In re Larson, Bankruptcy No. 93-30917. Adv. No. 94-7003.
Decision Date | 06 July 1994 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 93-30917. Adv. No. 94-7003. |
Citation | 169 BR 945 |
Parties | In re Michael M. LARSON, a/k/a Mike Larson, a/k/a Michael Larson, Debtor. Cindy SADOWSKY, Plaintiff, v. Michael M. LARSON, a/k/a Mike Larson, a/k/a Michael Larson, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of North Dakota |
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Scott J. McDonald, Bowman, ND, for plaintiff.
Gene F. Buresh, Dickinson, ND, for defendant.
Phillip D. Armstrong, Trustee.
The plaintiff commenced the above-entitled adversary proceeding by Complaint filed on January 10, 1994, seeking to have an obligation stemming from a monetary judgment entered by a state court in connection with a divorce decree declared nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). The matter directly before the court arises by cross motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Michael M. Larson (Larson), and by the plaintiff, Cindy Sadowsky (Sadowsky), on May 27 and June 24, 1994, respectively. Each party asserts that an examination of the pleadings, papers, affidavits, and accompanying materials demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists in this case and that he or she is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
On July 13, 1982, the Stark County District Court for the State of North Dakota entered a judgment of divorce which dissolved the marriage of the plaintiff, Cindy Sadowsky, and the defendant, Michael M. Larson. After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the state court drafted an order for judgment and made relatively detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sadowsky was awarded custody of the two children born during the marriage. The court specifically delineated or categorized the obligations of the respective parties in its "findings of fact" to include, inter alia, the following:
See Stark County District Court Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order for Judgment, at 2-3 (July 8, 1982) (emphasis added). Additionally, the court made "conclusions of law" which substantially parrot the findings of fact and include, inter alia, the following:
Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). See also Judgment of Stark County District Court, at 2-3 (July 13, 1982); Order Confirming Child Support, Spousal Support and Attorney Fees Arrearages, at 1 & 2 (July 29, 1987) ( ).
The plaintiff's obligation for alimony and child support was modified at various times subsequent to the entry of the divorce judgment.1 On at least two occasions, Larson was deemed to be in contempt of court for willfully failing to comply with the judgment for divorce and make the court-ordered payments:
The Court herewith determines that Larson is willfully, knowingly and intentionally in contempt of this Court by virtue of his disregard of the Court\'s Judgment requiring him to provide modest spousal support of $100.00 per month, and by intentionally permitting the repossession of one 1981 Mercury Cougar automobile, when in fact Larson has secured housing and reliable transportation for his present family.2
See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Contempt and Order for Amended Judgment, at 7-8 (July 17, 1986) (emphasis added).
Larson continued to remain significantly in arrears on the court-imposed obligations. In an apparent effort to execute on the outstanding indebtedness, Sadowsky moved the state court for an order "reducing the arrearage for spousal support to money judgment" by motion filed on August 5, 1993. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit and schedules from the clerk of district court who confirmed the arrearage of "spousal support". The court entered an order on August 30, 1993, reducing the arrearage of "spousal support", in the amount of $13,676.89, to money judgment.3 The court further ordered that the sum of $8,390.19 was due as pre-judgment interest and that additional interest on the aforementioned sums would accrue at a rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of judgment until paid.
The defendant-debtor, Larson, filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on October 28, 1993. As of the date of the bankruptcy filing, the outstanding obligation owed to Sadowsky was $22,466.10 in aggregate.4 The creditor-plaintiff, Sadowsky, commenced the above-entitled adversary proceeding on January 10, 1994, seeking to have the aforementioned amount declared nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
On April 13, 1994, Larson propounded Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Requests for the Production of Documents in connection with the adversary proceeding. On Friday, May 13, 1994, the date that discovery requests were due under the Rules of Procedure and the deadline for discovery pursuant to this court's pretrial order, counsel for Sadowsky mailed completed, but "unsigned", copies of the requested items together with a letter explaining why they were not executed.5 The documents were subsequently executed and forwarded to counsel for the defense shortly after the 16th of May.
The parties to this dispute predicate their summary judgment motions, for the most part, on divergent views regarding the nature or characterization of the debt initially created by the pre-bankruptcy divorce order. Sadowsky essentially avers that the indebtedness is in the nature of alimony or support and should therefore be declared nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5). Larson, on the other hand, contends that the obligation arises from a property settlement and is therefore dischargeable. In support of his position, Larson argues that reducing the obligation which stemmed from a judgment of divorce to a monetary judgment, conclusively establishes that the debt was in the nature of a property distribution. Larson further argues that Sadowsky's failure to properly execute the Requests for Admission within the time parameters of Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conclusively establishes the nature of the obligation.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the grants of summary judgment and is made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7056. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The primary purpose for granting a summary judgment motion is to promptly dispose of actions and avoid unnecessary trials when no genuine issue of material facts exists. The summary judgment mechanism is thus not a...
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