In re Little

• Decision Date: 11 February 1902
• Citation: 89 N.W. 38,129 Mich. 454
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: In re LITTLE.

89 N.W. 38

129 Mich. 454

In re LITTLE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

February 11, 1902

Habeas corpus by Phillip Little against the sheriff of Montcalm county. Writ denied.

Ritchie Murphy & Phelan, for petitioner.

H. E Chase, Dep. Atty. Gen., and F. A. Mller, Pros. Atty., for the People.

GRANT J.

The petitioner is confined in the jail of Montcalm county under a complaint and warrant charging him with the crime of burglary, committed in that county. He seeks release upon the writ of habeas corpus, for the reason that at the time of his arrest for this crime he was confined in the jail of Kent county, Mich., under a warrant issued from the United States court for the Northern district of Ohio, charging him with the crime of robbery of post offices in Michigan, and, under the order of the United States court in Ohio, removing him to the United States court for the Western district of Michigan to await the action of the grand jury upon said alleged offense. The marshal of the United States court for the Western district of Michigan, upon the request of the sheriff of Montcalm county, and the presentation to him of the warrant for the petitioner's arrest, surrendered him to the jurisdiction of the state courts for examination and trial. His counsel insist that upon his release by the United States marshal he was entitled to return to the state of Ohio, whence he was brought under the order and judgment of the federal court; that he was by law entitled to a reasonable time and opportunity to return, and was, during that time, privileged from arrest by the authorities of the state court. Courts have shown no inclination to scrutinize too closely the means used by police officers to secure fugitives from justice and bring them before the courts for trial. It has been repeatedly held that, when alleged criminals are brought by force or by false representation, or even by abuse of process, from one jurisdiction, to which they have fled, into another, they are not entitled to return to the jurisdiction whence they were taken. In re Mahon (D. C.) 34 F. 525, 528; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 543, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549, and authorities there cited. The prisoner, upon being discharged by the United States authorities, would not be entitled to return to Ohio, even if he had been extradited. It is just to counsel to say that they do not intend to carry their argument to this extent. If extradited for larceny, and discharged, and a charge of murder had been lodged against him, he would not be absolutely released, and given the opportunity to escape trial upon the more heinous offense. What counsel mean to say is this: That the United States marshal would take him back to Ohio, and there retain him until the necessary papers could be obtained from the governor of Michigan for his return to this state to be tried. This would be an idle ceremony.

No question of treaty stipulation is involved. Petitioner has not been extradited. He was brought to this state under a United States warrant, arrested in one jurisdiction, where the crime was not committed, and transferred to another jurisdiction, where the crime was committed, for appropriate action. But, if the case were to be disposed of upon the rules governing extradition proceedings, the controversy has been settled by Lascelles v. Georgia,...