In re Legon
| Decision Date | 05 July 1949 |
| Citation | 85 F. Supp. 946 |
| Parties | In re LEGON. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
George H. Rosen, Monticello, N. Y., for Bankrupt.
The bankrupt brings on for review three separate orders of the Referee which denied bankrupt's motion to dismiss specifications filed by three creditors opposing the discharge of the bankrupt.
The bankrupt raises three objections to the action of the Referee on these specifications: (1) that the Referee was without jurisdiction to allow the filing of the specifications because they were not filed within time fixed for such filing; (2) that the specifications were improperly executed because they were not signed by counsel for the creditor; and (3) that the first specification sustained by the Referee was insufficient in law.
The Referee had the power to extend the time for filing the specifications, if in his discretion sufficient reason existed for taking such action, In re Weidemeyer, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1940, 32 F.Supp. 809, and the Referee could extend the time without entering a formal order. In re Massa, 2 Cir., 133 F.2d 191. From the present record we cannot say that the extension here granted was an abuse of discretion. The Referee did have jurisdiction to entertain the specifications.
Although Rule 11, Federal Rules Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., requires all pleadings to be signed by counsel, it does not invalidate unsigned pleadings. The rule merely provides that an unsigned pleading may be stricken. Here, the specifications were signed by the president of the objecting creditor bank and this was at least substantial compliance with the rule.
The third objection raised by the bankrupt is not well taken. Specification No. 1 obviously raises questions of fact concerning the conduct of the bankrupt's business. It alleges that the bankrupt has not satisfactorily explained the disposition of some $12,000 of receipts in view of the number and amount of claims which have been filed for supplies, materials and wages used in connection with the business. The court, of course, does not at this time pass on the merits of the specification, but merely holds that it is sufficient in law and that the Referee was correct in refusing to dismiss it. Under this specification, evidence may be presented to sustain a denial of discharge under Sec. 14, sub. c (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32, sub. c (2).
The Referee refused to dismiss three specifications of Karamechedis and two of the Sullivan County Trust Co. The objections of the bankrupt to these rulings may be considered together because the first two specifications of Karamechedis are identical with those of the Trust Company.
The objections of the bankrupt to specifications No. 2 are well taken. These specifications merely allege that the bankrupt has failed to...
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In re Magee, 74 B 1819-W-1.
...been so strictly construed. In re Massa (2 Cir., 1943) 133 F.2d 191; In re Weidemeyer (E.D.N. Y., 1940) 32 F.Supp. 809; In re Legon (S.D. N.Y., 1949) 85 F.Supp. 946; In re Meckler (D.C.Md., 1957) 156 F.Supp. 20; In re Fithian (D.C.Md., 1957) 156 F.Supp. 877; and In re Taylor (D.C.Va., 1968)......
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In re Machek, 70-387-Bk-J.
...241 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1957); Richey v. Ashton, 143 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1944); In Re Massa, 133 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1943); In Re Legon, 85 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Cf. Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 375 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1967). Furthermore if a creditor, who has failed to file any ob......
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In re Rapino
...objection, but the discharge had not yet been granted, the referee could allow the papers to be filed out of time. See also In re Legon, S.D.N.Y.1949, 85 F.Supp. 946 (referee has discretion to extend time without filing a formal order granting an "In accordance with the principle that the p......
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Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co.
...Rule 11 which provides that an unsigned pleading "may be stricken as sham and false". But an unsigned pleading is not invalid. In re Legon, D.C., 85 F.Supp. 946; Pallant v. Sinatra, D.C., 7 F.R.D. 293. Striking the pleading is within the sound discretion of the court. The District Court did......