In re KG, No. 49A04-0205-JV-239.

Docket NºNo. 49A04-0205-JV-239.
Citation781 N.E.2d 700
Case DateDecember 31, 2002
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

781 N.E.2d 700

In the Matter of K.G., D.G., D.C.B., and J.J.S

No. 49A04-0205-JV-239.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

December 31, 2002.


781 N.E.2d 701
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant

Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellees K.G., D.G., D.C.B., and J.J.S.

Loretta A. Oleksy, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee Child Advocates, Inc.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At various times throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001, the State filed delinquency petitions against K.G., D.G., D.C.B., and J.J.S. On March 19, 2002, the juvenile court issued a single order regarding the children's four separate juvenile cases. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1, which provides procedures for determining the competency of adult criminal defendants

781 N.E.2d 702
to stand trial, the court determined that none of the children were competent and ordered each child to be committed to the division of mental health to be confined in an appropriate psychiatric institution. On March 28, 2002, the Family and Social Services Administration, Division of Mental Health and Addictions ("DMHA") filed a motion to intervene, which the court granted. On April 9, 2002, DMHA filed a motion for relief from judgment. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion. This appeal ensued

ISSUES

DMHA presents three issues for our review:

1. Whether the juvenile court erred when it applied Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1 to juvenile cases.

2. Whether the juvenile court violated the doctrine of separation of powers when it ordered DMHA to provide services to K.G., D.G., D.C.B., and J.J.S.

3. Whether DMHA has the financial responsibility to pay for the costs of the competency-related services.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 1999, the State filed a delinquency petition against D.G. alleging that he committed Child Molesting, as a Class B felony, and Child Molesting, as a Class C felony, when committed by an adult. That same month, D.G. filed his Notice of Insanity Defense and Incompetency to Stand Trial. D.G. underwent a competency evaluation in December 1999, when he was ten years old. At that time, the evaluator reported that D.G. had previously undergone counseling and treatment for sexual misconduct and setting fires. D.G. is mildly mentally handicapped, has attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), and requires constant adult supervision. He was re-evaluated by the same psychologist in September 2000. The psychologist reported that, despite placement at Valle Vista Residential Treatment Center for seven months, D.G. continued to show risks of acting out sexually and starting fires and that he is not competent to stand trial. At some point thereafter, pursuant to a pending Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") action, D.G. was placed at Lutherwood.1

In June 2000, the State filed a delinquency petition against D.C.B., alleging that he committed Arson, a Class B felony, and Conversion, as a Class A misdemeanor, when committed by an adult. D.C.B., who was eleven years old at the time, immediately filed a Motion for Psychiatric Examination to Determine Competence to Stand Trial pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1. He was examined that same month. The competency evaluation showed that D.C.B. suffers from major depression, oppositional defiant disorder, ADHD, and mild mental retardation. The psychiatrist further expressed concern about D.C.B. experiencing possible hallucinations in the past. He also noted a previous diagnosis of autism, but doubted the accuracy of that diagnosis. The psychiatrist concluded that D.C.B. is not competent to stand trial. Like D.G., D.C.B. was eventually placed at Lutherwood pursuant to a CHINS action.

In September 2000, the State filed a delinquency petition against J.J.S., alleging that she had committed Burglary, as a

781 N.E.2d 703
Class B felony, and Theft, as a Class D felony, when committed by an adult. Fourteen-year-old J.J.S. entered into a plea agreement and was placed on probation. In April 2001, the court ordered a competency evaluation. J.J.S. was diagnosed as moderately mentally handicapped and ADHD, with an IQ of 48. Again, the evaluator concluded that she is not competent to stand trial. In January 2002, J.J.S. was admitted to Options Treatment Center

In August 2001, the State filed a delinquency petition against K.G. alleging that he committed Sexual Battery, a Class D felony, when committed by an adult. In September 2001, K.G. filed a Motion for Psychiatric Examination to Determine Competence to Stand Trial pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1. On October 2001, two separate health professionals performed evaluations of K.G. The evaluations submitted to the juvenile court revealed that K.G., then twelve years old, is mildly mentally handicapped, autistic, and has a history of Tourette's Syndrome. K.G. has received psychiatric care for several years. He was diagnosed as bipolar and as having ADHD. K.G. was in special education classes, has an IQ score in the 40's, and a speech problem. At the time of the evaluation, K.G. functioned at the pre-kindergarten level, and it was determined he is not competent to stand trial. In December 2001, the court ordered that K.G. be removed from juvenile detention and placed in the sexual offenders unit at Options Treatment Center.

On March 19, 2002, the court entered an order regarding all four juveniles.2 In the order, the court explained that each juvenile had been examined for competency pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1 and that none were competent to stand trial. Accordingly, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1(b), the court ordered the juveniles committed to the DMHA to be confined in an appropriate psychiatric institution. The court further stated in relevant part:

All of the above Respondents are currently placed out of their homes because of the information available to the Court about their ability to understand and assist in their defenses. The court has delayed issuing its final order under [I.C. § 35-36-3-1] in several cases for a significant period of time, in the hope that the parties, along with the agencies currently or contemplated to be involved with the Respondents, could arrive at an acceptable and appropriate resolution to the placement of the Respondents.
The Court is aware that the division of mental health has acknowledged that it does not currently have available appropriate facilities or programs to meet the mental health needs of these Respondents and therefore placement initially with the division of mental health has not been appropriate. The Court has now determined that time requires that the Court make its order and that the division of mental health will resist any order committing the Respondents to the division of mental health. Since
781 N.E.2d 704
there is an impasse, and this Court will not allow the Respondents to be harmed by their placement in an inappropriate or unacceptable program which will not address their mental health and other needs, the Court makes the following order pursuant to the request of the Respondents regarding their competency. The Court finally notes that the placement will not change from their current placement until and unless this Court, or another Court of competent jurisdiction, determines otherwise. This Court reserves the right to take any action necessary to place the Respondents with the division of mental health in the event that this matter is not addressed in a speedy, appropriate and effective manner.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1. The Court finds that each of the Respondents,..., lack[s] the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of their [sic] respective defenses, as indicated by the reports of the competent, disinterested professionals pursuant to I.C. XX-XX-X-X.
2. The Court therefore orders each of the Respondents committed to the division of mental health, to be confined by the division in an appropriate psychiatric institution.
3. The Court orders that each of the Respondents will remain at their [sic] current placements until ordered otherwise by this Court or another Court of competent jurisdiction, this Court reserving the right to place the Respondents in the custody of the division of mental health if speedy, appropriate and effective action is not taken to respond to this order.

On March 28, 2002, DMHA filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted. DMHA subsequently filed its Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60 and requested that the court vacate its March 19, 2002 order. After a hearing, the court denied DMHA's motion.3 DMHA now appeals the denial of its motion, and the four separate juvenile cases were consolidated for the purposes of this appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

DMHA appeals from the court's denial of its motion for relief from judgment. We review the grant or denial of a Trial Rule 60(B) motion under an abuse of discretion standard. Integrated Home Technologies, Inc. v. Draper, 724 N.E.2d 641, 642 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for relief. Id. However, where, as here, the parties dispute the proper application of a statute, the issue is a pure question of law, which we review de novo. See Chaja v. Smith, 755 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (stating when trial court's legal conclusions rest on application of statute, our review is de novo).

Issue One: Application of Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1 to Juvenile Cases

DMHA asserts that the trial court erred when it invoked Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1

781 N.E.2d 705
to determine if K.G., D.G., D.C.B., and J.J.S. are...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 practice notes
  • Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, No. 71S03-0203-CV-183.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 15, 2003
    ...4, 58 S.Ct. 778. This Court was correct when it held that claims under art. IV, § 23, presented no justiciable issue. Board of Comm'rs of 781 N.E.2d 700 Jennings County v. Fetter, 193 Ind. 288, 296, 139 N.E. 451, 454 (1923); Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868).1. At the time this action wa......
  • In re KG, No. 49S04-0305-JV-225.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • May 20, 2004
    ...The trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. On review the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. In re K.G., 781 N.E.2d 700 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the trial Discussion The trial court proceeded under......
2 cases
  • Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, No. 71S03-0203-CV-183.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 15, 2003
    ...4, 58 S.Ct. 778. This Court was correct when it held that claims under art. IV, § 23, presented no justiciable issue. Board of Comm'rs of 781 N.E.2d 700 Jennings County v. Fetter, 193 Ind. 288, 296, 139 N.E. 451, 454 (1923); Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868).1. At the time this action wa......
  • In re KG, No. 49S04-0305-JV-225.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • May 20, 2004
    ...The trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. On review the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. In re K.G., 781 N.E.2d 700 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the trial Discussion The trial court proceeded under......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT