In re Klingshirn
Decision Date | 28 March 1996 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 94-51445. Adv.No. 94-5130. |
Parties | In re Kent M. KLINGSHIRN, Debtor. Kent M. KLINGSHIRN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Sixth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Kathryn Belfance, Akron, OH, for plaintiff.
Michael Davis, Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
This declaratory judgment action is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff-Debtor, Kent Klingshirn (the "Debtor"), and by Defendant, Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). This proceeding arises in a case referred to this Court by the Standing Order of Reference entered in this District on July 16, 1984. It is determined to be a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B) and Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9) over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a) and (b).
On September 15, 1994, the Debtor filed a petition under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Schedule E of the Debtor's petition listed one unsecured, priority debt owing to the IRS in the amount of $52,454.87. Paragraph 2 of the Debtor's Plan indicated that the amount owing to the IRS was disputed and that it would be subject to an objection by the Debtor. The IRS filed a proof of claim1 for $174,923.58 in past due taxes, penalties, and interest (the "Claim")2 that it claimed were owing as of the date the petition was filed.
On November 29, 1994, the Debtor filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment3 requesting that this Court determine that the Claim was barred by the running of the limitations period and that, therefore, the IRS has no viable claim in his pending chapter 13 case. After obtaining an extension, the IRS timely filed its Answer on February 8, 1995 alleging that the statute of limitations for collection of the Debtor's taxes had been tolled by a previous bankruptcy filing and that the Debtor's taxes were therefore still due.
After a pre-trial conference, held on May 10, 1995, it was determined that this matter might be resolved by the filing of dispositive motions. On August 31, 1995, the Debtor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 2, 1995, the IRS filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a response to the Debtor's motion. On November 6, 1995, the Debtor filed a brief in opposition to the IRS' cross-motion and on December 1, 1995, the IRS filed a reply to that document. The matter is now poised for resolution.4
The undisputed, pertinent facts of this case are set forth in the following chronology:
August-November, 1981 Form 9415 taxes assessed against the Debtor for unpaid taxes in the principal amount of $49,014.76 July 11, 1983 Form 9406 taxes assessed against the Debtor for unpaid taxes in the principal amount of $2,354.97 June 25, 1986 The Debtor and IRS executed Tax Collection Waivers7 (the "Waiver") and agreed that the collection period for the aforementioned taxes would be extended to December 31, 1992 and further agreed that "if an offer in compromise is made by the taxpayer(s) on or before the date to which the statutory period has been extended then the time for making any collection will be further extended beyond that date by the number of days ... the offer is pending ..., plus one year." October 21, 1986 The Debtor submitted an Offer in Compromise to IRS June 10, 1987 The Debtor withdrew the Offer in Compromise March 6, 1991 The Debtor filed for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. July 25, 1991 The Debtor received a discharge. December 31, 1992 Original deadline for commencement of IRS collection activity as specified in the Waiver. August 20, 1994 Deadline for commencement of IRS collection activity as extended according to the terms of the Waiver. September 13, 1994 IRS attached the Debtor's checking account for $179,722.87 in taxes, penalties and interest related to the 1981 and 1983 assessments. September 15, 1994 The Debtor filed for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Based upon these undisputed facts the parties disagree as to the appropriate limitations period governing the IRS' collection of taxes.
Section 6502 of the Internal Revenue Code sets forth two alternative time frames in which the IRS may collect taxes from a taxpayer after the taxes have been assessed. That statute states:
26 U.S.C. § 6502 (1989) ( ).8
Both the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code address the potential modification of certain periods of time due to the pendency of a bankruptcy case. Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
11 U.S.C. § 108(c). Section 6503(h) of the Internal Revenue Code states:
26 U.S.C. § 6503(h).9
The IRS contends that 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h) mandates that the limitations period provided for in the Waiver should be lengthened by the time in which the Debtor's prior chapter 7 case was pending, thus extending that period to June 28, 1995. The IRS argues that the time in which it could properly commence collection activities for the Claim was extended, first, by the execution of the Waiver, second, by the submission of an offer in compromise, and finally, by the filing of the Debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h). The IRS thus implicitly argues that, in the terms of 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), this controversy is controlled by "an applicable nonbankruptcy law that fixed a period for commencing . . . a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on the claim against the debtor." See 11 U.S.C. § 108(c).
The Debtor contends that the collection period expired on August 20, 1994, the end of the period specified in the Waiver as lengthened to include the time the offer in compromise was pending plus one year. The Debtor further contends that, because the deadline for commencement of the IRS' collection activity in this case is governed by 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(2) and is not a limitations period addressed § 6502(a)(1), the period of time during the pendency of the Debtor's prior chapter 7 case cannot be "tacked on" to the August 20, 1994 date.
The Debtor attempts to distinguish subsection (a)(1) of 26 U.S.C. § 6502, arguing that it contemplates the passing of a defined period of time, from subsection (a)(2) of 26 U.S.C. § 6502, arguing that it contemplates the passing of a certain date established by agreement, and not a "block of time which may run down." The effect of this distinction, the Debtor argues, is that there can be no extension, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h), of the latter, and therefore the duration of a prior bankruptcy filing cannot be "tacked on" to extend the date certain. As authority for this position, the Debtor relies upon ...
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