In re Madison H.
| Citation | 215 Ill.2d 364,830 N.E.2d 498 |
| Decision Date | 19 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 98533.,98533. |
| Parties | In re MADISON H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Mandi H., Appellee). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Albert G. Algren, State's Attorney, Monmouth (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer, Judith Z. Kelly, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Susan O'Neal Brosam, Sullivan, for appellee.
Charles P. Golbert, Janet L. Barnes, Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, Chicago, for amicus curiae Robert F. Harris, Cook County Public Guardian.
In this appeal we determine whether section 2-27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act), which requires a trial court to provide a factual basis for its determination "in writing," is satisfied if the court orally announces the basis for its finding and a court reporter records those statements. See 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). The appellate court concluded that the plain language of section 2-27(1) requires that the basis for the court's determination be contained in the court's written order. 347 Ill.App.3d 1024, 1027, 284 Ill.Dec. 99, 809 N.E.2d 221. On this point, we disagree with the appellate court. However, we affirm the appellate court for the reasons discussed below.
Respondent, Mandi H., and her husband, Jimmy H., are the parents of Madison H., born July 30, 2002, in Monmouth, Illinois.1 Hospital staff contacted the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) immediately after Madison's birth due to their concerns about the ability of respondent and Jimmy to care for the newborn. Both respondent and Jimmy are developmentally disabled. Following its receipt of a child abuse/neglect report on July 30, 2002, DCFS developed a safety protection plan. Under this plan, Mary Goodwin, respondent's stepmother, would live with respondent and Jimmy and provide primary care to Madison. The safety plan expressly stated that Mary's boyfriend was not permitted contact with Madison due to his prior criminal and child abuse history. On September 11, 2002, DCFS received a second child abuse/neglect report alleging that the safety plan was not being followed, and that Mary allowed her boyfriend to live in respondent and Jimmy's home. The child abuse/neglect report also alleged that Mary failed to properly care for Madison, resulting in Madison's hospitalization for a high fever and urinary tract infection caused by a kidney reflux condition. On September 12, 2002, DCFS took protective custody of Madison, and the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that Madison was a dependent minor and that she lacked proper care. Madison was then placed in the temporary custody of DCFS.
At the adjudicatory hearing, on November 22, 2002, respondent and Jimmy stipulated that Madison was a dependent minor who was "lacking adequate care because of the mental disability of her mother and father." At the hearing, the State supported the stipulation with the following factual information: both respondent and Jimmy are moderately mentally retarded; respondent and Jimmy failed to follow the safety plan developed by DCFS; Madison was in need of ongoing medical attention and monitoring for her kidney reflux condition, and the failure to adequately care for her led to her hospitalization for a fever and respiratory infection on September 7, 2002; respondent and Jimmy were unable to monitor the temperature of Madison's formula and therefore unable to feed Madison; respondent and Jimmy were unable to monitor the temperature of Madison's bath water and therefore unable to clean Madison; and despite numerous parenting classes both respondent and Jimmy were unable to retain information from one class to the next and therefore unable to learn proper parenting skills. The trial court found that both respondent and Jimmy had a developmental disability, and that Madison was a dependent minor based upon the stipulated facts. He ordered that respondent and Jimmy cooperate with DCFS and comply with the terms of the service plan. He further set the case for a dispositional hearing.
After several agreed continuances, on March 7, 2003, respondent appeared at the dispositional hearing with her attorney. Also present for the hearing were Jimmy, and his attorney; Jacqueline Bryant, a DCFS child welfare specialist; and Brandon Scott, respondent's 22-year-old brother. The court considered the testimony of Jacqueline Bryant, Brandon Scott, and respondent. Bryant recommended guardianship with DCFS due to respondent and Jimmy's inability to care for Madison's current needs. Bryant testified that despite their best efforts to learn from family support workers who provided them with weekly one-on-one parenting instruction, their cognitive ability made it unlikely that they could ever improve their ability to provide for Madison. Scott testified that he would live with respondent and Jimmy to supervise the care of Madison. He believed that respondent was capable of caring for Madison. He testified that on one occasion he left his infant son with respondent for several hours, and her care was satisfactory. Bryant testified that DCFS recommended against placement with Scott based on his work situation and his inability to transport Madison to medical appointments on a regular basis. Last, respondent testified about her desire to care for Madison and discussed the type of care she would provide to Madison if given the opportunity. Respondent testified that she had a book that told her how to care for Madison.
The court further considered several reports, including a home study report exploring placement with Brandon Scott; several client service plans prepared by DCFS; a diagnostic report prepared by Patty Cook of the Child Abuse Council, which included psychological evaluations prepared by Dr. Elizabeth Lonning; a psychological report prepared by Dr. Joseph Cress; and a parenting-assessment report prepared by Joe Terronez, a social worker. Based upon his observations of respondent and Jimmy with Madison, Terronez concluded that respondent and Jimmy's limited comprehension may cause Madison to be "at risk of harm if left alone with [respondent and Jimmy] without supervision." Dr. Lonning reported that she questioned respondent's "ability to provide a safe and nurturing environment for her child." She stated that respondent "does not seem to have a clear understanding of cause and effect kinds of relationships and tends to give up easily when she is faced with a challenge." Following interviews and psychological testing with respondent, Dr. Cress wrote that respondent He recommended that Madison not be returned to the independent care of her parents.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court adjudged Madison a dependent minor, made Madison a ward of the court, and placed guardianship in DCFS. The trial court's findings are recorded in a four-page preprinted dispositional order form and in brief statements in the record. In particular, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge stated on the record:
"First I find that it is [in] the child's best interest that the child be made a ward of the Court. I find that the health, safety and in the interest of the minor, as well as the public, requires [sic] that the minor be placed outside the home. I find that the parents at this time are unable to care for, protect, train, properly discipline, although the child is not at an age appropriate for that at this point, but I am basing this on the ability of the parents, and that the child's health, safety and best interest would be jeopardized if the child remained in the parents' custody at this time. I also find that services — appropriate services that would be aimed at preservation of the family[ — ]would be inappropriate at this time and that it would be in the best interest of the minor that custody and guardianship be given to D.C.F.S. with right to place.
[Respondent] and Jimmy, as [the assistant State's Attorney] stated, and I find this as well, every indication here is that you love Madison very much and I don't doubt that at all, and I don't doubt that you are trying your hardest to be the best parents that you can to Madison. I do have concerns about your skills at his [sic] point, the things that you're learning in your parenting classes. I think it sounds like you're cooperating, you're doing what you need to do. I think you need to have more of that and continue to educate yourselves on being good parents. So I am going to award guardianship with the power to place and right to consent to medical and dental care to D.C.F.S. Madison will remain in foster care at this time. I'm also going to order that Jimmy and [respondent] be ordered to cooperate with the Client Service Plan and D.C.F.S.
[Respondent] and Jimmy, I need to tell you something else so this is really important so pay attention. It is important that you continue to cooperate with D.C.F.S. and any other agencies that they assign you to cooperate with. Your failure to comply with the service plan and continue to cooperate and correct the conditions which has made Madison a dependent minor could result in termination of your parental rights, and what that means is she could take your rights away as parent[s] and someone else would adopt...
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