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Henry D. Pahl, Jr., Boston, Mass., Gilbert H. Hennessey, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., Patent & Trademark Office, Thomas E. Lynch, Washington, D. C., of counsel.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER, and NIES, Judges.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) in reissue application serial No. 865,610, filed December 29, 1977,1 for "Digital Counter Driven Pacer." Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9-16 ( ) stand rejected on the ground of a defective reissue declaration, and claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9-11, 13, and 14 are rejected on the ground of obviousness in view of the following references:
Claim 12 is allowable over the art of record but is objected to on the ground that the claim depends from a rejected claim. Claims 15 and 16 are allowable over the art of record.2 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9-163 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 251 on the ground that the declaration made by applicant to support the reissue application does not particularly specify the prior art being brought to the attention of the examiner as required by 37 CFR 1.175(a)(4), does not particularly specify the errors relied upon by applicant and how the errors arose as required by 37 CFR 1.175(a)(5), and does not state that the errors arose "without any deceptive intention" on the part of applicant as required by 37 CFR 1.175(a)(6).4
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 are rejected as unpatentable in view of Keller taken with Walsh. Claims 1 and 2 are further rejected as unpatentable in view of Berkovits taken with Walsh. The statutory basis of these rejections is 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The claimed invention is a cardiac pacer having a digital counter.
As background, the specification explains:
Summarizing the invention, the specification states:
A block diagram of a cardiac pacer, according to the present invention, appears below:
The specification indicates that if the pacer is to operate in the demand mode in a particular patient, an output electrode implanted in the patient's heart at a location suitable for stimulating ventricular contractions is connected to output terminal 6 of the pacer. If the pacer is to operate in the synchronous mode in a particular patient, an output electrode implanted in the patient's heart at a location suitable for stimulating ventricular contractions is connected to output terminal 9 of the pacer.
According to the specification, for demand mode operation an input electrode implanted to detect ventricular signals of the patient's heart is connected to input terminal 10 of the pacer. For synchronous mode operation, an input electrode implanted to detect atrium signals of the patient's heart is connected to the input terminal 10. "Cardiac signals applied to the input terminal 10 are amplified and shaped by means of an amplifier 11 so as to be squared into waveforms suitable for use with digital circuitry, as is understood by those skilled in the art."
The timing of the different events occurring in the operation of appellant's pacer is provided by a digital counter 3.
In describing operation of the pacer in the demand mode, the specification states that:
... if the patient's heart is beating normally at a rate which is more than the free running rate of the pacer, i. e. about 70 beats per minute, and not more than twice that rate, i. e. about 140 beats per minute, the counter 3 will be reset to its zero count by each natural heartbeat before a count of 511 is reached. Thus, the patient's heart will not be stimulated at all if it is beating spontaneously within this 2-to-1 range of rates. However, if no spontaneous heartbeat is detected between count 256 and count 511, the pacer will then stimulate the patient's heart at the end of the full count period, that is, after a period which corresponds to the 70 pulse per second free running rate. In other words, the difference between the starting point count and the end of the counting sequence establishes a maximum interval between heartbeats. Accordingly, if the spontaneous heart signals disappear intermittently, the pacer will integrate its operation with the normal heartbeat.
In describing operation of the pacer in the synchronous mode, the specification states:
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