In re LaPorta
Decision Date | 07 July 1982 |
Docket Number | 82 A 186.,Bankruptcy No. 81 B 4451 |
Citation | 26 BR 687 |
Parties | In re Robert LaPORTA, d/b/a Chicago Linoleum & Tile, Chicago Carpet Supplies and Chicago Carpet Mart & Warehouse, Debtor. Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. Robert LaPORTA, d/b/a Chicago Linoleum & Tile, Chicago Carpet Supplies and Chicago Carpet Mart & Warehouse, Defendants, and Lawrence M. Cooper, Trustee. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Phillis B. Dolinko, U.S. Dept. of Labor, for U.S. Dept. of Labor.
Lawrence M. Cooper, Chicago, Ill., Trustee.
Maury Fisher, Laser, Schostok, Kolman & Frank, Chicago, Ill., for debtor.
This cause came to be heard on the plaintiff's complaint for an order revoking discharge and declaring that the U.S. Secretary of Labor may proceed with an administrative hearing pursuant to the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. The court, being fully advised in the premises, and having carefully considered the pleadings and memoranda, hereby re-opens this case and grants the plaintiff's request allowing the Secretary of Labor to proceed with an administrative hearing but denying the request for an order revoking discharge.
The plaintiff (Secretary) contends that as a result of the debtor's contracts with the General Services Administration and subsequent violations of the Service Contract Act, the debtor is liable to the GSA in the amount of $16,827.13. Pursuant to an investigation, the Secretary is holding $5,641.32 from sums due on the debtor's contracts with the GSA. The Secretary contends that this sum being withheld was never scheduled as an asset of the debtor's estate, the GSA was never scheduled as a creditor and the Secretary must be allowed to proceed to determine rightful ownership of the funds. The trustee for the debtor contends that the sum being withheld by the Secretary is property of the debtor's estate.
1. On February 15, 1979 and March 10, 1980 the General Services Administration (GSA) of the United States of America awarded Chicago Linoleum and Tile Company (Debtor) two contracts for the provision of carpet installation, clearing and repair. These contracts were subject to and contain the representations and stipulations required by the Service Contract Act (SCA) and its regulations issued pursuant thereto.
2. Subsequent thereto the Department of Labor conducted an investigation of the debtor's compliance with the SCA and determined a violation of the Act's minimum wage and benefit provisions existed.
3. Pursuant to that investigation and determination, on October 6, 1980 the Department of Labor requested the GSA to withhold payment of funds owing to the debtor in the amount of $16,827.13.
4. Pursuant to GSA's order of October 6, 1980, the government agency commenced withholding funds and currently $5,641.32 is being withheld.
5. On April 10, 1981 Administrative Complaint No. SCA-1369 was filed with the Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor. The debtor failed to file a responsive pleading.
6. On April 15, 1981, the debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Said petition failed to list the Secretary of Labor as a creditor in the amount of $16,827.13 nor did debtor list the $5,641.32 being withheld as an asset of the estate.
7. On September 10, 1981 an order was entered approving the interim trustee's No Asset Report and an order was entered discharging the debtor.
8. On September 28, 1981 the Secretary of Labor learned of the debtor's bankruptcy. Upon notifying the debtor's attorney of its position and receiving no response, the Secretary on January 19, 1982 filed its complaint.
Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes that a bankruptcy case may be re-opened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor or for other causes. Bankruptcy Rule 515 provides that the re-opening of a case is a matter of court discretion but relief to the bankrupt is explicitly recognized as a proper cause for re-opening. Given that the Secretary of Labor is holding over $5,000 of funds originally owed to the debtor and has a possible claim against the debtor for as much as $16,827.13, a clear cause for re-opening the debtor's bankruptcy case does exist and this court believes it would properly be exercising its discretion under Bankruptcy Rule 515 to so re-open.
The Secretary of Labor in his complaint asks that he be allowed to proceed with an Administrative hearing pursuant to the Service Contract Act to determine the liability of the debtor and the rightful ownership of the funds being held by him. In effect, what the Secretary is asking for is a vacation of the § 362 automatic stay. Section 362(a)(1) does state that the automatic stay is applicable to the commencement or continuation of administrative proceedings against the debtor that were or could have been commenced before the filing of debtor's petition.
The purpose of the automatic stay is to prevent dismemberment of the estate and insure its orderly distribution in order to eliminate the impetus for a race of diligence by fast-acting creditors. S.E.C. v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (C.A. 5 1981). Therefore, even though the present case involves a Chapter 7 debtor with no assets who was discharged from his debts nine months ago, the automatic stay is appropriate to preserve nonexempt assets for a fair distribution thereof among creditors.
This court, however, does not have to decide the question of whether it should vacate the automatic stay because of § 362(b)(4). Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
In construing Section 362(b)(4) and applying it to the present situation, it is helpful to review its legislative history. Honorable Don Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee of the Judiciary, explained Congress' intent in enacting Section 362(b)(4) by stating:
An excerpt from House Report No. 95-595, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6299 indicates that:
The Congressional intent to treat court proceedings differently than administrative proceedings is inherent in § 362. With the enactment of § 362(b)(4) not only did Congress fail to confer jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court to hear and determine matters involving a governmental unit's police or regulatory powers, it also exempted those proceedings from the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. (In re Brada Miller Freight Systems, 16 B.R. 1002, 6 C.B.C. 375 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ala. 1981)). Congress's intention to treat such proceedings differently stems from the very nature of Administrative agencies. Administrative agencies, in general, are charged with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and have been established to "execute" governmental programs designed to control the individual's conduct of his commercial and noncommercial affairs, to set the cost of services that he obtains and to provide services that he cannot otherwise obtain. (In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. 917, 4 C.B.C. 1237 (Bkrtcy.1981)).
The present case involves an administrative proceeding before the U.S. Department of Labor. The issue involves a dispute over compliance with the Service Contract Act. It is the job of the Department of Labor to resolve such disputes and said department has the expertise to so dispose of such matters. Section 362(b)(4) contemplates that where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violations of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws the proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. It is manifest that the enforcement of the Service Contract Act which provides for minimum wages and benefits for employees of government contractors is a proceeding akin to an action to protect the public...
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