In re M-D-
| Citation | 21 I&N Dec. 1180 |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | Interim Decision No. 3339. |
| Parties | In re M-D-, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In an oral decision dated July 24, 1996, an Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable based on his own admissions, and denied his applications for asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h)(1994). The Immigration Judge granted voluntary departure pursuant to section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(1994). The respondent has appealed from the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent testified that he is a half-black Mauritanian national who is a member of the Peurh ethnic group. He bases his asylum claim on past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race and ethnicity. According to the respondent's testimony, a group of five white and two black Maurs from the military came to the respondent's house in the village of Nouadhibou in Mauritania on June 15, 1990. The police accused the respondent and his family of being Senegalese. They demanded to see the respondent's identity documents, which the Maurs destroyed. The respondent was then separated from his parents, wife, and siblings, all of whom resided in the home. His family members were arrested and forced to cross the river into neighboring Senegal, but the respondent was beaten, blindfolded, thrown into a car, and taken to the village of M'Bagne, where he was imprisoned. He was placed in a large cell with about 50 other black prisoners. During the respondent's detention from June 1990 until December 1991, he and the other prisoners were forced to perform hard labor, primarily carrying bricks and working the farmland. He also suffered repeated beatings by the white Maurs, one of which left a permanent scar on his left knee. During another beating, one of his teeth was knocked out by a blow to the face. The respondent also described being burned with cigarettes.
The respondent also testified that on the day of his release, he and two other prisoners were summoned by the guards and taken by jeep to the river's edge. Initially, they were placed in a boat, but then the officers forced the respondent and the other prisoners into the river at gunpoint and ordered them to swim to the other side. They screamed to get the attention of a passing Senegalese fisherman, who transported them to Senegal. After reaching the shore and resting, the respondent walked 4 hours to the refugee camp in Horefode, where he joined his family. He testified that he remained at the camp for 11 months. Concerned by rumors that Mauritanians in the camp would be sent back to Mauritania, the respondent fled to the city of Dakar in November 1993, leaving his wife and family behind in the refugee camp, where they remain to this day. In Dakar, he earned money working at the harbor. On January 15, 1994, he paid the equivalent of $60 to travel by boat from Dakar to the United States and landed in Miami on February 20, 1994.
The Immigration Judge's denial was based on a finding that the respondent had failed to meet his burden of proof. Specifically, the Immigration Judge noted (1) that the respondent offered no documentation to support his claim that he is a Mauritanian citizen; (2) that the respondent provided no letters or affidavits from family members to corroborate his claim that he was arrested and detained by the authorities or that his family was expelled from Mauritania; (3) that the respondent offered no explanation as to why he decided to leave his entire family in the Senegalese refugee camp; and (4) that the respondent was unable to obtain confirmation of his or his family's presence and registration at the refugee camp, even after the Immigration Judge granted him a continuance for that express purpose. The Immigration Judge found "the respondent's inability or unwillingness to provide supporting documentation to seriously undermine the plausibility of his account, particularly since he has not offered the type of specific, credible detail about the circumstances underlying his period of detention for almost two years in Mauritania and the circumstances of his residence at the refugee camp in Senegal."
An asylum applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proof to establish his or her asylum claim. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,342 (1997) () (interim, effective Apr. 1, 1997). To establish eligibility for a grant of asylum, an alien must demonstrate that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994). See section 208 of the Act. That section defines "refugee" as any person who is unable or unwilling to return to her home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. An applicant for asylum has established that his fear is "well founded" if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Furthermore, asylum, unlike withholding of deportation, may be denied in the exercise of discretion to an alien who established statutory eligibility for the relief. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. To establish eligibility for withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act, an alien must demonstrate a clear probability of persecution in the country designated for deportation on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This means that the alien must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be subject to persecution for one of the grounds specified in the Act. Id.
With regard to burden of proof, we have held that where an alien's testimony is the only evidence available, it can suffice where the testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis of the alien's alleged fear. Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989); see also Matter of Mogharrabi, supra, at 446 (BIA 1987). However, we explained that the introduction of such evidence is not "purely an option" with the asylum applicant; rather, corroborating evidence should be presented where available. See Matter of Dass, supra, at 124.
We recently reiterated and clarified this holding in Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997), where we held that general background information on country conditions must be included in the record as a foundation for an asylum claim. In that case, we stated that "[w]here the record contains general country information, and an applicant's claim relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification, corroborative documentary evidence of the asylum applicant's particular experience is not required." Id. at 725. However, we explained that "where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided . . . [or] an explanation should be given as to why such information was not presented." Id. (emphasis added). The absence of such corroboration can lead to a finding that an applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof. Id. at 725.
In the case at bar, we find that the respondent has not provided sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof. We acknowledge that the respondent has submitted numerous articles and reports regarding general country conditions in Mauritania and the oppression of black Mauritanians on account of their race. Furthermore, the record contains a country profile prepared by the Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Mauritania — Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions (July 1995) [hereinafter Profile]. However, we note the conspicuous lack of documentary evidence corroborating the specifics of the respondent's testimony.
As an initial matter, there is no evidence to confirm the respondent's purported Mauritanian nationality, a central element in his claim. No passport, birth certificate, or identification card has been submitted by the respondent, although we note that the respondent testified that his identity documents were destroyed by the Maurs upon his arrest. It would be reasonable to expect the respondent to attempt to obtain some identity documentation or to adequately explain why replacement documentation was not available. However, even were we to excuse the production of identity documents in this case, we note that the respondent often communicates with his sister who lives in Senegal, outside the refugee camp. We do not find it unreasonable to expect some type of corroboration from the sister in the form of a letter or affidavit, especially given her frequent contact with the respondent. We further note that while he communicates with his sist...
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