In re Magee

• Decision Date: 26 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-622-CIV-T-17B,Bankruptcy No. 87-0477-8P7.,89-622-CIV-T-17B
• Citation: 111 BR 359
• Parties: In re Harold R. MAGEE, Debtor. Harold R. MAGEE, Appellant, v. Shirley A. EXCELL and Alexander Excell and Nathaniel Excell, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

111 B.R. 359 (1990)

In re Harold R. MAGEE, Debtor Harold R. MAGEE, Appellant, v. Shirley A. EXCELL and Alexander Excell and Nathaniel Excell, Appellees.

No. 89-622-CIV-T-17B, Bankruptcy No. 87-0477-8P7.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

February 26, 1990.

C. Kathryn Preston, Cindy L. Turner, Stichter & Riedel, P.A., Tampa, Fla., for appellant.

Charles M. Tatelbaum, Larry Foyle, Kass, Hodges and Massari, Tampa, Fla., for appellees.

ORDER ON APPEAL

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on appeal from Final Judgment on Case No. 80-79, entered March 14, 1989, by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Alexander L. Paskay. 98 B.R. 62. ISSUES:

I. Whether the Bankruptcy Court was correct in ruling that the debt, claimed by the appellees, was nondischargeable.

II. Whether the Bankruptcy Court was correct as a matter of law in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees.

III. Whether the Bankruptcy Court was correct in entering a summary judgment for the liquidated amount of the claimed liability.

STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The applicable standards of appellate review are as follows: "The burden is squarely on the appellant to show the appellate court that a finding is clearly erroneous," Griffin v Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 413 F.2d 9, 12 (5th Cir.1969), Bankruptcy Rule 8013. Furthermore, the reversal of a finding is proper only when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Inter-Cities Navigation Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th Cir.1979); Matter of Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir.1980). Appellant is entitled to an independent de novo review of all conclusions of law and the legal significance accorded to the facts. However, Bankruptcy Rule 8013 states that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

This Court has carefully reviewed the Final Judgment Order of Judge Paskay, as well as the briefs of both parties. Under the standards quoted above, the Court finds that the findings of fact contained within the order are not clearly erroneous. The Court also finds that the conclusions of law contained in Judge Paskay's order are sound. Accordingly, this Court affirms the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.

DISCUSSION

I.

The first matter for discussion is whether the Bankruptcy Court was correct in ruling the debt claimed by the appellees was nondischargeable. The debt in question is represented by a final judgment order entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois in favor of the appellee, Mrs. Excell. The Chancery division of the Illinois court specifically found that the Debtor, Harold R. Magee, is the biological father of both Alexander Excell and Nathaniel Excell and that he has a legal obligation to support these children.

Appellant's primary contention is that the Cook County judgment may not be excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code because Mrs. Excell is not the appellant's spouse, former spouse or child. Section 523(a)(5) provides that:

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—

(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with state or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement . . .

Appellant's argument that the debt does not come under the confines of 523(a)(5) because the debt was not owed "to a spouse, former spouse or child of a debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record . . . (emphasis added)" is without merit.

Although a literal reading of the above quoted section would appear to preclude a debt represented by a final judgment to Mrs. Excell from being excepted from discharge, such a result would frustrate the congressional intent behind Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. Clearly, by its enactment of this section, Congress intended to protect the debts owed to, and for, all dependent children of the debtor, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Debts arising from the promise of a debtor to support his children may not be avoided merely because those debts are represented by a final judgment in favor of a non-spouse mother. Whether the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy is determined by the nature of the obligation, not by its form.

"What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support will be determined under the bankruptcy laws not state law." In re Harrell 754 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, 5787, 6320). Furthermore, bankruptcy courts must look to the substance of the award rather than to state law labels....