In re L.M.
| Decision Date | 20 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 96,197.,96,197. |
| Citation | 186 P.3d 164 |
| Parties | In the Matter of L.M. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Paul M. Shipp, of Kansas Legal Services, of Garden City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Stephen R. McAllister, solicitor general, argued the cause, and Lara Blake Bors, assistant county attorney, John P. Wheeler, Jr., county attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
Marsha L. Levick, Jessica R. Feierman, and Riya S. Shah, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were on the brief for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center.
David Lowden, assistant district attorney, and Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, of Wichita, were on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas County and District Attorneys Association.
L.M. seeks review of the Court of Appeals decision affirming his juvenile adjudication for aggravated sexual battery and being a minor in possession of alcohol. L.M. claims that he should have received a jury trial and argues that sweeping changes to juvenile justice procedures in Kansas since 1984 merit renewed scrutiny under applicable constitutional protections.
Sixteen-year-old L.M. was charged and prosecuted as a juvenile offender on one count of aggravated sexual battery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3518 and one count of minor in possession of alcohol in violation of K.S.A.2005 Supp. 41-727. The facts leading up to these charges involve a sexually suggestive confrontation between L.M. and a neighbor who was walking home. Further discussion of the facts is not relevant to the issue on appeal and will not be discussed herein. L.M. requested a jury trial, and the district court denied his request. After a trial to the bench, the district court found L.M. guilty as charged. The district court sentenced L.M. as a Serious Offender I to a term of 18 months in a juvenile correctional facility but stayed his sentence and ordered L.M. to be placed on probation until he was 20 years old. In addition, the district court ordered L.M. to complete sex offender treatment and register as a sex offender in accordance with K.S.A.2005 Supp. 22-4906.
L.M. appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial, that his statements to police should have been suppressed, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. See In re L.M., No. 96,197, 2006 WL 3775275, unpublished opinion filed December 22, 2006. L.M. filed a petition for review with this court on the sole issue of whether he had a constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile offender proceeding. We granted L.M.'s petition for review.
L.M. is challenging the constitutionality of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 38-2344(d), which provides that a juvenile who pleads not guilty is entitled to a "trial to the court," and K.S.A.2006 Supp. 38-2357, and which gives the district court complete discretion in determining whether a juvenile should be granted a jury trial. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Allen, 283 Kan. 372, 374, 153 P.3d 488 (2007).
State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 246, 120 P.3d 319 (2005).
L.M.'s first argument relies on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...."
L.M. further relies on the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which provides in relevant part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...."
Kansas has previously resolved this issue against L.M.'s position. Twenty-four years ago, under the statutes then controlling the disposition of juvenile offender cases, this court held that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under either the federal or state constitutions. Findlay v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 463-64, 681 P.2d 20 (1984). Acknowledging that the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal prosecutions, the Findlay court concluded that juvenile adjudications then were not criminal prosecutions based on K.S.A.1982 Supp. 38-1601, which provided:
" 235 Kan. at 463, 681 P.2d 20.
The Findlay court also adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), where a plurality of the Court held that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
In McKeiver, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania and North Carolina juvenile justice systems, neither of which afforded juveniles the right to a jury trial. Although the resulting plurality opinion held that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial under the federal constitution, the justices could not agree on the reasoning to support that holding. Four of the justices supported their decision with the following 13 policy considerations and assumptions or speculations about the impact of jury trials on juvenile proceedings:
(1) The Court had previously refrained from flatly holding that all constitutional rights assured to adults accused of crimes were imposed on state juvenile proceedings;
(2) Imposing jury trials might remake juvenile proceedings into fully adversarial proceedings, thereby putting an end to the intimate, informal proceedings envisioned by the creators of the juvenile justice system;
(3) A governmental task force that had studied the juvenile justice system did not make any recommendation regarding jury trials as a means of improving the deficiencies and disappointments in the juvenile system;
(4) As noted in dictum in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), a jury trial is not a necessary part of every fair and equitable criminal process;
(5) The imposition of a jury trial would not strengthen the factfinding process and would eliminate the juvenile system's ability to function in a unique way, placing the juvenile "squarely in the routine of the criminal process;"
(6) The Court was reluctant to preclude the States from experimenting with different ways of handling juvenile problems;
(7) The Court refrained from concluding that the abuses in the system were of constitutional dimension;
(8) Nothing prevented the juvenile court judge from using an advisory jury;
(9) Twenty-eight States and the District of Columbia denied juveniles the right to a jury trial, while 10 States provided a jury trial under certain circumstances;
(10) A great majority of States had previously concluded that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and Duncan did not require jury trials for juveniles;
(11) The Uniform Juvenile Court Act stopped short of proposing a jury trial;
(12) Injecting a jury trial into juvenile proceedings would bring "the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial"; and
(13) The possibility of prejudgment by a judge who has had prior access to the juvenile, the juvenile's record, and the juvenile's social file would ignore every aspect of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention contemplated by the juvenile system. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-50, 91 S.Ct. 1976.
Two concurring justices relied on other reasoning. Justice Harlan concurred with the result because he did not believe that the Sixth Amendment or the right to due process required the states to provide criminal jury trials for anyone. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also concurred with the result but relied on the concept of fundamental fairness. According to Justice Brennan, the State did not have to provide jury trials for juveniles as long as some other aspect of the process adequately protected the juvenile's Sixth Amendment interests by preventing governmental oppression. Justice Brennan concluded that the Pennsylvania system was adequate because it allowed public trials, thereby "exposing improper judicial behavior to public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress through the medium of public indignation." 403 U.S. at 555, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (Brennan, J., concurring). Under this rubric, Justice Brennan concluded that the North Carolina system was not constitutionally sound because it did not allow public...
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