In re Louis S.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-05-0131.,4-05-0131. |
| Citation | 838 N.E.2d 226 |
| Parties | In re LOUIS S., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Louis S., Respondent-Appellant). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Jeff M. Plesko, Director, Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Anna, Cynthia Z. Tracy, Staff Attorney (Court-appointed), Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Peoria, for Louis S.
John P. Schmidt, State's Attorney, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Thomas R. Dodegge, Staff Attorney, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
In January 2005, a petition was filed for the administration of involuntary treatment as to respondent, Louis S., alleging he had a mental illness and lacked the capacity to give informed consent. The trial court conducted a hearing and granted the petition.
On appeal, respondent argues (1) his procedural due-process rights were violated and (2) the State failed to set forth clear and convincing evidence warranting authorized involuntary treatment. We reverse.
On January 21, 2005, respondent was involuntarily committed for 90 days. Respondent has appealed from that order in case No. 4-05-0085, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 297 Ill.Dec. 731, 838 N.E.2d 218, 2005 WL 2932267 (2005). On January 25, 2005, Dr. William Earley of the McFarland Mental Health Center filed a petition for administration of involuntary treatment as to respondent. The petition alleged respondent lacked the capacity to give informed consent, and it sought authorization to administer various psychotropic medications. On January 26, 2005, counsel was appointed to represent respondent and notice of the January 28 hearing was sent.
On January 28, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. Dr. Zhihong Zhang testified as an expert in psychiatry. Dr. Zhang stated he was part of respondent's treatment team for his bipolar disorder. Respondent showed symptoms of paranoia, "was very aggressive," and "tried to threaten his wife with a knife." Dr. Zhang had prescribed Zyprexa to reduce respondent's paranoia, delusions, and aggressive behavior. Dr. Zhang stated respondent had exhibited aggressive behavior by being "very loud and intrusive" and the medication would decrease his paranoia and delusions and help organize his thought processes. If the medication was not given, Dr. Zhang stated respondent's situation would get worse. Dr. Zhang opined the potential benefits from the medication outweighed the potential side effects such as weight gain and a sedating effect.
Dr. Zhang testified he discussed the medication with respondent, but respondent refused to take the written statement of the possible side effects. Respondent did not seem to "understand what the medication would do to affect him" and stated he did not need the medication. Dr. Zhang opined a less-restrictive service was not available and recovery would not happen without medication.
Respondent then cross-examined Dr. Zhang. Respondent questioned him about clinical notes finding him paranoid. After respondent's counsel stated she needed to ask the questions, respondent stated his intention to represent himself with help from counsel on "procedural matters." The following exchange occurred:
Respondent then asked Dr. Zhang if it was possible to bring the nurses who wrote the notes into court and question them. The court denied the request.
When respondent asked how he manifested his aggression, Dr. Zhang stated respondent had threatened his wife with a knife. Further, respondent was intrusive and spoke "very loud." Respondent claimed he had not been convicted of harming his wife, but the trial court stated the evidence in a prior hearing was sufficient to require his admittance to the hospital. When asked why he had not been able to appeal that issue, the court stated it was currently on appeal. After the court told respondent about the appeal process, the following exchange occurred:
How do we know that for a fact?
I'm not going to argue with you all day today about what happened or didn't happen. I heard evidence about what happened.
The issue today * * * the doctor [is] of the opinion that you need to take medication to improve your situation, that this is chronic, it's gone on for many years, that you will not take the medication, and they're asking [for] an order from me for you to take the medication and that is the [o]rder."
The court allowed the State's petition. This appeal followed.
Initially, we note this case is moot. Section 2-107.1(a-5)(5) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2004)) provides that an order for the administration of authorized involuntary treatment shall in no event be effective for more than 90 days. Here, the trial court's order granting the petition for involuntary treatment was entered on January 28, 2005. Since the 90 days have passed and the court's order no longer has any force or effect, it is impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief to any party. Thus, any decision rendered would merely be advisory, and "[g]enerally, a court of review will not consider moot or abstract questions or render advisory decisions." In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424, 433 (2004). Moot issues may be reviewed, however, under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Robert S., 213 Ill.2d at 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d at 433.
"The criteria for application of the public[-]interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur." Robert S., 213 Ill.2d at 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d at 433-34.
Our supreme court has stated the authorization of involuntary medication of mental-health patients is a matter of "`substantial public concern.'" Robert S., 213 Ill.2d at 46, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d at 434, quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 402, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2002). Also, the short duration of an order authorizing involuntary treatment renders it likely that similar litigation would again be mooted by the expiration of the order. Robert S., 213 Ill.2d at 46, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d at 434. Thus, we find review appropriate.
Respondent argues he did not receive at least three days' notice prior to a hearing on the petition for authorized involuntary treatment as required by the Code. We agree.
Section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2004)) provides, in part, as follows:
"The petitioner shall deliver a copy of the petition, and notice of the time and place of the hearing, to the respondent, his or her attorney, any known agent or attorney-in-fact, if any, and the guardian, if any, no later than 3 days prior to the date of the hearing."
This court has stated " " In re O.C., 338 Ill.App.3d 292, 298, 273 Ill.Dec. 287, 788 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (2003), quoting In re Luttrell, 261 Ill.App.3d 221, 230, 198 Ill.Dec. 612, 633 N.E.2d 74, 81 (1994).
In the case sub judice, the petition was filed on January 25, 2005. A copy of the petition for forced medications was given to respondent on the same date. The copy of the petition did not notify respondent of the date of the hearing because a hearing had not been set by the court. The order setting the hearing on the petition for January 28, 2005, was filed January 26, 2005, and mailed to respondent. Thus, respondent did not receive three days' notice prior to the hearing as required by the Code.
In In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 226-27, 204 Ill.Dec. 121, 641 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1994), our supreme court held formal notice under a section 2-107.1 petition is not necessary if the respondent and his attorney were aware of the proceedings and given ample opportunity to respond to the arguments made. Instead, the respondent must establish he was prejudiced by the absence of formal notice. C.E., 161 Ill.2d at 227, 204 Ill.Dec. 121, 641 N.E.2d at 357.
In this case, we question whether two days' notice sufficiently afforded responde...
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...the same conclusion. See In re A.W., 381 Ill.App.3d 950, 957, 320 Ill.Dec. 687, 887 N.E.2d 831 (2008) ; In re Louis S., 361 Ill.App.3d 774, 780, 297 Ill.Dec. 739, 838 N.E.2d 226 (2005). This is because we must decide the sufficiency of the evidence based solely on the evidence presented at ......
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