In re Luna-Ruiz

• Decision Date: 19 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. CV 13-5059 VAP (AJW),CV 13-5059 VAP (AJW)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: In the Matter of the Extradition of GUSTAVO LUNA-RUIZ, a/k/a Gustavo Luna Guzman, a/k/a Gustavo De La O, a/k/a Tavo A Fugitive from the Government of the United Mexican States.

In the Matter of the Extradition of

GUSTAVO LUNA-RUIZ, a/k/a Gustavo Luna Guzman, a/k/a Gustavo De La O, a/k/a Tavo

A Fugitive from the Government of the United Mexican States.

No. CV 13-5059 VAP (AJW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

March 19, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CERTIFYING EXTRADITABILITY

Introduction

The United States of America (the "government" or the "United States"), acting on behalf of the United Mexican States ("Mexico"), has requested the extradition to Mexico of Gustavo Luna-Ruiz, also known as Gustavo Luna Guzman, Gustavo De La O, or "Tavo" ("Luna-Ruiz" or "relator"), pursuant to the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. See Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, signed at Mexico City on May 4, 1978 ("Extradition Treaty"), and entered into force January 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 1980 WL 309106 (Jan. 25, 1980).

On March 29, 2013, the United States filed a complaint on Mexico's behalf for the extradition of Luna-Ruiz in United States of America v. Gustavo Luna-Ruiz, 13-MJ-00959. Luna-Ruiz was arrested in the United States pursuant to an arrest warrant on April 18, 2013. He subsequently was released on bond, with conditions.

The United States filed formal extradition papers and a request for extradition ("Extradition Request") under seal on July 17, 2013. On September 23, 2013, the United States filed the Extradition Request in redacted form ("Redacted Papers" or "RP")¹ and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Extradition. The Extradition Request includes a certified copy of a February 1, 2000 arrest warrant issued by a court in Mexico. The arrest warrant charges Luna-Ruiz with the crime of aggravated homicide in the August 29, 1999 death in Tecate, Baja California, Mexico of Jesus Francisco Cordero Amador ("Cordero"), in violation of Articles 123, 147, 148, and 126 of the Penal Code for the State of Baja California, Mexico. [RP 80, 93-103]. The Extradition Request indicates that the crime of aggravated homicide is punishable by a term of imprisonment of 20 to 50 years and is within the scope of Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty. [RP 1-3, 108].

Through counsel, Luna-Ruiz filed an opposition to the extradition request ("Opp.") and supporting exhibits under seal on January 9, 2014. The government filed a reply memorandum on January 12, 2014.

An extradition hearing was conducted on February 18, 2014. The government and Luna-Ruiz were represented by counsel during the hearing. The court has considered the parties' written submissions, the documentary record in this case, the parties' stipulations made on the record during the hearing, and counsel's oral arguments during the hearing.

Discussion

Standard for Certification of Extraditability

Extradition from the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. section 3184, which confers jurisdiction on "any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate judge authorized soto do by a court of the United States" to conduct an extradition hearing under the relevant extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting nation, and to issue a certification of extraditability to the Secretary of State.² 18 U.S.C. § 3184; In re Requested Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 1996).

To obtain a certification of extraditability on behalf of a requesting state, the United States has the burden of demonstrating each of the following elements: (1) the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to conduct extradition proceedings; (2) the court possesses personal jurisdiction over the person named in the extradition request; (3) a valid extradition treaty exists between the requesting state and the United States; (4) the extradition treaty between the requesting state and the United States is, and at all relevant times has been, in full force and effect; (5) the person named in the extradition request is charged with having committed a criminal offense within the jurisdiction of the requesting state; (6) the charged offense is extraditable under the relevant extradition treaty (that is, the offense charged falls within the terms of the relevant extradition treaty); (7) the person named in the extradition request is the person arrested and brought before the court; and (8) there is competent evidence establishing probable cause to believe that the person named in the extradition request committed the charged offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3190; Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008); Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1009 (2006); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782-783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); In re Extradition of Santos, 795 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969-970 (C.D. Cal. 2011). "Extradition treaties are to be liberally construed so as to effect their purpose, that is, to surrender fugitives for trial for their alleged offenses." Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 14 (1936). "After an extradition magistrate certifies that anindividual can be extradited, it is the Secretary of State, representing the executive branch, who ultimately decides whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting country." Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006).

During the extradition hearing, counsel for the government and relator stipulated that all of the elements required for certification of extraditability except the element of probable cause have been satisfied. Accordingly, the only disputed issue is whether the record contains competent evidence establishing probable cause to believe that Luna-Ruiz committed the charged offense of aggravated homicide.

Authentication and admissibility of evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in extradition hearings. Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1996); Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). Instead, the admissibility of evidence in extradition proceedings is governed by "the general extradition law of the United States and the provisions of the" Extradition Treaty. Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 834 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); accord, Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1406.

"The authentication requirements for documentary evidence are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3190, which specifies that 'the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that submitted documents are authenticated in the manner required.'" Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (per curiam); see Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916) (holding that documentary evidence that was "properly authenticated in accordance with" the predecessor provision to section 3190 was "competent" and "sufficient" to establish probable cause).

The Extradition Treaty states that the documents "accompany[ing] the request for extradition, shall be received in evidence when: . . . b) In the case of a request emanating from the United Mexican States, they are certified by the principle [sic] diplomatic or consular officer of theUnited States in Mexico." Extradition Treaty, art. 10, § 6. The Extradition Treaty imposes no supplementary authentication requirements or other requirements for the admissibility of documentary evidence.

The documents submitted by Mexico in support of the Extradition Request were certified on June 7, 2013 by Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne, who at the time was the principal diplomatic officer of the United States in Mexico. [RP 1-3]. Therefore, those documents have been properly authenticated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3190 and the Extradition Treaty. In any event, relator does not challenge the admissibility in this extradition proceeding of any of the evidence submitted in support of the Extradition Request. See Man-Seok Choe v. Torres, 525 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that where it was undisputed that the government's evidence was "certified and authenticated in accordance with the admissibility requirements of" the relevant treaty and 18 U.S.C. § 3190, "the magistrate judge [was] authorized to consider it").

Probable cause

Relator contends that the government's evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that he committed the charged offense, and that even if the government's evidence amounts to probable cause, evidence proffered by relator in opposition to the extradition request "obliterates" the government's evidence of probable cause. [Opp. 13-25].

The Extradition Treaty states that an "extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to the laws of the requested Party, either to justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he has been accused had been committed in that place or to prove that he is the person convicted by the courts of the requesting Party." Extradition Treaty, art. 3. This provision "requires extradition under the [Extradition] Treaty to be based on competent evidence that would be sufficient to establish probable cause to hold a defendant for trial under United States law." Wang v. Masaitis, 316 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2004)(construing nearly identical treaty language) (quoting Emami, 834 F.2d at 1447); see Barapind, 400 F.3d at 747 ("Certification of extradition is lawful only when the requesting nation has demonstrated probable cause to believe the accused person is guilty of committing the charged crimes."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184; Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the record must "contain[] competent evidence to support the conclusion that there was probable cause to believe the petitioner guilty") (quoting Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1984)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).

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