In re Lil'Patrick T.

• Citation: 216 Conn.App. 240,284 A.3d 999
• Decision Date: 26 October 2022
• Docket Number: AC 45399
• Parties: IN RE LIL'PATRICK T.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

216 Conn.App. 240

284 A.3d 999

IN RE LIL'PATRICK T.^*

AC 45399

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 7, 2022

Officially Released October 26, 2022^**

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father).

Katherine Blouin, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O'Roark and Nisa Khan, assistant attorneys general (petitioner).

Moll, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The respondent father, Lil'Patrick T., Sr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, P.¹ On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court (1) incorrectly concluded that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, he could assume a responsible position in the life of P, (2) incorrectly determined that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of P and (3) failed to canvass him adequately concerning his right to testify on his own behalf. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In December, 2019, P was born prematurely, weighing four pounds, three ounces, and he tested positive for marijuana. Because S, P's biological mother, tested positive for marijuana and had a history of domestic violence,² including a May, 2019 incident with the respondent, the hospital notified the Department of Children and Families (department). P was discharged from the hospital six days later to reside with the respondent and S under a safety plan with the department. On January 14, 2020, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed a motion for temporary custody along with a petition representing that P had been neglected. The court granted the order of temporary custody on January 24, 2020. On January 24, 2020, and on July 22, 2020, the court issued orders of specific steps for the respondent to undertake. On December 14, 2020, the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption. On February 23, 2021, the petitioner filed a petition for the termination of the respondent's parental rights as to P.

On February 3, 2022, the court issued its memorandum of decision terminating the respondent's parental rights as to P. With respect to the adjudicatory phase, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, both that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with P and that the termination of the respondent's parental rights with respect to P was warranted because of his failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation. In the dispositional phase of the proceeding, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in P's best interest. This appeal followed.³ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We first note the following relevant legal principles. "A hearing on a termination of parental rights petition consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the [petitioner] has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, a proper ground for termination of parental rights.... In the dispositional phase, once a ground for termination has been proven, the court must determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leilah W. , 166 Conn. App. 48, 66–67, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016).

I

The respondent first claims that the court incorrectly concluded that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. We disagree.

As clarified by our Supreme Court in In re Shane M. , 318 Conn. 569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015), the standard of review of a trial court's determination that a parent has failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation is as follows: "We have historically reviewed for clear error both the trial court's subordinate factual findings and its determination that a parent has failed to rehabilitate.... While we remain convinced that clear error review is appropriate for the trial court's subordinate factual findings, we now recognize that the trial court's ultimate conclusion of whether a parent has failed to rehabilitate involves a different exercise by the trial court. A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court's factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in [General Statutes] § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly, we now believe that the appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].... When applying this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court."⁴ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

We note the following relevant legal principles. "In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must decide whether there is clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for the termination of parental rights exists." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jennifer W. , 75 Conn. App. 485, 493, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003). In the present case, the court determined that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). "Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of six statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112. [See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).] That ground exists when a parent of a child whom the court has found to be neglected fails to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of that child....

"Personal rehabilitation as used in [ § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) ] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent.... [ Section 17a-112 ] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.... [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he or she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he or she] can assume a responsible position in [his or her] child's life.... [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leilah W. , supra, 166 Conn. App. at 67–68, 141 A.3d 1000.

In the present case, the court determined that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify P with the respondent and that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from efforts to reunify; the respondent does not challenge these findings. The court determined that the failure to rehabilitate ground in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) had been established by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the court found that the respondent's issues, at the time of removal, were domestic violence⁵ with S, abuse of marijuana and lack of stable housing. The court noted that trial was originally scheduled to begin on December 1, 2021, and that, thereafter, the respondent requested new referrals for, and attended an intake at, Wheeler Clinic, which addresses substance abuse and mental health; began Fatherhood Engagement Services, which works to help strengthen bonds between fathers and children and to enhance the level of involvement of fathers in their case planning with the department; and scheduled an intake for domestic violence counseling. The court stated that it "question[ed] the sincerity of [the respondent's] motivation, given the timing of his recent engagement in anticipation of litigation, and considering he had two years to participate in services. In any event it remains too little too late. [The respondent] is in no better position today than at the end of December, 2019, when the child was removed from his care. Considering the age and needs of the child ... the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a reasonable position in the life of the child."

A

The respondent challenges several of the court's subordinate findings. We first address the respondent's arguments challenging the court's findings regarding marijuana use. In the section of the court's memorandum of decision that sets forth its general factual findings, the court found that the respondent "disclosed to the investigative worker that he uses marijuana daily, which continued through the early stages of [the department's] involvement. He tested positive in December, 2019. He later told [the department] that he stopped in January, 2020, without treatment. A toxicology screen taken by Wheeler [Clinic] shortly thereafter was negative. That was the last screen that he provided." In the section of the decision involving the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, the court found that ...