In re Louisville Underwriters

• Decision Date: 31 March 1890
• Citation: 10 S.Ct. 587,134 U.S. 488,33 L.Ed. 991
• Parties: In re LOUISVILLE UNDERWRITERS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

10 S.Ct. 587

134 U.S. 488

33 L.Ed. 991

In re LOUISVILLE UNDERWRITERS.

March 31, 1890.

J. R. Beckwith, for petitioner.

O. B. Sansum, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This is a petition by a corporation of the state of Kentucky for a writ of prohibition to the judge of the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, to prohibit him from entertaining jurisdiction of a libel in admiralty in personam, filed April 23, 1889, by the Natchez & New Orleans Packet & Transportation Company, also a corporation of Kentucky, against the petitioner, 'in a cause of contract civil and maritime,' upon a policy of insurance by which the petitioner insured against perils of the seas and rivers, and other perils, a steam-boat of the libelant employed in the navigation of the Mississippi river.

By Pub. Laws, La. Feb. 26, 1877, No. 21, no insurance company organized under the laws of any other state shall take risks or transat any business through an agent in Louisiana, without having filed in the office of the secretary of state a certified copy of a vote of its directors appointing such an agent there to transact business, and to take risks, accompanied by a warrant of appointment from the company containing an express consent that service of legal process on him shall be as valid as if served on the company. By a copy of the record of the proceedings in the district court annexed to the return to the rule to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, it appears that the libelee had filed with the secretary of state of Louisiana a copy of a vote of its directors, as well as a warrant of appointment, appointing William M. Railey its attorney at New Orleans, as required by the statute of Louisiana; that the policy sued on was signed by the libelee's president and secretary at Louisville, in the state of Kentucky, was not to be binding until countersigned by its authorized agent at New Orleans, and was countersigned by Railey; that a citation to the libelee was issued by the district court, and served by the marshal upon Railey in person; that a motion to quash the libel, and an exception to it, upon the ground, among others, that neither party was an inhabitant of the eastern district of Louislana and that the libelee had no property or credits within the district, were overruled by the district court, and the libelee ordered to answer; and that the libelee thereupon answered, and took depositions under commission. Before the cause had been brought to a hearing, the petition for a writ of prohibition was presented to this court.

It is admitted that the district courts of the United States, sitting in admiralty, have jurisdiction of the matter of the libel. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1. But it is argued, in support of the prohibition, that no libel in personam can be sustained against a corporation in a district not within the state in which it is incorporated; and this argument is rested on the latter part of the following provision in the act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 1: 'But no person shall be arrested in one district, for trial in another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court; and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts, against any person by any original process of proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.' 24 St. 552. A brief reference to previous acts of congress and decisions of this court makes it clear that this provision has no application to causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. By the ancient and settled practice of courts of admiralty, a libel in personam may be maintained for any cause within their jurisdiction, wherever a monition can be served upon the libelee, or an attachment made of any personal property or credits of his; and this practice has been recognized and upheld by the rules and decisions of this court. Rule 2 in Admiralty; Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473; Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272; Insurance Co. v. Navigation Co., Id. 307; Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. 69, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; In re Manufacturing Co., 108 U. S. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894. The judgment, delivered at October term, 1873, in Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., just cited, is really decisive of this case. The question there presented was the construction of that provision of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, c. 20 § 11, by which, after defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in 'suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,' in which the United States were plaintiffs, or an alien was a party, or the suit was between a citizen of the state where it was brought and a citizen of another state, and also defining the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts, it was provided as follows: 'But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court; and no civil suit shall b brought before either of said courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ.' 1 St. 79.

Upon a consideration of the acts of congress upon the subject, and especially of other sections of the judiciary act of 1789, of which section 9 conferred upon the district courts 'exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit courts of certain 'suits at common law' by the United States, (1 St. 77,) ...