In re King

• Decision Date: 28 July 1892
• Citation: 51 F. 434
• Parties: In re KING.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

51 F. 434

In re KING.

United States Circuit Court, M.D. Tennessee.

July 28, 1892

G. W Pickle, Atty. Gen., for the State.

W. G Weatherford, J. M. Greer, and W. W. King, for defendant.

JACKSON Circuit Judge.

In the consideration of this application there are a few well-settled general principles which should be borne in the mind. While the writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right being the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty, it will not issue as a matter of course. Section 755, Rev. St., provides that the court to which the application is made shall forthwith award the writ, 'unless it appears from the petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto. ' It was accordingly said by the supreme court in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 301, 9 S.Ct. 77, that 'the writ need not, therefore be awarded, if it appears upon the showing made by the petitioner that if brought into court, and the cause of his confinement inquired into, he would be remanded to prison. ' Although this writ is most frequently resorted to because of what is done or omitted in the administration of the criminal law, the judicial proceeding under it is not to inquire into the criminal act charged against the petitioner, but the inquiry is limited and confined to the petitioner's right to liberty or discharge from custody notwithstanding the act. It is not a proceeding in the prosecution of the offense or crime with which the petitioner is charged or has been convicted. On the contrary, it is a new suit of a civil nature, brought by the petitioner to enforce a civil right of personal freedom, which he claims as against those who are holding him in custody or restraining him of his liberty. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 2 S.Ct. 871.

The petitioner's claim in the present case is that, notwithstanding his trial and conviction of murder in the first degree, under which he is now held in custody by the sheriff of Shelby county, awaiting the execution of the sentence of death, pronounced against him by the highest court of the state, he should be discharged from such custody, and be restored to his liberty, because in said trial and conviction he was denied certain rights, privileges, and immunities guarantied to him by the constitution of the United States, which are specially set forth in his petition, and which, it is claimed, rendered the sentence pronounced against him void, and his imprisonment thereunder unlawful, without reference to his guilt or innocence of the criminal act for which he was tried and convicted. It is well settled by a uniform course of decisions in the supreme court of the United States that the writ of habeas corpus in cases like the present cannot be converted into a writ of error, or be used as a substitute for a writ of error, to review or reverse the judgment of the court pronouncing the sentence complained of for alleged errors of either law or fact committed in the course of the trial. Under the writ of habeas corpus, this court can exercise no appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings of the trial court or courts of the state, nor review their conclusions of law or findings of fact, and pronounce them erroneous. The writ of habeas corpus is not a proceeding for the correction of errors, (Ex parte Lane, 18 Wall. 163; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 375; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 275, 1 S.Ct. 381; Ex parte Carll, 106 U.S. 521, 1 S.Ct. 535; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328, 5 S.Ct. 542; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152; Ex parte Crouch, 112 U.S. 178, 5 S.Ct. 96; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 420, 421, 5 S.Ct. 935; Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, l S.Ct. 734; In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556; In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 S.Ct. 1263; In re Wight, 134 U.S. 136, 10 S.Ct. 487; Stevens v. Fuller, 136 U.S. 478, 10 S.Ct. 911;) the reason or principle upon which this rule is settled being, as stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 182, 9 S.Ct. 672, that a habeas corpus proceeding which impeaches the validity of a judgment or sentence of a court having jurisdiction of the offense and person of the accused is a collateral attack, and as such it is limited to the inquiry, in cases like the present, whether the trial court has acted without jurisdiction, or has exceeded its jurisdiction so as to render its sentence or judgment void. After conviction of crime in the highest court of a state, which the accused claims to have been reached in disregard or violation of rights secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States, two remedies are open to his relief in the federal courts,-- he may take his writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, and in that proceeding have a review of the error alleged to have been committed by the state courts to the prejudice of the rights, privileges, and immunities guarantied him by the constitution and laws of the United States; or he may apply for his discharge from custody under such conviction on the ground that the court or courts pronouncing sentence against him had no jurisdiction of either his person, or of the offense with which he is charged, or had, for some reason, lost or exceeded its jurisdiction, so as to render its judgment a nullity. In this latter proceeding, as already stated, there can be no review of the action or rulings of the state court or courts even upon federal questions, which might be reviewed by the supreme court upon writ of error.

It is also settled that, whether the application for writ of habeas corpus is made before or after conviction in the state court, the circuit court of the United States has a discretion whether the petitioner shall be put to his writ of error to the highest court of the state, or whether he will proceed by writ of habeas corpus summarily to determine whether the party is restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution of the United States. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252, 253, 6 S.Ct. 734; In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573; and In re Wood, 140 U.S. 289, 11 S.Ct. 738. In the latter case the rule announced in Ex parte Royall is reaffirmed, with the additional statement 'that, after the final disposition of the case by the highest court of the state, the circuit court, in its discretion, may put the party who has been denied a right, privilege, or immunity, claimed under the constitution of the United States, to his writ of error from the supreme court, rather than interfere by habeas corpus; and it is there said by the court that these principles have special application, where there is not pretense that the statute or law of the state under which the petitioner was prosecuted is repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States. There is no such claim in the present case. In the consideration of the present application it should also be borne in mind that 'it was not intended by congress that circuit courts of the United States should, by writs of habeas corpus, obstruct the ordinary administration of the criminal laws of the state through its own tribunals. ' In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 738. It is further said by the supreme court in that case that 'it often occurs in the progress of a criminal trial in a state court, proceeding under a statute not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, that the questions occur which involve the construction of that instrument and the determination of rights asserted under it; but that does not justify an interference with its proceedings by a circuit court of the United States upon a writ of habeas corpus, sued out by the accused, either during or after the trial in the state court;' for 'upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, wherever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them;' and 'if they fail therein, and withhold or deny rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of the state, in which the question could be decided, to this court for final and conclusive determination. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 637, 4 S.Ct. 544.'

Testing the present application by the foregoing principles and considerations, should this court, upon the showing made by the petition and accompanying documents, including the transcript of the record in the supreme court of ...