In re Knight
| Decision Date | 08 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 97066-1,97066-1 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Amanda Christine KNIGHT, Respondent. |
Robin Khou Sand, Anne Elizabeth Egeler, Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, 930 Tacoma Ave. S. Rm 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171, Prosecuting Attorney Pierce County, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402, for Petitioner(s).
Timothy Kent Ford, Attorney at Law, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1796, for Respondent(s).
James Elliot Lobsenz, Carney Badley Spellman, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of WA Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
¶ 1 In 2010, Amanda Christine Knight and her accomplices ransacked James and Charlene Sanders’1 home, zip-tied them, placed them face down on the floor, stole their wedding rings off their fingers at gunpoint, pistol-whipped Charlene and her son, and shot and killed James Sanders. A jury convicted Knight of multiple crimes, including felony murder in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, and burglary in the first degree. Knight now challenges these convictions under double jeopardy in a personal restraint petition (PRP), arguing that her robbery and felony murder conviction against James, as well as her robbery and assault conviction against Charlene, should merge. The Court of Appeals held that the two convictions against James merge, but declined to review Knight's convictions against Charlene because the Court of Appeals had previously reviewed and dismissed that double jeopardy claim on direct appeal.
¶ 2 We hold that Knight's convictions against James Sanders do not merge and that review of her convictions against Charlene Sanders is barred. Knight's robbery and felony murder convictions against James served independent effects, falling under an exception to the double jeopardy merger doctrine. However, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Knight's claim against her convictions in regards to Charlene is barred as it was already raised and dismissed on direct appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals’ ruling, affirm Knight's original conviction and sentence, and dismiss her personal restraint petition.
¶ 3 In April 2010, James and Charlene Sanders posted an advertisement on Craigslist, seeking to sell a wedding ring.
On the evening of April 28, after informing the Sanderses they were interested in purchasing the ring, Amanda Knight and three other men arrived at the Sanderses’ residence. James invited Knight and one other man into the kitchen where Charlene soon joined them. Just as the transaction was seemingly about to be completed, Knight's accomplice drew a gun and pointed it at the Sanderses. While holding James and Charlene at gunpoint, Knight and her accomplice zip-tied the couple, placed them face down on the floor, and took their wedding rings off their fingers.
¶ 4 After Knight and her accomplice stole the Sanderses’ rings, Knight's two remaining accomplices entered the Sanderses’ house, went upstairs, and brought the Sanderses’ two children downstairs at gunpoint. Both children were then zip-tied and one of them was pistol-whipped in the head. As Knight proceeded to ransack the rest of the house, Knight's accomplices demanded that Charlene tell them the location of their safe. When she denied owning a safe, they kicked her in the head and once again held her at gunpoint.
¶ 5 The Sanderses then admitted to owning a safe, and James agreed to provide Knight's accomplices with the combination. At that point, James was pulled off the floor and his zip tie was loosened. James then broke free of his restraints and jumped on one of the accomplices. James was attacked and pistol-whipped in the head before he was fatally shot three times. After James was shot, Knight and her accomplices fled. The police declared James dead at the scene.
¶ 6 A week later, Knight turned herself in and confessed. The police charged Knight with one count of first degree murder while in the furtherance of a robbery (i.e., felony murder), two counts of first degree robbery, two counts of second degree assault, and one count of first degree burglary, all with firearm enhancements. At trial, the jury was presented with 45 jury instructions, one of which stated that "[a] person commits the crime of Murder in the First Degree when she or an accomplice commits Robbery in the First Degree and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime she or another participant causes the death of a person other than one of the participants." Clerk's Papers at 335. In April 2011, the jury found Knight guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced Knight to 860 months in prison.
¶ 7 Knight appealed, arguing that her robbery and assault convictions against Charlene Sanders merge and that her separate sentences violate double jeopardy. State v. Knight , 176 Wash. App. 936, 940-41, 309 P.3d 776 (2013). The Court of Appeals disagreed and dismissed Knight's appeal. Id. at 951, 956, 309 P.3d 776.
¶ 8 In July 2016, Knight filed a PRP with the Court of Appeals, relitigating her claim that her assault and robbery convictions of Charlene Sanders merge and raising a new claim that her convictions for the robbery and felony murder of James Sanders merge as well.2 The Court of Appeals first denied Knight relief, but Knight filed a motion for reconsideration; the Court of Appeals subsequently held that Knight's felony murder conviction merged with her robbery conviction against James Sanders, but that Knight's claim regarding her robbery conviction and assault conviction against Charlene Sanders was barred from review.
¶ 9 Both parties filed motions for discretionary review, which we granted. The Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed an amicus brief.
1. Do Knight's felony murder and robbery convictions against James Sanders violate double jeopardy?
2. Is Knight's claim—arguing that her assault and robbery convictions against Charlene Sanders violate double jeopardy—barred from review?
¶ 10 Whether separate convictions violate double jeopardy is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Hughes , 166 Wash.2d 675, 681, 212 P.3d 558 (2009). Generally, double jeopardy means that defendants are protected from being convicted for the same offense twice. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9 ; U.S. CONST. amend. V. "In order to qualify as the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes, the two offenses must be the same both in law and in fact."
State v. Arndt , 194 Wash.2d 784, 815, 453 P.3d 696 (2019) (citing State v. Calle , 125 Wash.2d 769, 777, 888 P.2d 155 (1995) ). " ‘Where a defendant's act supports charges under two criminal statutes, a court weighing a double jeopardy challenge must determine whether, in light of legislative intent, the charged crimes constitute the same offense.’ " State v. Freeman , 153 Wash.2d 765, 771, 108 P.3d 753 (2005) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Orange , 152 Wash.2d 795, 815, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) ).
¶ 11 When determining whether two convictions and sentences violate double jeopardy, our analysis begins with whether the legislature "authorized cumulative punishments for both crimes," either via "express or implicit legislative intent." Id. at 771-72, 108 P.3d 753. Here, neither the statute for felony murder nor the statute for first degree robbery explicitly authorizes these crimes to be punished separately from any related crime. See RCW 9A.32.030 ; see also RCW 9A.56.190, .200. Furthermore, these statutes’ legislative history do not reflect that the legislature intended to punish these offenses separately, making legislative intent unclear in this case.
¶ 12 When our examination of legislative intent does not provide an answer, we then analyze the convictions under the Blockburger3 test: " ‘[w]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ " Freeman , 153 Wash.2d at 772, 108 P.3d 753 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Orange , 152 Wash.2d at 817, 100 P.3d 291 ). If our analysis stopped here, then Knight's separate convictions would violate double jeopardy because Knight's felony murder charge required the jury finding that Knight committed a robbery against James Sanders. See RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c)(1) ; see also RCW 9A.56.190, .200. However, other doctrines and exceptions apply to our double jeopardy analysis that we must consider before making a final determination.
¶ 13 When legislative intent is unclear, we also consider whether the merger doctrine is applicable. Freeman , 153 Wash.2d at 772, 108 P.3d 753. "Under the merger doctrine, when the degree of one offense is raised by conduct separately criminalized by the legislature, we presume the legislature intended to punish both offenses through a greater sentence for the greater crime." Id. at 772-73, 108 P.3d 753 (citing State v. Vladovic , 99 Wash.2d 413, 419, 662 P.2d 853 (1983) ). Again, if our analysis stopped here, Knight's separate convictions would violate double jeopardy because felony murder is an offense "raised by conduct separately criminalized by the legislature" that applies in Knight's case—first degree robbery. RCW 9A.56.200 ; Freeman , 153 Wash.2d at 772-73, 108 P.3d 753.
¶ 14 However, under the merger doctrine, "even if on an abstract level two convictions appear to be for the same offense or for charges that would merge, if there is an independent purpose or effect to each, they may be punished as separate offenses." Freeman , 153 Wash.2d at 773, 108 P.3d 753 (citing State...
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