In re Lucas
Decision Date | 09 June 1989 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 386-05479,Adv. No. 388-0143. |
Parties | In re Elizabeth Hayes LUCAS, Debtor. Jane B. FORBES, Trustee, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth Hayes LUCAS and Holiday Corporation Savings and Retirement Plan, Defendants. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Sixth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Jane B. Forbes, Franklin, Tenn., trustee.
Charles W. Broun, III, Holiday Corp., Memphis, Tenn., for Holiday Corp. Sav. and Retirement Plan.
The issues presented on cross-motions for summary judgment are: (1) whether Mackey v. Lanier, 486 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) upsets the Chapter 7 trustee's recovery of vested ERISA-qualified pension benefits that are not exempt under Tennessee or non-bankruptcy federal law; and (2) whether a pension fund is liable for benefits paid to the debtor after notice of the estate's claim. Mackey does not affect the trustee's right to non-exempt pension benefits. The trustee can recover post-petition distributions from the debtor or the pension fund.
This is a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E) (Supp.1988). The following are findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bankr.R. 7052.
Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 on December 22, 1986. Schedule B-4 listed a $2,000 exemption in a retirement fund not listed as an asset on Schedule B-2. An alert trustee inquired about the retirement fund by letter to debtor's attorney dated January 27, 1987. By letter dated January 30, 1987, Holiday Corporation was notified by the debtor's lawyer that "Jane B. Forbes, Chapter 7 Trustee" would be seeking information regarding the debtor's pension benefits. Associate General Counsel for Holiday, by letter dated February 20, 1987, acknowledged the interest of the Chapter 7 trustee and inquired of the debtor's attorney: "it would be very helpful to me if the situation giving rise to any further queries were explained." By letter from the trustee dated April 6, 1987, Holiday was informed:
I am trustee in bankruptcy for the above individual . . . According to your letter, a certain percentage of the contributions vest and become 100% sic after eight (8) years sic service by the employee. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542 and § 543, I am requesting that you provide me with a complete accounting of amounts in Elizabeth Hayes Lucas\' account with a breakdown as to the amounts that have vested and the amounts that are not vested. Should you have any questions or should you require a subpoena to provide me with this information, please advise me within the next ten (10) days.
Holiday's counsel responded on April 20, 1987 advising that $5,863.08 was vested as of January, 1987. In April and again in May, the trustee notified the attorney for the debtor that the "vested" pension benefits were property of the bankruptcy estate. The debtor requested withdrawals from Holiday of $1,500 on April 16, 1987, $1,161.13 on May 7, 1987 and $4,829.98 on August 24, 1987.
The trustee filed this complaint against the debtor and Holiday1 to recover that portion of the vested pension benefits paid to the debtor post-petition exceeding the $2,000 personal property exemption claimed pursuant to TENN.CODE ANN. § 26-2-102 (1980).2
It is conceded that the Holiday Corporation Savings and Retirement Plan is not a spendthrift trust under Tennessee law, thus, the debtor's vested pension benefits became property of the bankruptcy estate at filing on December 22, 1986. In re Ridenour, 45 B.R. 72, 78 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1984) (). See also In re Faulkner, 79 B.R. 362 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1987).
Tennessee has enacted exemptions pertaining to pension benefits.3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-111 provides in part:
TENN.CODE ANN. § 26-2-111 (1980) (emphasis added).
The debtor's pension benefits are not subject to exemption under § 26-2-111 because the debtor has access to vested benefits greater than that permitted by the highlighted proviso. The Holiday Corporation Savings and Retirement Plan dated June, 1987 provides: The minimum amount a participant can borrow is $500 and the maximum depends on the vested money available in the account. Participants may have two loans outstanding if one loan was made to acquire or build a home. The plan allows hardship withdrawals: "If you need money because you or a family member have big medical bills or need to finance a home or a college education, you can apply for a hardship withdrawal of your before tax savings." A participant "can receive all the vested money . . . when you: leave the company, retire at or after age 55, or become permanently disabled." Leaving the company includes voluntary termination. Since the Holiday plan fails the proviso of § 26-2-111(1)(D), there is no Tennessee exemption available to the debtor to defeat recovery of the debtor's benefits for the bankruptcy estate, net of the $2,000 conceded by the trustee. See In re Clark, 18 B.R. 824 (Bankr.E.D. Tenn.1982) (analysis of § 26-2-111(1)(D)).
Mackey does not change this result. In Mackey, the Supreme Court considered a Georgia statute that prohibited garnishment of employee welfare benefits. The Supreme Court concluded that ERISA preempted state anti-assignment or anti-alienation of ERISA-qualified welfare plan benefits. Because there was no protection in ERISA for garnishment of welfare benefits, Georgia could not enact a statute that prohibited garnishment. The predicate for the pre-emption question in Mackey is not here present: There is no state exemption statute applicable to this debtor that might be pre-empted by ERISA.
The trustee can avoid the post-petition transfers of pension benefits to the debtor and recover the amounts transferred.
11 U.S.C.S. § 549(a) provides:
11 U.S.C.S. § 549(a) (1986).
This petition was filed in December of 1986. The debtor's vested pension benefits were property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a) (1986). The debtor demanded and received payments of pension benefits from Holiday on April 16, 1987, May 7, 1987 and August 24, 1987. Each payment of benefits was a transfer of property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(50) (Supp.1988). These transfers were not authorized by title 11, were not authorized by this court, nor did the debtor make any attempt to obtain court authorization, notwithstanding that debtor's counsel was aware of the trustee's assertion of rights in the pension benefits at least as early as January 30, 1987—nearly three months before the debtor's first withdrawal.
Upon avoidance of a transfer under § 549, 11 U.S.C.S. § 550(a)(1) authorizes the trustee to recover, for the benefit of the estate, "the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer . . ." 11 U.S.C.S. § 550(a)(1) (1986). The debtor is the initial transferee of transfers of pension benefits avoidable under § 549.
The debtor had an affirmative duty to surrender property of the estate to the trustee and to assist the trustee in administration of the estate. 11 U.S.C.S. § 521 (1986). Through counsel, the debtor was fully informed that the trustee claimed the pension benefits. In complete disregard of the debtor's duties, and in violation of the automatic stay,4 the debtor demanded and received property of the estate from Holiday. Section 550(a)(1) entitles the trustee to recover from the debtor the avoidable post-petition transfers of pension benefits.
11 U.S.C.S. § 542(a) required Holiday to turn over to the trustee the debtor's vested benefits and entitles the trustee to recover from Holiday the benefits wrongfully paid to the debtor. The statutory protection in § 542(c) is not available to Holiday.
11 U.S.C.S. § 542 provides in part:
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