In re E. Little, Minor
| Decision Date | 13 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 362152 |
| Parties | In re E. LITTLE, Minor. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Bay Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 18-012494-NA
Before: Gadola, P.J., and Patel and Maldonado, JJ.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, EL, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (g), and (j). We find that at least one ground for statutory termination was established by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child's best interests. We also find that the trial court's failure to adhere to the time requirements imposed by MCR 3.977(I)(1) does not warrant reversal. We affirm.
Respondent has a long history of mental-health issues and criminally-aggressive behavior. She has been involuntarily hospitalized multiple times for psychiatric reasons. In January 2018, respondent was involuntarily hospitalized for mental health treatment, which led to the removal of EL.[1] EL was four months old when these proceedings began and was nearly five years old at the end of the termination hearing. EL has spent a majority of these proceedings in the care of one of respondent's cousins. Respondent's cousin and his spouse wish to adopt EL.
Respondent was provided with numerous services aimed at reunifying her with EL, including a psychological assessment, psychiatric evaluation, individual counseling, substance-abuse counseling, drug screens, parenting classes, parenting-time visits, and family support services. It is undisputed that she made some progress-she had periods of mental wellness, she obtained employment, and she maintained suitable housing. But she suffered a number of setbacks with her mental-health and criminal issues. During these proceedings, she was briefly hospitalized for psychiatric reasons and she was arrested twice for drunk driving.
In January 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights to EL. Following the nine-day termination hearing during which testimony was taken from 19 witnesses and respondent, the trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in EL's best interests. This appeal followed.
Respondent first argues that she is entitled to reversal of the termination order because the trial court did not timely issue its opinion and order terminating her parental rights. We disagree.
Because respondent did not raise any issue below regarding the trial court's failure to comply with the timing requirements of MCL 712A.19b(1) and MCR 3.977(I)(1), we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich.App. 1, 8; 761 N.W.2d 253 (2008). To obtain relief, respondent must show that an error occurred, that it was clear or obvious, and that the error affected her substantial rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. 120, 135; 809 N.W.2d 412 (2011). An error generally affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., it affected the outcome of the case. In re Utrera, 281 Mich.App. at 9.
This issue also involves the interpretation of a court rule and a statute, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Micheli v Mich. Auto Ins Placement Facility, 340 Mich.App. 360, 367; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2022).
MCL 712A.19b(1) states, in pertinent part: MCR 3.977(I)(1) states, in pertinent part: "If the court does not issue a decision on the record following hearing, it shall file its decision within 28 days after the taking of final proofs, but no later than 70 days after the commencement of the hearing to terminate parental rights." The trial court's opinion and order in this case was untimely under these provisions. The termination hearing commenced on March 16, 2022. Final proofs were taken on May 19, 2022, and the referee issued her opinion on the record on June 22, 2022.[2] Thus, the trial court erred by failing to comply with MCL 712A.19b(1) and MCR 3.977(I)(1). But this error does not warrant reversal of the order terminating respondent's parental rights.
The harmless-error standard of civil procedure is incorporated into proceedings involving juveniles. See MCR 3.902(A) ("[l]imitations on corrections of error are governed by MCR 2.613."); see also In re Utrera, 281 Mich.App. at 14 (). MCR 2.613(A) provides:
An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
MCL 712A.19b(1) expressly states that "[t]he court's failure to issue an opinion within 70 days does not dismiss the petition." And this Court has held that a trial court's violation of the time limits set forth in the court rule does not require dismissal. In re TC, 251 Mich.App. 368; 650 N.W.2d 698 (2002).[3] In In re TC, the trial court's final decision was not issued within 70 days after the termination hearing commenced. Id. at 369. The respondent acknowledged the statement from MCL 712A.19b(1) that "[t]he court's failure to issue an opinion within 70 days does not dismiss the petition," but argued that the court rule took precedence in such a procedural matter and that if the Supreme Court intended for there to be no sanctions for a violation, it would have stated as much in the rule. Id. at 370. This Court rejected the respondent's argument, reasoning that "[t]his Court has consistently interpreted [a preceding section in the court rules] as not requiring dismissal where the time limits set forth in that section have been violated." Id. at 370-371. This Court added, "There is no reason to suppose that the Supreme Court intended that the penalty for delay would be more delay." Id. at 371. This Court held that reversal was not required under MCR 2.613(C). Id.
In this case, respondent has failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the trial court's untimely issuance of its termination decision. She has not provided a reason to believe that a timely decision would have reached a different outcome. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to reversal of the termination decision.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We disagree.
We review a trial court's factual findings regarding statutory grounds for termination of parental rights and the decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 709; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Sanborn, 337 Mich.App. 252, 276; 976 N.W.2d 44 (2021) (cleaned up). "To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong." In re Ellis, 294 Mich.App. 30, 33; 817 N.W.2d 111 (2011). "When applying the clear-error standard in parental termination cases, 'regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.'" In re Mota, 334 Mich.App. 300, 320; 964 N.W.2d 881 (2020), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich. 331, 337; 445 N.W.2d 161 (1989); see also MCR 2.613(C).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. 120, 139; 809 N.W.2d 412 (2011). If at least one statutory ground for termination is established, "we need not consider whether the other grounds cited by the trial court also supported the termination decision." In re Foster, 285 Mich.App. 630, 633; 776 N.W.2d 415 (2009).
A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if "182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order" and "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when "the totality of the evidence amply supports that [the respondent] ha[s] not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to the adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich.App. 253, 272; 779 N.W.2d 286 (2009), "despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services[,]" White, 303 Mich.App. at 710 (cleaned up).
It is undisputed that, at the time of termination, more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial disposition order was entered. Thus, we must determine whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that the conditions that lead to adjudication continued to exist, and there...
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