In re Love
| Decision Date | 26 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-64 (DNH/ATB) |
| Parties | AMORE LOVE, Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
AMORE LOVE, Plaintiff, pro se
The Clerk has sent to the court, what is labeled a "Private Intercession Petition," filed by pro se "petitioner"1 Amore Love. (Dkt. No. 1). Petitioner Love has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") (Dkt. No. 2).
A review of plaintiff's IFP application shows that he declares he is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 2). He also declares that his employer is God, and that he makes $0.00, listing his pay period as "eternity." (Dkt. No. 2 at 1). Plaintiff also states that he has no income from any sources, and that he has no money in a checking or savings account. (Dkt. No. 2 at 1-2). Although it is unclear how petitioner would have been able to put together his petition, with exhibits which total over 500 pages and bring it to Albany,2 New York if he had no funds from any source, the court will find for purposes of this Order and Report-Recommendation, that petitioner satisfies the financial criteria for proceeding without the payment of fees.
In addition to determining whether petitioner meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) -(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a petitioner to proceed. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) ().
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555). The court will now turn to a consideration of the petition under the above standards.
Although at first, difficult to decipher, the petitioner's claims become clearer if the court literally reads "between the lines." It is well-settled that pro se pleadings are read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). In this case, the petition is 195 pages long, and the exhibits are 320 pages long. The petitioner's statements are well hidden between pages of religious quotations. In fact, petitioner does not make any specific allegations until page 176 of the petition. Petitioner has listed "breach of contract" as one of his claims, although the petition is replete with references to the United States Constitution, and he lists diversity as his basis for jurisdiction. (Civil Cover Sheet) (Dkt. No. 1-3).
In essence,3 the petitioner is attempting to challenge the November 3, 2020 presidential election and asks that this court issue a temporary restraining order ("TRO") preventing the January 21, 2020 inauguration of President Joseph R. Biden and Vice-President Kamala Harris.4 (Petition ("Pet.") at 193). Petitioner also asks that this court issue a preliminary injunction, repealing or voiding the January 7, 2021 Electoral College certification because it was influenced by foreign forces, based on erroneous facts and law, based on a breach of fiduciary duty and contract, and based on a fiduciary duty owed to God and the petitioner's "beneficiaries." (Pet. at 193). Petitioner also requests that this court begin a nationwide inquiry into the November 3, 2020 election, particularly in the states of Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and any other state which was denied re-certification due to "irregularities." (Id.) There are no "respondents" or "defendants" listed in the caption, the civil cover sheet, or anywhere in the petition, although petitioner requests that the court enjoin President Biden and Vice President Harris from taking office.
As part of the petition, petitioner also asks this court to accept the papers filed by the State of Texas and Amici Curiae in Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155 Orig., 2020 WL 7296814 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020). (Pet. at 185). Petitioner has attached copies of the papers as Exhibits 6-9 to his petition.5 He has also attached a multitude of other documents, including copies of excerpts from the Federalist Papers. (Pet.'s Ex. generally). Petitioner states that he is bringing this action "on behalf of" a number of "beneficiaries" who he lists at the beginning of the petition.6 These "beneficiaries" include "All Sovereign America People;" [Former] President Donald J. Trump; all national, state, and local Justices and Judges; all national, state, and local law enforcement; and twenty-two other individuals who appear to be the Attorney General and Solicitor General of Texas, together with the Attorneys General of the seventeen states that joined in submitting an Amicus Brief before the Supreme Court in Texas v. Pennsylvania. (Pet. at 1)7 (Pet.'s Exs. 9, 10 & pp. 2-45, 47-75, 76).
It is well-settled that an individual who is not a licensed attorney may proceed pro se, but may not represent others in a law suit.8 Whitfield v. Johnson, 763 F. App'x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2019). In Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d at 20, the Second Circuit stated that the court has a responsibility to ensure appropriate representation for the parties appearing before it, even if those parties do not raise the issue.
In this case, although the petitioner purports to act "on behalf of" a myriad of people, including "all sovereign America people," he may not do so. He is a pro se party, who has not even identified himself. He has not indicated that he is admitted to the practice of law in any state or federal jurisdiction. Thus, he may only proceed on his own behalf, and he may not represent any of his listed co-petitioners. The court will proceed to consider the petition to the extent that the petitioner may bring it on his own behalf.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the federal courts' authority to hear only disputes involving "Cases" and "Controversies."Common Cause/New York v. Brehm, 344 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). A party invoking the court's jurisdiction must have standing to sue. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 (2000)). "Standing "'is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.'" Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim, and the court may raise the absence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Id. (citing inter alia United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Viltrakis, 108 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The elements of standing are "(1) a concrete and particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Dominguez v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 19 CIV. 10172, 2020 WL 3263258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020) (quoting Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, ___U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Standing to seek injunctive relief requires "'a real or immediate threat' of injury.'" Id. (quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983)). The actual controversy must exist throughout the litigation. Id. (citing Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)).
In a relevant section of the petition, petitioner states as follows:
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