In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litigation

Decision Date28 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-CV-0559 (WJM).,04-CV-0559 (WJM).
PartiesIn re LORD ABBETT MUTUAL FUNDS FEE LITIGATION.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Jerome M. Congress, Esq., Janine L. Pollack, Esq., Kim B. Levy, Esq., Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, New York, NY, Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel and Chair of Plaintiffs' Executive Committee.

Samuel H. Rudman, Esq., Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, Melville, NY, Marvin L. Frank, Esq., Eric J. Belfi, Esq., Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP, New York, NY, Joseph H. Weiss, Esq., Richard A. Acocelli, Esq., Weiss & Lurie, New York, NY, Members of Plaintiffs' Executive Committee.

Patrick L. Rocco, Esq., Jennier A. Sullivan, Esq., Shalov Stone & Bonner LLP, Morristown, NJ, Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Joseph J. DePalma, Esq., Lite, DePalma, Greenberg & Rivas LLC, Newark, NJ, Gary S. Graifman, Esq., Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, Montvale, NJ, Counsel for Plaintiff.

Anthony P. LaRocco, Esq., Christopher A. Barbarasi, Esq., Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Newark, NJ, Jeffrey B. Maletta, Esq., Nicholas G. Terris, Esq., Jon A. Stanley, Esq., Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Andrew Weissman, Esq., Sam Broderick, Esq., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Mary Sue Henifin, Esq., Tod S. Chasin, Esq., Buchanan Ingersoll, PC, Princeton, NJ, Counsel for Defendants.

AMENDED OPINION

MARTINI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a pair of motions to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (referred to herein as "Complaint" or "Compl.") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), 12(b)(6), and 23.1 — one filed by Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC, Lord Abbett Distributor LLC, Robert S. Dow, and the persons identified in the Complaint as "the Partners" and the other filed by the remaining persons identified in the Complaint as "the Directors and Trustees." There was no oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Accordingly, Counts One, Two, Five, and Seven through Ten are DISMISSED. Counts Three and Four are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1

BACKGROUND

This consolidated action, before this Court on allegations of subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-43, 80b-14, is brought by six shareholders in seven mutual funds managed by Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC ("Lord Abbett") against Lord Abbett, certain of its "Partners," certain "Directors and Trustees" of Lord Abbett-sponsored Funds, Lord Abbett Distributor LLC (Lord Abbett's wholly-owned broker dealer and principal underwriter), and certain other unnamed "John Doe" Defendants. (See Compl. ¶¶ 14-82.) Also named as nominal defendants are more than fifty separate mutual funds managed by Lord Abbett (referred to herein as "Lord Abbett Funds" or the "Fund(s)"). (See Compl. ¶¶ 78-81 & Ex. A.) The action, which purports to assert both class and derivative claims, arises out of broker compensation practices employed by Lord Abbett between February 1999 and December 2003 pursuant to which brokers were allegedly compensated excessively as an incentive for them to steer new investors into Lord Abbett mutual funds. The following are the relevant allegations. To provide some necessary context, the following also briefly describes the Funds' and their disclosed fee and broker compensation practices.

The Funds, Their Fees, and Lord Abbett's Broker Compensation Practices

Lord Abbett is investment advisor to a mutual fund complex that, as of September 30, 2003, maintained over $62.1 billion in assets. (Id. ¶ 20.) The 52 nominal-defendant Funds it manages are open-ended management companies consisting of the capital invested by fund shareholders. (Id. ¶ 78.) They share a common board of directors, are all generally managed and administered by officers and employees of Lord Abbett, all share Lord Abbett as their investment adviser and Lord Abbett Distributor LLC as their principal underwriter and distributor, and pool together fees and expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.)

The Funds prospectuses indicate that Lord Abbett deducts a number of fixed-percentage fees from Fund assets each year. (See March 1, 2003 Prospectus and Statement of Information for the Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund at 6, Ex. G to Decl. of Kim E. Miller [hereinafter "2003 Prospectus & SAI"].)2 These annual fees, which are distinct from those assessed at the time of purchase, are called "Annual Fund Operating Expenses" and include "Management Fees," "Distribution and Services (12b-1) Fees," and "Other Expenses." (Id.) "Distribution and Services (12b-1) Fees" (referred to herein as "12b-1 Fees") are drawn from fund assets pursuant to a written plan "describing all material aspect of ... financing of distribution" (Compl. ¶ 105) and are expended on activities intended to result in the sale of Fund (see 2003 Prospectus & SAI at 7).

The Fund prospectuses' discussion of "Sales Compensation" acknowledges that brokers are compensated for selling Fund shares in part out of 12b-1 Fees: "[T]he Fund and Lord Abbett Distributor pay sales and service compensation to AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS that sell the Fund's shares ..., [which] compensation originates from sales charges ... and 12b-1 distribution fees ...." (2003 Prospectus & SAI at 15.) 12b-1 Fees may also be used to provide brokers with additional concessions for selling Fund shares: "Additional payments may be paid from Lord Abbett Distributor's own resources or from distribution fees received from the Fund and may be made in the form of cash or ... non-cash payments. The non-cash payments may include business seminars ..., including meals and entertainment ...." (Id. at 16 (emphasis added).) Although it is not clear from the allegations in the Complaint, the Fund prospectuses suggest that Lord Abbett Distributor is ultimately compensated out of 12b-1 Fees for any sales compensation or additional concessions it pays to brokers out of its own assets. (See id. at 61 ("Each [12b-1] Plan compensates Lord Abbett Distributor for financing activities primarily intended to sell shares of the Fund.").)

With regard to compensation of brokers for executing portfolio transactions, Fund prospectuses state that "the Fund pays all expenses attributable to its operations ..., including, without limitation, ... expenses connected with executing portfolio transactions." (See id. at 57 (emphasis added).) The Funds generally pay commissions on portfolio transactions above and beyond the lowest possible commission they could otherwise obtain, a fact acknowledged in Fund prospectuses: "Consistent with obtaining best execution, the Fund generally pays ... a higher commission than some brokers might charge on the same transaction.... We pay a commission rate that we believe is appropriate to give maximum assurance that our brokers will provide us, on a continuing basis, the highest level of brokerage services available." (Id. at 58-59.) Elaborating on the circumstances in which Lord Abbett allows the Funds to pay higher brokerage commissions than they could otherwise obtain, the prospectuses state:

Our traders are authorized to pay brokerage commissions in excess of those that other brokers might accept on the same transactions in recognition of the value of the services performed by the executing broker, viewed in terms of either the particular transaction or the overall responsibilities of Lord Abbett, with respect to us and the other accounts they manage. Such services include showing us trading opportunities ..., a willingness and ability to take positions in securities, knowledge of a particular security or market-proven ability to handle a particular type of trade, confidential treatment, promptness and reliability.

(Id. at 59.) For the fiscal years ended October 2002, 2001, and 2000, the Funds paid commissions totaling $27,249,265, $26,213,126, and $13,129,004, respectively. (Id. at 60.)

The Purported Scheme: Undisclosed Revenue-Sharing Payments and Excessive "Soft Dollars"

Against this background, the Complaint alleges that between February 1999 and December 2003 Lord Abbett, unbeknownst to Fund shareholders, compensated brokers excessively as an incentive for brokers to steer unwitting investors into the Lord Abbett Funds. (See generally Compl. ¶¶ 1, 83-93, 103-112.) The Complaint indicates that the broker compensation was "excessive" because it included, above the standard compensation for executing portfolio transaction and for selling Lord Abbett shares, either revenue-sharing payments or "Soft-Dollar" payments. (See id. ¶ 112.) That is, under so-called "Shelf-Space Programs," Lord Abbett entered into undisclosed oral revenue-sharing agreements with brokers pursuant to which Lord Abbett paid brokers "an additional 10 to 15 basis points of compensation from Lord Abbett [for selling Fund shares] as incentive to steer unwitting investors into the Lord Abbett Funds." (See id. ¶¶ 84-91, 93.)3 Lord Abbett also paid excessive "Soft Dollar" commissions — that is, that portion of broker commission that exceeds the broker's execution costs and which, therefore, is permissible only if it compensates "assistance to the money manager in the performance of his investment decision-making responsibilities" — on portfolio transactions not for permissible purposes but simply to compensate brokers for "push[ing] unwitting clients into Lord Abbett Funds." (See id. ¶¶ 111-12.)

In addition to making these broker payments, Lord Abbett allegedly treated brokers who steered investors into its Funds to lavish vacations and engaged in "Directed Brokerage," whereby it directed brokerage business to brokers who steered clients into Lord Abbett Funds. (See id. ¶¶ 92, 103.) Fund prospectuses disclaim the existence of brokerage allocation agreements: "No commitments are made regarding the allocation of brokerage business to or among brokers...." (2003 Prospectus & SAI at 59.) However, the prospectuses...

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