In re Lenox
| Decision Date | 15 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 24971.,24971. |
| Citation | 371 Ill. 505,21 N.E.2d 721 |
| Parties | In re LENOX. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding in the matter of the disbarment of John K. Lenox, Jr., attorney.
Respondent disbarred.
Charles Leviton, of Chicago, amicus curiae.
John Franklin Lax, of Chicago, for respondent.
In a complaint filed with the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, John K. Lenox, Jr., an attorney, was charged with converting to his own use certain money received by him from a client, Frank Jurewicz. This money was given Lenox for the purpose of purchasing first and second mortgages on a given piece of property. After a hearing on the supplemental complaint the committee on grievances filed its report recommending respondent's disbarment. The board of managers overruled objections to the report, and ordered it to be filed in this court.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint on the ground it was not signed by the complaining party, Frank Jurewicz, as required by rule 59 of this court, Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 110, § 259.59. Thereupon a supplemental complaint signed by Jurewicz was filed, setting forth the charges in greater detail. To this supplemental complaint respondent filed an answer. He claims it was error to begin the proceeding on a faulty complaint, dismiss it, and then proceed upon the unverified complaint of Jurewicz, without a preliminary hearing or investigation. This contention cannot be sustained. Rule 59 and an order of this court entered at the April, 1933, term, give the commissioners a wide discretion as to the procedure to be followed in disbarment suits. They authorize a preliminary hearing or investigation but do not make such procedure mandatory. The commissioners did not abuse their discretion here. The supplemental complaint fully and clearly apprised respondent of the charges made against him, and there was no substantial variance between the allegations and the proof. Respondent was given a full and fair hearing and makes no contention to the contrary. Moreover, it must be remembered that this is not a criminal case with its formalities of pleading, but is an investigation of an attorney's conduct to determine whether he should be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. In re Anderson, 370 Ill. 515, 19 N.E.2d 330. Nor may respondentinvoke technicalities to combat a charge against his professional integrity, where the facts show that, notwithstanding a technical defense, his conduct was ethically or morally without support. In re Sanitary District Attorneys, 351 Ill. 206, 184 N.E. 332.
There is little conflict in the evidence. It appears that on July 7, 1937, Frank Jurewicz employed respondent as his counsel to represent him in the purchase of a first and second mortgage on certain real estate in Chicago. Later, respondent advised him that he should also obtain a quitclaim deed from the record owner of the land. Jurewicz paid respondent a total of $1050 in cash, and respondent paid $175 on account of the first and second mortgages and $20 for a quit-claim deed from the record owner, leaving him a balance of $855. It was necessary to delay the completion of the transaction because one of the mortgage notes had been lost.
About August 22, 1937, respondent left Chicago without notifying Jurewicz and without leaving any forwarding address. Jurewicz endeavored to locate him, but was unable to do so. He had moved from his old office, and was not at 105 West Adams street, where his name was on the bulletin board. October 11, 1937, respondent was arrested on a warrant issued at the instance of complainant. At that time he was living at the Mark Twain Hotel in Chicago, under the name of Kelly. Attorney Jack Freeman, who was employed by Jurewicz to close the transaction, testified that he had three or four conversations with respondent after his arrest and that respondent would not tell him what he did with the money, but would remain silent when asked. Respondent made...
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Heirich, In re
... ... In re Mack, 360 Ill. 343, 196 N.E. 197. It is asserted that not every member of the commission voted upon the report submitted to the court. That was not essential. The majority of the committee voted for the report, and that was sufficient.' In the case of In re Lenox, 371 Ill. 505, 21 N.E.2d 721, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint on the ground that it was not signed by the complaining party as required by Rule 59 of this court. Thereupon a supplemental complaint signed by the complaining party was filed setting forth the charges ... ...
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Herr, In re
... ... 470, 240 N.Y.S. 481 (App.Div.1930); In re Kunstler, 248 App.Div. 393, 289 N.Y.S. 107 (App.Div.1936); In re Salus, 321 Pa. 106, 184 A. 70 (Sup.Ct.1936); In re Gery, 284 Pa. 121, 130 A. 307 (Sup.Ct.1925); People ex rel. Attorney-General v. Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101 P.2d 33 (Sup.Ct.1940); In re Lenox, 371 Ill. 505, 21 N.E.2d 721 (Sup.Ct.1939); In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d 935 (Sup.Ct.1943). As it is abhorrent to the law and our ethical code that an attorney should derive a benefit to himself from the misuse of the confidence arising from the attorney-client relation, 'where from the ... ...
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Phipps v. Wilson, 10248.
... ... In re Donaghy, 393 Ill. 621, 66 N.E.2d 856. It has also held that this section gives the commissioners a wide discretion as to procedure to be followed in disbarment cases. In re Lenox, 371 Ill. 505, 21 N.E.2d 721 ... Construing the amended complaint most favorably to the pleader as an attempt to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a federal court, it may be said that plaintiff claims to be aggrieved by his disbarment by the Illinois Supreme Court, ... ...
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Yablunky, In re
... ... In re Hamilton, 388 Ill. 589, 58 N.E.2d 449; In re Carr, 377 Ill. 140, 36 N.E.2d 243; In re Lenox, 371 Ill. 505, 21 N.E.2d 721; In re Doss, 367 Ill. 570, 12 N.E.2d 659 ... Respondents next assert that the commissioners erred in denying their motions for a continuance of ninety days from June 23, 1949. In this connection, it should be observed that respondents were apprised of ... ...