In re Lyda
| Decision Date | 03 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 359601 |
| Parties | In re M. J. LYDA, Minor. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2020-000672-NA
Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
Respondent-father Mauricio Joshua Lyda, appeals by right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, ML. The termination proceedings arose out of respondent's sexual assaults of ML's older half-sister, to whom respondent had been a caregiver and father-figure for many years. Respondent denied committing the assaults, but for purposes of this appeal, he does not challenge the trial court's findings that he did commit the assaults. Furthermore, respondent does not challenge the trial court's findings that statutory grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, respondent only challenges the trial court's best-interests findings. For the most part, respondent relies on the undisputed fact that he had a strong, close, healthy and nurturing emotional bond with ML. The trial court nevertheless concluded that the risk of harm to ML was unacceptably high, and it found termination in ML's bests interests. We affirm.
The proceedings below involved three children: AM, AS, and ML all of whom share the same mother, ALM. Respondent-father is the father of ML, the youngest child; the older children have other fathers. Petitioner sought to take jurisdiction over all three children because, in relevant part, AM had disclosed that respondent had sexually assaulted her on three[1] occasions, and ALM became verbally and emotionally abusive toward AM when AM attempted to tell ALM about the assaults. The petition alleged that respondent and ALM were partners and lived together.
Petitioner sought, in relevant part, to terminate respondent's parental rights to ML. Respondent was allowed to have visitation with ML during the pendency of the proceedings.
At respondent's bench trial, most of the testimony came from AM. AM testified that respondent came into her life when she was eight or nine years old, and, before respondent assaulted her, he was like a father to her. She testified that respondent first sexually assaulted her when she was twelve years old. At the time, AM was living with respondent, her two siblings, respondent's mother, and five of respondent's mother's other children.[2] At that time, ALM had moved out and was living with an ex-boyfriend, for reasons unknown to AM. ALM simply left the children behind and in respondent's care. The assault happened at night, while AM was sleeping in the room in which ALM previously stayed. AM testified that she woke up with respondent on top of her with his penis inside her. She had fallen asleep wearing a t-shirt and basketball shorts, but when she woke up, her shorts and underwear were gone. She tried to get respondent off of her, but at that point the respondent's mother called for AM, so respondent "hurried up and got off of me, and I went downstairs." Respondent did not say anything during the assault. AM explained that she did not tell anyone in part because "I didn't want to see my sister go through what she's going through now," apparently referring to the termination proceedings, and in part because she felt nobody would believe her, especially not ALM. According to AM, ALM had a history of refusing to believe AM when AM told ALM about things members of respondent's family had said.
When the second assault occurred, AM was again living with the same individuals, albeit at a different address; this time ALM was temporarily not present because she was in jail for a few days. AM was in the room she shared with ML, although ML had gone downstairs before the assault occurred. Respondent came into the room smelling of liquor, looked over at AM, pulled her clothes off, got on top of her, and raped her; she tried to push him off while he told her to be quiet. AM was too scared to scream. Eventually, respondent stopped and AM ran downstairs. ALM got out of jail a day or two later, and two or three days after that, AM attempted to tell ALM what happened. Previously, AM's cousin had informed AM's aunt and uncle, who called ALM. ALM responded by asking AM if AM knew the difference between sex and rape, and she told AM that AM was a liar when AM attempted to describe details of what respondent did. AM's aunt and uncle took AM to live with her grandmother, but respondent and ALM would not permit AS or ML to be removed. AM saw ALM occasionally thereafter, but much of her interaction with ALM thereafter was negative, and she had no further contact with respondent. By the time of trial, ALM had apparently come to believe AM. ALM testified that she and respondent lived together for quite some time before either of the sexual assaults, and she had no prior reason to be concerned about respondent.
Respondent argued that there had been no allegations of any wrongdoing committed by respondent against ML, there was no physical evidence that respondent actually assaulted AM, and none of AM's testimony was corroborated. Furthermore, the assault allegations had been reported to the Wayne County Prosecutor, and almost two years later, there was nothing to suggest a criminal conviction was impending. He opined that a parent's rights should not be terminated on the basis of a single person's word when there were no allegations that the parent did anything wrong to the child at issue. Petitioner noted that it was common for there to be no physical evidence of sexual abuse, but AM's testimony was consistent and believable. It recounted that AM regarded respondent as a father figure, they had been residing together as a family for many years, and respondent sexually assaulted AM when she was twelve years old on two occasions. In addition to the principle that how a person treats one child may be indicative of how that person would treat another generally, respondent assaulted a sibling of his daughter, ML. Petitioner argued that AM's testimony was enough to establish grounds for the trial court to take jurisdiction over the children and statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights. The lawyer-guardian ad litem concurred with petitioner.
The trial court ruled from the bench that statutory grounds for termination of respondent's parental rights had been established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) [parent's act caused a sibling to suffer physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and reasonable likelihood child will suffer from injury or abuse if placed in parent's home], (3)(g) [failure to provide proper care or custody despite being financially able to do so], (3)(j) [reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent's home], (3)(k)(ii) [parent abused sibling of child including criminal sexual conduct involving penetration and reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to care of the parent], and (3)(k)(ix) [parent abused sibling of child as defined in MCL 722.622 and reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to care of the parent. The matter then proceeded to a dispositional hearing that included a best-interests hearing for respondent.
The assigned foster care supervisor testified that ML was currently placed with her maternal grandmother, where she was doing well. Respondent's visits with ML were appropriate ML looked forward to those visits, and ML and respondent had a strong emotional bond. However, ML was also placed with AM and AS, and it would be unacceptable for respondent to have continued contact with AM. Furthermore, although ML was apparently unaware of respondent's assault of AM, ML's feelings toward respondent might be affected if she understood what respondent did to AM. Furthermore, because respondent had been like a father to AM and had cared for AM for six years, it was likely that respondent would eventually also assault ML. The foster care supervisor opined that on balance, it would be in ML's best interests for respondent's parental rights to be terminated. A report from the Clinic for Child Study was admitted into evidence without objection. In relevant part, the clinician who interviewed respondent noted that respondent seemed to have very low intellectual capacity and extremely poor operational judgment.[3] Petitioner argued that although the allegations might remain unproven in the criminal context, for purposes of this proceeding, AM had been found to be truthful about the two sexual assaults. Petitioner pointed out that respondent had been involved in the family for at least six years as a father figure, including when the mother was not around, and sexually assaulting AM twice "had really ripped this family apart, and we are in a scenario where [ML] could be at risk of harm if continued contact with father." Notwithstanding how well respondent's visits went, "if he could sexually assault [AM], who he treated like a daughter and has known since such a young age, there's no reason he couldn't do the same thing to [AS], or could do the same thing to [ML]." Particularly given his extremely poor decision-making skills, ML would be at risk of harm unless his parental rights were terminated. Petitioner acknowledged that ML was placed with a relative. The LGAL opined that the only scenario under which it might make sense not to terminate respondent's rights "would be a situation where [ML] was totally separated from the rest of her family; and in my scenario, in fact, she would be older." The LGAL also pointed out that respondent had in fact been bound over in the criminal matter. Respondent admitted that he had been bound over in the criminal matter, but he emphasized that a bindover was not based on the beyond a reasonable doubt...
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