In re Mallett

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011–338.,2011–338.
• Citation: 37 A.3d 333,163 N.H. 202
• Parties: In the Matter of Tami MALLETT and Michael Mallett.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

163 N.H. 202

37 A.3d 333

In the Matter of Tami MALLETT and Michael Mallett.

No. 2011–338.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: Nov. 10, 2011.

Opinion Issued: Jan. 13, 2012.

Wiggin & Nourie, P.A., of Manchester (Doreen F. Connor on the brief and orally), for the petitioner.

Daniel J. Harkinson, of Rochester, by brief and orally, for the respondent.

DUGGAN, J.

This is an interlocutory appeal from two orders of the Conway Family Division (Albee, J.) granting petitioner Tami Mallett's motions to amend and for attorney's fees. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We accept the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer statement and the trial court's orders. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 158 N.H. 130, 133, 960 A.2d 1275 (2008). The petitioner (the mother) and the respondent, Michael Mallett (the father), were involved in a long-term relationship, but never married. During the nearly fourteen years they were together, they had two children and held themselves out as a married couple. They wore wedding rings, implied that they had participated in a wedding ceremony, shared the same last name, owned property together, and worked jointly in business enterprises.

On March 2, 2009, the mother filed a petition for divorce. In response, the father filed a motion to dismiss, based upon the fact that he and the mother never married. The trial court granted the father's motion in part, but ruled that it would nonetheless "address all issues of parenting and child support raised" in the petition for divorce. The court also ruled that it had "equitable authority to make certain adjustments of the rights and interests of the parties," and granted the mother leave to amend her petition, or to file parenting and equity petitions to more fully develop her theories related to, among other things, the division of the parties' personal and real property.

The mother then filed a motion to amend, and later a motion for attorney's fees. In two separate orders, the court granted both motions. The father moved for reconsideration of the orders, or in the alternative, for an interlocutory transfer. The trial court granted the request for an interlocutory transfer, and transferred the following six questions to this court:

(1) Does the family division have jurisdiction under N.H. RSA 490–D:3, or otherwise, to adjudicate legal or equitable claims with respect to assets of parties who have children together but who never married?

(2) Does the family division have jurisdiction under N.H. RSA 490–D:3, or otherwise, to adjudicate a claim for compensation for services between unmarried parents of children?

(3) Does the family division have jurisdiction under N.H. RSA 490–D:3, or otherwise, to order one parent of a child to provide health insurance to the other parent, when the parties never married?

(4) Does the family division have jurisdiction under N.H. RSA 490–D:3, or otherwise, to partition real estate jointly owned by unmarried parents of children?

(5) Does the family division have jurisdiction to order that one parent in a parenting petition case pay any part of the legal fees of the other parent, in the absence of a finding of conduct that is in bad faith, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive?

(6) Does the family division have jurisdiction to find a marriage by estoppel and to grant a petition for divorce based on such a finding?

I

We first address whether the family division may find a marriage by estoppel between the parties and grant a divorce based upon that finding. In New Hampshire, marriage is controlled by statute. To constitute a valid, legal marriage, the union of two people must comply with the requirements of RSA chapter 457 (2004 & Supp.2011). Common law marriage is not recognized, except to the limited extent provided in RSA 457:39 (2004). Joan S. v. John S., 121 N.H. 96, 98–99, 427 A.2d 498 (1981). Under RSA 457:39, when two persons cohabit and acknowledge each other as husband and wife, and are generally reputed as such, for at least three years and until the death of one of them, the survivor may be treated as the spouse of the deceased. Here, the mother recognizes that her relationship with the father does not meet these requirements, and does not argue that a common law marriage exists for any other reason. Instead, relying upon the principles of estoppel, she argues that the parties' committed relationship should be treated as a marriage for the purposes of these proceedings.

The application of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a knowingly false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) a recipient who was ignorant of the truth and who was intentionally, or through culpable neglect, induced to rely upon the false representation or concealment; and (3) a resultant injury. Cadle Co. v. Bourgeois, 149 N.H. 410, 418, 821 A.2d 1001 (2003). In the context of marriage, estoppel does not create a valid marriage; rather, in limited circumstances, it may prevent a party from claiming the defense of invalidity. Jessie v. Jessie, 53 Ark. App. 188, 920 S.W.2d 874, 877 (1996) ; Suneson v. Suneson, 24 Mass.App.Ct. 940, 508 N.E.2d 891, 891 n. 2 (1987).

Other jurisdictions have recognized marriage by estoppel. Some states apply the doctrine to prevent one party from claiming invalidity where there was no valid marriage, but one or both of the parties believed there was, and the two lived together as husband and wife. See, e.g., Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tenn.2000) ; Yun v. Yun, 908 S.W.2d 787, 790–91 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) ; Brown v. Imboden, 28 Ark. App. 127, 771 S.W.2d 312, 313 (1989). The doctrine generally "does not apply in cases where the parties knowingly live[d] together in an unmarried state and [were] privileged to discontinue that relationship at will." Coleman, 19 S.W.3d at 760. Some states also apply the doctrine to prohibit the defense of invalidity against a third party where one party to a relationship knowingly misrepresented to the third party that the relationship was a marriage. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 321 N.C. 244, 362 S.E.2d 542, 547 (1987).

We need not decide whether we would, under any circumstances, adopt the doctrine of marriage by estoppel because the doctrine would have no effect on our decision in this case. For estoppel to apply, the party asserting it must be ignorant of the truth. Bourgeois, 149 N.H. at 418, 821 A.2d 1001. Here, the mother never believed she and the father were married. Further, the mother knowingly lived with the father in an unmarried state. See Coleman, 19 S.W.3d at 760. Accordingly, we hold that in this case, the family division does not have the authority to recognize a marriage by estoppel, and thus cannot grant a divorce.

II

We next address questions one through four, i.e., whether, in a dispute between unmarried parties who have children together, the family division has jurisdiction to partition jointly owned real estate, order one parent to provide health insurance coverage to the other parent, or adjudicate legal or equitable claims to assets and claims for compensation for services rendered.

Whether the family division has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review.

In the Matter of O'Neil & O'Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 622, 992 A.2d 672 (2010). The family division is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Its powers are limited to those conferred by statute. See id.; RSA 490–D:2 (2010). RSA 490–D:2 grants the family division jurisdiction over "[p]etitions for divorce, nullity of marriage, alimony, custody of children, support, and to establish paternity" and "[a]ctions for support or custody for children of unwed parties." RSA 490–D:2, I, II. It also grants jurisdiction over other specific matters, such as delinquency and abuse and neglect, and children in need of services. RSA 490–D:2, III–V.

RSA 490–D:2 does not give the family division jurisdiction over the division of assets, or over any other claims for compensation between unmarried parties. However, in addition to the jurisdiction granted by RSA 490–D:2, the family division has "the powers of a court of equity in cases where subject matter jurisdiction lies with [the family division]." RSA 490–D:3 (2010). The mother argues that because, in this case, RSA 490–D:2 grants the family division express statutory jurisdiction over the child support and custody issues, pursuant to RSA 490–D:3, the court has " ancillary" jurisdiction over all claims raised in her amended petition, including the power to partition the parties' real estate, divide assets and order the father to pay her health insurance. The father argues that RSA 490–D:3 does not grant any such jurisdiction, but merely provides the family division with the equitable powers needed to enforce orders in cases properly before it.

Resolution of this issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. We interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme, not in isolation. Appeal of Union Tel. Co., 160 N.H. 309, 317, 999 A.2d 336 (2010). We first look to the language of the statute, Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451, 879 A.2d 1161 (2005), and construe it "according to the common and approved usage of the language unless from the statute it appears that a different meaning was intended," N.H. Resident Ltd. Partners of Lyme Timber v. N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98, 101 (2011) (quotation omitted). We will not consider "what the legislature might have said nor add language that the legislature did not see fit to include." State v. Lamy, 158 N.H. 511, 515, 969 A.2d 451 (2009).

In granting the mother's motion to amend, the trial court first noted that New Hampshire case law permits unmarried parties to seek a judicial determination of their equitable rights, and permits recovery based upon express contract theories and quantum meruit. The trial court then explained that the statutory scheme includes unmarried parties with children within its...