In re Malmin

• Decision Date: 13 October 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23153.,23153.
• Citation: 364 Ill. 164,4 N.E.2d 111
• Parties: In re MALMIN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

364 Ill. 164

4 N.E.2d 111

In re MALMIN et al.

No. 23153.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 10, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1936.

Appeal from proceeding to disbar.

Proceeding in the matter of Lucius J. M. Malmin and C. W. Larsen, attorneys, wherein the Board of Managers and the Committee on Grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, as a commission to investigate complaints, against members of the bar, made report recommending that respondents be disbarred and their names stricken from the roll of attorneys. On respondents' exceptions to report.Respondent Lucius J. M. Malmin disbarred.

Charles Leviton, of Chicago, amicus curiae.

Ferdinand J. Karasek, John F. Lax, and Lucius J. M. Malmin, pro se, all of Chicago, for respondent Lucius J. M. Malmin.

C. W. Larsen, of Chicago, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

The board of managers and the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, acting as commissioners of this court and authorized by our order of April 21, 1933, to investigate complaints against members of the bar of this state, have conducted hearings upon the complaint of Harold L. Ickes against Lucius J. M. Malmin and C. W. Larsen, attorneys. Voluminousreports of the testimony and proceedings have been filed herein, together with the recommendation of the commissioners ‘that the respondents, Lucius J. M. Malmin and C. W. Larsen, be disbarred and their names stricken from the roll of attorneys.’

While the issues are primarily questions of fact, both respondents devote large portions of their briefs and arguments to an attack upon the jurisdiction of this court, saying that under the order of April 21, 1933, the commissioners were only an investigating body in the nature of a grand jury; that proceedings in disbarment can begin only with the issuance of summons or process out of this court after leave has been granted to file an information; that the unsworn complaint filed against them was insufficient to confer jurisdiction, because it was not signed by the Attorney General, state's attorney, president, and secretary of any regularly organized bar association; that the commissioners were without authority to conduct the hearings before charges were preferred in this court; and that the proceedings were otherwise irregular and insufficient. These points indiscriminately relate to a course of procedure still available under that part of rule 59 which provides for the filing of informations in disbarment proceedings. The case of In re Ranson, 358 Ill. 227, 192 N.E. 912, cited and relied upon by respondents was such a case, the procedure there being by information. But the alternative mode of procedure followed in the case at bar and prescribed as an additional means of discipline by our order of April 21, 1933, has been approved and followed in so many recent decisions (In re Zahn, 356 Ill. 283, 190 N.E. 419;In re Borchardt, 357 Ill. 458, 192 N.E. 383;In re Lasecki, 358 Ill. 69, 192 N.E. 655;In re Grosso, 359 Ill. 243, 194 N.E. 514;In re Casey, 359 Ill. 496, 195 N.E. 39;In re Horwitz, 360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208; In re Mack, 360 Ill. 343, 196 N.E. 197;In re Kolb, 362 Ill. 190, 199 N.E. 92), that the sufficiency of such proceedings to confer jurisdiction is no longer a debatable subject.

A further contention affecting jurisdiction and procedure is that it was the duty of the complainant to follow the case, and that John L. Fogle and his successor, Charles Leviton, as amicus curiae, were each without authority to act in the capacity of prosecutor or to file pleadings except by permission of the court, and this not having been obtained, the complaint has been abandoned and there is nothing before the court. Here, again, respondents have failed to notice that portion of the order of April 21, 1933, which provides that the commissioners shall, if action of any kind is recommended, make report to this court of its conclusions of fact and law concerning the complaint, answer, and proof, and that such report shall be entered on the docket and entitled in the name of the respondents. This provision indicates that the procedure is not a strictly adversary proceeding, but that the case is docketed in the name of the respondents for purposes of investigation. The order further recites in what manner the respondent shall file his exceptions, record, abstract, and brief, and then states: ‘Upon the filing of exceptions to such report by the respondent, the board of governors or the board of managers, as the case may be, shall designate a member of the bar to file certificates of proof, additional abstracts and briefs as may be determined necessary fully to advise the court.’ From the language in the order, it will be seen that no necessity exists for the original complainant to follow the proceedings into this court, but that a member of the bar designated by the board of managers, as was amicus curiae in the present case, may properly present the matter to this court.

The complaint charging respondents, Malmin and Larsen, with professional misconduct was filed with the grievance committee of the Chicago Bar Association on March 24, 1934. Notices thereof, together with copies of the complaint and copies of the order of this court of April 21, 1933, were duly served upon both respondents, who filed their respective answers and requested that the hearing be public. Accordingly, on June 5, 6, and 7, 1934, public hearings were held in Chicago, attended by all the parties interested and their respective attorneys. Malmin and Larsen each testified in his own behalf, while in support of the complaint six witnesses, including Ickes, testified orally and the depositions of five others were read and filed, with numerous exhibits. The complaint covers ten pages of the printed abstract, with some thirty-four different specifications of fact and charges. After detailing a series of events relating to the settlement of an estate by Ickes prior to his appointment to the President's cabinet as Secretary of the Interior, it charges, in substance, that Malmin and Larsen had engaged in a conspiracy to attack the reputation of Ickes for personal gain to themselves; that they trumped up a pretended case of fraud against him in an effort to intimidate him, and expressed their willingness to suppress the publication or use of his supposed fraudulent conduct in return for political appointments to official positions. The answers of respondents in equal length and detail deny the various charges made against them.

Malmin was licensed to practice law in this state in 1885, and Larsen in 1915. Larsen was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months from October 24, 1934, and until the further order of the court. In re Larsen, 358 Ill. 103, 192 N.E. 643. An examination of our own records discloses that no further order has been entered reinstating him.

The proof shows that in August, 1928, Ickes was retained by Dr. Roland P. Saunders, of Chicago, as attorney for the estate of his deceased brother, Clarence A. Saunders. The heirs at law where Roland P. Saunders, brother, and Margaret Belle Saunders, sister of the deceased. The estate consisted of personal property in Illinois and Minnesota and personal and real property in California and North Dakota. The total value of the personal estate was $12,469.74. The real property in California had an appraised value of $11,000. This latter value was disputed by Larsen, who contended that the assessed value for taxation was only $4,000. The value of the North Dakota real property was unknown. Ickes received $1,000 for services rendered in the estate and $352.84 for services and costs in the North Dakota matters. The final account and report of all fees and costs incurred and paid by the administrator of the estate was approved by the probate court of Cook county and the estate was closed in 1930. The record shows no payments to Ickes of any other money out of the Saunders estate, and his sworn testimony to this effect stands uncontroverted.

In May, 1928, about three months before Ickes was retained as attorney for the Saunders estate, one Marshall Stimson, an attorney in Los Angeles, wrote to Ickes advising him that Saunders' property in California had been sold for taxes and suggested that for a contingent fee of 50 per cent. of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate, he would be willing to take action to clear the title thereto. This offer was communicate to Dr. Roland P. Saunders by Ickes, and after some correspondence Stimson undertook the matter of a modified contract of $500 retainer and a contingent fee of one-third of the proceeds of the appraised value of the lots if he should succeed in redeeming them. This contract was carried out. The lots were redeemed, appraised, Stimson's fees paid, and the title to the lots vested in the Saunders heirs. No additional charge was made by Ickes for this service. The final account in the ancillary administration in California for a period ending June 2, 1930, was duly approved, and the Saunders estate was closed in 1930 in both jurisdictions.

In the latter part of 1931 Larsen appeared at the Ickes law offices in Chicago and met Austin Hall, a lawyer associate of Ickes. Larsen stated that he wanted to talk to some one about the Saunders estate. Hall said he had handled the estate in the probate court and perhaps could talk to him about it. They went into Hall's office where Larsen wanted to know why the Los Angeles lots had been redeemed from tax sale. Hall said that Larsen probably wanted to talk to Ickes, who then came from his private office and the conversation was continued in the reception room by the three lawyers. Larsen said he was interested in the case against attorney Stimson of Los Angeles who had redeemed the California property. Here occurs the only conflict in the testimony as to the original conversation of Larsen with Ickes. Larsen testified that in December, 1931, or January or February, 1932, he first...