In re Lockwood

• Decision Date: 05 March 1908
• Citation: 69 A. 8,80 Conn. 513
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re LOCKWOOD et al.

69 A. 8

80 Conn. 513

In re LOCKWOOD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1908.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Ralph Wheeler, Judge.

Application by Alice C. Lockwood and others for the probate of the will of Sarah J. Lockwood, deceased. The probate court admitted the will and Ada M. Lockwood and others, contestants, appealed to the superior court. From a verdict and judgment for the contestants, the proponents appeal. Reversed.

The appeal to this court assigns as reasons of appeal: (1) Error in the charge of the trial court to the jury; (2) error in rulings upon evidence; (3) error in denying a motion for a new trial on the ground of verdict against evidence.

John H. Light and William F. Tammany, for appellants. Stiles Judson and Clement A. Fuller, for appellees.

HAMERSLEY, J. Sarah J. Lockwood, the testatrix of the will in dispute, died December 30, 1903. Her husband, William Lockwood, died intestate in 1878, leaving her and nine children surviving him and an estate which inventoried about $93,000. At his death the youngest of the children was about three years old, and the three older children were of age. About $7,500 was distributed to each of the nine children, and to the widow about $20,000, and her life interest in one-third of the real estate was set to her in a piece of farm land appraised at $8,000. In 1888, the testatrix received a bequest from her own sister amounting to about $30,000. The will in dispute was executed June 27, 1901; the testatrix then being 70 years of age. At that time the youngest child, Emily, then 26 years old and unmarried, Alice, then 33 years old and unmarried, Irving, then 35 years old and unmarried, and Ada, then over 44 years old and unmarried, lived with their mother at the home she had kept up since her husband's death. Irving had for several years been engaged in business for himself. Of the other children, Homer, then 30 years old and married, had lived in Massachusetts for upward of 10 years; Stanley, then 41 years old, had a wife and two children and was in business for himself; George had been dead for five years, leaving a wife and two children; Jennie E., who was older than Ada, had been married to a Mr. Green since 1880 and had one child; Lucy L., the oldest child, had been married to a Mr. Hoyt since 1882 and had two children. The first clause of the will directed the payment of debts. The second and third devised the homestead to Alice and Emily, giving to Ada, while unmarried, a right of occupation jointly with Alice and Emily until the two latter may see fit to sell the same. The fourth bequeathed to Alice $9,000. The fifth bequeathed to Emily $9,000. The sixth bequeathed to St. Mark's Episcopal Church $2,000. The seventh gave the residue, in equal parts, to Lucy, Jennie E., Stanley, Ada, Irving, Homer, and the children of George; the bequest to Jennie E. and Stanley, however, being for life, with remainder to their children. The property thus devised and bequeathed was inventoried at about $46,000. The will was drawn by Henry W. Gregory, then judge of probate for the district of Norwalk. It was drawn in accordance with instructions given to him by the testatrix at two or three interviews in the probate office. Alice drove her mother to Norwalk when she went there for these interviews and remained in the probate office during most of the time her mother was conversing with Judge Gregory. At the time of execution, the testatrix was suffering from a disease which had impaired her bodily strength, and this weakness continued until her death. This will was approved and admitted to probate by the court of probate of Norwalk January 21, 1904, and on February 18th following an appeal to the superior court was taken. The reasons of appeal allege that the paper admitted to probate is not the last will of the testatrix, because at the time of its execution she did not have the requisite testamentary capacity, and because she was induced to execute the will through undue influence exercised by her daughters Alice and Emily.

It appears from the record that the appellants conceded that the testatrix had sufficient mental capacity to make a will directing the payment of her debts, bequeathing $2,000 to St. Mark's Episcopal Church, and appointing her executor, and that the will in question, so far as these provisions were concerned, was validly made by the testatrix without being unduly influenced to do so; but they claimed that the second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh clauses of the will, by which a larger portion of her property was given to her daughters Alice and Emily than was given to her other children, were procured through undue influence exercised by Alice and Emily, and especially by Alice. The jury found in accordance with the claims of the appellants, and the court accepted their verdict and adjudged that the decree of the court of probate approving and admitting to probate said instrument be confirmed in so far as it applies to the first, sixth, and eighth clauses of said will, and be set aside in so far as it applies to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh clauses of said will. It appears that the only seriously contested issue of fact submitted to the jury was the one affirmed by the appellants, namely, that the testatrix was induced to insert in her will the clauses which discriminated in favor of Alice and Emily by force of undue influence exercised by those two daughters. After proof of the execution of the will and testamentary capacity of the testatrix by the attesting witnesses, the appellees (proponents of the will) rested. The appellants, in support of their affirmation of undue influence, produced as witnesses William Lockwood, Irving and Ada Lockwood, the widow of George Lockwood, Lucy Hoyt, and Jennie Green, and Judge Gregory. The last-named witness testified that he drew the will from instructions given him by the testatrix at two or three interviews in the probate court room, and that Alice drove her mother to Norwalk for these interviews and was present in the courtroom when they took place. The other witnesses testified to facts from which the appellants claimed the jury should infer, in connection with the testimony of Judge Gregory as to Alice's presence during his interviews with her mother, that at the time of execution the testatrix was not only physically weakened by illness, but that the natural vigor of her mind was impaired, so that she had less power to resist the pressure of influence; that Alice and Emily had acquired a controlling influence over her; that Alice's relation to her was one of special confidence and trust; and that Alice and Emily did in fact, by the exercise of their influence over their mother, constrain her to Insert in her will the objectionable clauses against her wishes. The appellees, in rebuttal, produced a large number of witnesses, including the physicians who had attended the testatrix in her illness, three of her children, and five of her near relatives, who testified to facts from which the appellees claimed the jury should infer that the testatrix retained during her illness her natural vigor of mind; that she was not under the control of Alice or Emily; that the provisions of the will, in view of the condition of her children, were reasonable and natural; and that Alice and Emily had not in fact exercised any undue influence. There was no direct testimony as to the actual exercise of any influence in procuring the discriminating provisions of the will, except that of Emily, who testified as to her relations with her mother, and that she had taken no part in any way in the making of the will; of Alice, who testified as to driving her mother to Norwalk and what took place there, and that she had not attempted in any way to influence her mother to make the discriminating provisions; and of Judge Gregory, that at his interviews with the testatrix he saw nothing indicating the existence of undue influence.

Upon the close of the testimony, the appellants requested the court to charge the jury as follows "Although it is the ordinary rule that the burden of proof is on those attacking a will to prove undue influence, yet that burden is shifted and rests upon those offering the will for probate in case principal legatees sustain, or a principal legatee sustains, a relation of special confidence to the testatrix, and takes part in procuring the terms and provisions of the will, even though some one else reduce it to writing and draw up the will in form. Undue influence used and yielded to for the sake of peace or quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind, or social discomfort, or family jars or troubles, may be such undue influence, if the provisions of the will are made in consequence of such influence, as will warrant the jury in setting aside the will, or any portion thereof that may he procured thereby, for the...