In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash
| Docket Number | 18 C 07686 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
| Parties | IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This Order applies to: Case No. 19 C 01552, Case No. 19 C 07091
This consolidated action arises out of an aviation accident involving a Boeing commercial jet, which resulted in the death of everyone on board. On December 20, 2022, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order (“the Order”) holding that the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-08 (“DOHSA”), applies to the two remaining actions (Chandra v. Boeing case no. 19 C 01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no 19 C 07091), preempts Plaintiffs' other claims, and rests in this Court's admiralty jurisdiction such that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial. R. 1460. Plaintiffs in both actions and Defendant Xtra Aerospace, LLC (“Xtra”) have moved this Court to amend the Order to certify for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b) the issue of Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial. R. 1468, 1471, 1474.[1]Plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (“Chandra Plaintiffs”) also request that the preemption question is certified for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons stated below, the Court will amend the Order to certify the right to a jury trial question under § 1292(b) but will not certify the issue of preemption.
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 crashed into the Java Sea at a high rate of speed just minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia. R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. There were no survivors. Id. at ¶ 5. The crash was caused by a faulty automatic flight control system which overrode the pilots and turned the plane into a nosedive. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45.
The resulting litigation involved 87 individual actions against Boeing and other defendants asserting wrongful death and other claims arising out of the accident on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were either filed in or removed to this Court and eventually consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has fully settled the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining two actions are those brought by the families and representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing); and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and entrepreneur (Smith v. Boeing).
Chandra Plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. They alleged wrongful death arising under DOHSA. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15-24. They also made survival claims for property damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing removed the case to this Court under the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. The operative Third Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16, 18-19; id. at p. 57. Mr. Manfredi's family and the administrator of Mr. Manfredi's estate, Laura Smith, (“Manfredi Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091, Dkt. 1. The Second Amended Complaint asserts wrongful death and survival claims and demands a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118-19.
Defendants the Boeing Company, Rockwell Collins, Inc., and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) filed motions in the Chandra and Smith cases, seeking the Court's determination that DOHSA applies, preempts each Plaintiffs' non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial.[2] See R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Court granted those motions in the Order. R. 1460. Chandra and Manfredi Plaintiffs now request that the Court amend the Order to certify the issue of the jury trial right for interlocutory appeal. R. 1468, 1471. Five admiralty law professors from around the country, Professors Martin Davies, Robert Force, Steven F. Friedell, Thomas Galligan, and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, filed an amici brief in support of Manfredi Plaintiffs' motion. R. 1470. Xtra, without taking a position on the merits of the parties' substantive positions, also joins Plaintiffs' request to certify this issue, arguing that an immediate appeal would promote judicial efficiency. R. 1474. Chandra Plaintiffs also ask the Court to certify whether DOHSA preempts non-DOHSA causes of action for physical destruction of property and personal injuries to an aircraft passenger sustained over land during a flight that ultimately led to a fatal crash. R. 1471.
Though the parties in the Chandra and Smith cases have informally exchanged some discovery in furtherance of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in formal written or expert discovery. Boeing has informed the Court that, if the Order stands, it would stipulate to its liability to pay damages such that the only issue at trial would be the amount of damages. Feb. 22, 2023 Letter to the Court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals may not entertain appeals from interlocutory (non-final) orders except in very limited circumstances. Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), a district court can certify an issue for interlocutory appeal if the movant shows that (1) there is a question of law; (2) the question is controlling; (3) the question is “contestable,” that is, there is substantial grounds for differences of opinion; and (4) immediate appeal would speed up the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). All four criteria must be met. Id. at 676. Even if a district court certifies an issue for appeal, the Circuit Court has discretion to accept or reject the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Plaintiffs desire to challenge on interlocutory appeal this Court's holding that “Congress . . . has explicitly limited DOHSA to ‘a civil action in admiralty,' which does not carry the right to a jury trial.” Order at 13 (citing Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986) (where the “sole predicate” for liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to a jury trial”)). Specifically, Manfredi Plaintiffs seek the certification of the following issue:
Does a DOHSA claim in a case asserting diversity rather than admiralty jurisdiction carry a jury-trial right as a “suit at common law” within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, the saving-to-suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962)?
R. 1468 at 1. And Chandra Plaintiffs seek certification of a similar question:
In a diversity case, is a DOHSA plaintiff entitled to a jury trial under the saving-to-suitors clause and DOHSA's savings clause when the plaintiff originally files suit in a state common law court pursuant to Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, demands a jury trial, and reasserts his jury demand post-removal?
R. 1472 at 2. These questions are substantively the same. At bottom, they ask whether a plaintiff in federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff's sole claim arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law jurisdiction (such as diversity). Defendants do not contest that the issue of Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial under DOHSA is a pure question of law.[3] Therefore, to determine whether an interlocutory appeal is appropriate, the Court examines whether the question fulfills the remaining three factors of the test laid out in § 1292(b) and Ahrenholz.
For a district court to certify a question under § 1292(b), the movant must show that the question is “controlling.” The Seventh Circuit does not read this requirement literally. Instead, it asks whether the resolution of the question is “quite likely to affect the further course of the litigation,” Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1996), and is “serious to the conduct of the litigation, either practically or legally.” Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974)). Therefore, “a question is controlling . . . if interlocutory reversal might save time for the district court, and time and expense for the litigants.” Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1205-06 ().
The resolution of the proper factfinder-whether judge or jury-will likely affect the course of the litigation at least practically, with substantial differences in decision-making authority, jury selection, the way evidentiary issues are handled, objections, and jury instructions. Defendants argue that, since Boeing will stipulate to liability, and the only role of the factfinder will be to compute damages, the identity of the factfinder will have no material impact on the outcome of the litigation. But the issue need not affect the litigation's outcome to be controlling-it need only be “serious to the conduct of the litigation,” even if only in a practical sense. Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1206.
Other considerations make this question a controlling one. For example, an interlocutory reversal would save substantial time for this Court and expenses for the litigants. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit accepted a question of proper service as a controlling question on interlocutory appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that, without...
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