In re Lough, Bankruptcy No. 84-03451-R.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1986
• Docket Number: Bankruptcy No. 84-03451-R.
• Parties: In re Bette Mae LOUGH, Alleged Debtor.
• Court: United States Bankruptcy Courts. Tenth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Michigan

57 B.R. 993 (1986)

In re Bette Mae LOUGH, Alleged Debtor.

Bankruptcy No. 84-03451-R.

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan.

February 24, 1986.

Paul Steinberg, Southfield, Mich., Robert Kane, Alpena, Mich., for debtor.

John Hebert, Bay City, Mich., for Peoples Bank & Trust.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEVEN W. RHODES, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Peoples Bank & Trust of Alpena filed this involuntary petition against Bette Mae Lough pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303 arising from two debts which the bank claims that Mrs. Lough owes to it. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion,¹ the Court concludes that there is a bona fide dispute concerning the bank's claim, and that therefore the involuntary petition must be dismissed.

I.

The first debt upon which the bank claims liability arose from a joint note which Mrs. Lough signed with her husband on April 30, 1973; this note has a balance of approximately $75,000. The second debt allegedly arose from a guaranty which Mrs. Lough signed on November 30, 1967 relating to her husband's various sole obligations with the bank; these obligations were consolidated into one note executed by Mr. Lough on February 19, 1981, in the approximate amount of $135,000. Thus, the bank claims a total indebtedness by Mrs. Lough in the approximate amount of $210,000. In its petition, the bank alleged that there are fewer than twelve creditors and that Mrs. Lough was not generally paying her debts, especially the debt to the bank, as they became due.

In her amended answer, Mrs. Lough admitted signing the April 30, 1973 joint note but nevertheless denied any liability on that note. She claims that this note was secured by a mortgage on property held by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety; that this property was deeded to the bank in lieu of foreclosure; and that if the proceeds from the bank's sale of this property had been applied to this note, rather than to a note on which Mr. Lough was obligated on solely, as required, then the proceeds would have been sufficient to extinguish the joint note.

In her amended answer, Mrs. Lough further alleged that although she signed the November 30, 1967 guaranty, she has no further liability on it in regard to her husband's note of February 19, 1981. She claims she has no liability on it because in 1967 she did not intend to guaranty what arose some fourteen or fifteen years later as a $135,000 note. She also contends that there was no consideration for this guaranty and no reliance upon it by the bank.

Mrs. Lough contends that because there is a bona fide dispute about the bank's claim against her, the bank does not qualify under 11 U.S.C. § 303 as a proper entity to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against her.

To this contention, the bank responds that there are no genuine issues of fact and that on the facts it is or would be entitled to a summary judgment against Mrs. Lough. Therefore, the bank argues, because there is no bona fide dispute, the bank is qualified to file this involuntary petition against Mrs. Lough.

II.

A.

11 U.S.C. § 303(b) provides that an involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition, pursuant to either subparagraph (1), "by three or more entities, each of which is . . . a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute," or subparagraph (2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding employees and insiders, "by one or more of such holders." The phrase "such holders" in subparagraph (2) refers to holders of claims which are "not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute."

The Court notes that the phrase "bona fide dispute" also arises in subsection (h) of Section 303, which provides:

If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed. Otherwise, after trial the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed only if — (1) the debtor is not generally paying such debtor\'s debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute.

The parties cited three cases² interpreting the phrase "bona fide dispute", and these cases are not entirely consistent.

In In re Johnson Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr.D.Hawaii 1985), the court noted that there had been a statutory change implemented by the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984. After reviewing the pre-1984 law, the court noted that the 1984 amendments to the bankruptcy code made significant revisions regarding disputed claims. 49 B.R. at 830. First, the test for the standing of petitioning creditors was revised to provide that holders of claims which are subject to bona fide disputes are barred from being petitioning creditors. Second, debts which are subject to bona fide disputes were excluded from the test provided in section 303(h), which provides that the court shall order relief if the debtor is not paying debts as such debts become due. The court further stated:

It is evident that under the 1984 amendments, creditors holding claims which are subject to bona fide disputes cannot be petitioning creditors under the threshold test of Section 303(b)(1). As stated in Colliers, "this does not mean of course that the debtor can assert any defense to a claim and be successful. Presumably, there must be a `bona fide dispute\' which a bankruptcy judge must find either on a motion to dismiss or at trial." 2 Collier\'s on Bankruptcy ¶ 303.08(b) (1985). . . .

A bona fide dispute is a conflict in which an assertion of a claim or right made in good faith and without fraud or deceit on one side is met by contrary claims or allegations made in good faith and without fraud or deceit on the other side.

49 B.R. at 830.

Then the court listed the following factors to determine whether the claims or defenses are subject to a bona fide dispute:

1. The nature of the dispute;

2. The nature and the extent of the evidence and allegations presented in support of the creditor\'s claim and in support of the debtor\'s contrary claims.

3. Whether the creditor\'s claim and the debtor\'s contrary claims are made in good faith and without fraud or deceit.

4. Whether on balance the interests of the creditor outweighs those of the debtor.

In re Henry, 52 B.R. 8 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1985), reviewed at length the legislative history relating to the addition of the "bona fide dispute" language to Sections 303(b) and 303(h). The Court stated:

The reason for the introduction of this additional language in the statute was explained by its proponent as follows:

The problem can be explained simply. Some courts have interpreted section 303\'s language on a debtor\'s general failure to pay debts as allowing the filing of involuntary petitions and the granting of involuntary relief even when the debtor\'s reason for not paying is a legitimate and good-faith dispute over his or her liability. This interpretation allows creditors to use the Bankruptcy Code as a club against debtors who have bona fide questions about their liability, but who would rather pay up than suffer the stigma of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.

My amendment would correct this problem. Under my amendment, the original filing of an involuntary petition could not be based on debts that are the subject of a good-faith dispute between the debtor and his or her creditors. In the same vein, the granting of an order of relief could not be premised solely on the failure of a debtor to pay debts that were legitimately contested as to liability or amount.

I believe this amendment, although a simple one, is necessary to protect the rights of debtors and to prevent misuse of the bankruptcy system as a tool of coercion. I also believe it corrects a judicial misinterpretation of existing law and congressional intent as to the proper basis for granting involuntary relief. 30 Cong.Rec. S7618 (June 19, 1984) (comments of Senator Baucus). 52 B.R. at 9-10.

In In re Stroop, 51 B.R. 210, 212 (Bankr. D.Colo.1985), the court stated:

This Court has concluded that an appropriate standard in determining whether a claim is subject to a bona fide dispute for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) is that applicable on motions for summary judgment. If the defense of the alleged debtor to the claim of the petitioning creditor raises material issues of fact or law so that a summary judgment could not be rendered as a matter of law in favor of the creditor on a trial of the claim, the claim is subject to a bona fide dispute.

B.

This Court concludes that none of these standards for determining whether there is a bona fide dispute concerning a debt is entirely appropriate. The standard set forth in the Johnston Hawks case is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it improperly gives consideration to the balance of interests as between the creditor and the debtor. These considerations were carried forward from the pre-1984 Amendments Act cases, but there is no basis for this in the statute as amended.

Second, the inquiry into "good faith", "fraud", and "deceit", as...