In re Manchester Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 01 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-730.,98-730. |
| Citation | 773 A.2d 640 |
| Parties | Appeal of MANCHESTER TRANSIT AUTHORITY (New Hampshire Department of Employment Security). |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
The petitioner, Manchester Transit Authority (MTA), appeals a decision of the appellate board of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (appellate board) finding the respondent school bus drivers (claimants) eligible for unemployment benefits for the week ending February 28, 1998. We reverse.
The following facts were either found by the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security Appeal Tribunal (appeal tribunal) and are not challenged here, or appear on the record before us. MTA is a public authority incorporated by the City of Manchester, pursuant to RSA 38-A:1 (2000), for the purposes of acquiring, owning, and operating a mass transportation system in Manchester. MTA has contracted with the City of Manchester School Department (school department) to provide buses and drivers to transport Manchester students in grades one through eight over specified school routes. In accordance with a collective bargaining agreement with the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 717, MTA employs part-time operators to transport students pursuant to its contract with the school department.
The claimants were employed by MTA as part-time school bus drivers. Each filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending February 28, 1998, during which Manchester schools were closed for the annual February vacation. The department of employment security initially denied the claims and the appeal tribunal ruled that each of the claimants was ineligible to receive benefits based upon the claimants' employment with MTA. On further appeal, the appellate board reversed the appeal tribunal's decisions and found the claimants eligible for unemployment compensation benefits based upon their MTA employment. Following the denial of motions to reconsider, MTA appealed to this court, purportedly pursuant to RSA chapter 541 (1997).
We note initially that MTA's appeal under RSA chapter 541 is improper. Judicial review of department of employment security decisions is provided for in RSA 282-A:67 (1999), which specifies the procedure for appealing "a final decision of the appeal tribunal as reversed, modified, or affirmed by the appellate board." Such review is "exclusive of all other methods of judicial review of unemployment compensation decisions." RSA 282-A:68 (1999). Nevertheless, the appeal was timely filed and complied with the substantive requirements of RSA 282-A:67. Accordingly, we will treat this appeal as having been brought pursuant to that statute.
In reviewing decisions under RSA 282-A:67, we must not "substitute [our] judgment for that of the appeal tribunal as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." RSA 282-A:67, V. "Furthermore, we will uphold the department's decision unless its findings or conclusions were unauthorized, affected by an error of law, or clearly erroneous in view of all the evidence presented." Appeal of Work-A-Day of Nashua, 132 N.H. 289, 291, 564 A.2d 445 (1989) (quotation omitted).
At issue here is the interpretation of RSA 282-A:31, II (1999), which provides:
An unemployed individual shall not be eligible to receive benefits:
(a) Based on services in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution....
(b) Based on services in any other capacity for an educational institution, including services for a service organization for any educational institution for any week which commences during a period between 2 successive academic years or terms to any individual if such individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the second of such academic years or terms;
. . . .
(c) Based on services for an educational institution for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if such individual performs services in the period immediately before such vacation period or holiday recess and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the period immediately following such vacation period or holiday recess.
The appeal tribunal framed the legal issue before it as "whether or not the claimant[s] performed services as ... bus driver[s] for a service organization for an educational institution, and if so, did the claimant[s] have reasonable assurance to return to work following the February 1998 school vacation." The appeal tribunal ruled that MTA was such a service organization and that the claimants had reasonable assurance that they would return to work. The appellate board disagreed, finding that under Appeal of Locke, 127 N.H. 403, 503 A.2d 754 (1985), MTA was not a service organization.
Both the appeal tribunal and the appellate board erroneously imported the "service organization" language of RSA 282-A:31, II(b) into RSA 282-A:31, II(c). Subparagraph (b), however, applies to unemployment in any week between successive academic years or terms, whereas the week of February 28, 1998 was, as found by the appeal tribunal, "an established and customary vacation ... period." Thus, RSA 282-A:31, II(c) is the applicable provision. Because subparagraph (c) does not refer to service organizations, we need not decide whether MTA is such an organization.
The claimants first argue that they were not providing services for an educational institution, but rather were providing services for MTA. They argue that the statute must be read to apply only to employees of educational institutions, or it would have the absurd effect of rendering ineligible for unemployment benefits any person who provides any service for a school, such as a police officer who gives a presentation to the schoolchildren or the manufacturer of the school's desks. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the statute is clear on its face and that the claimants provide services for the Manchester schools.
Similar statutes in other jurisdictions have been interpreted both ways. Compare, e.g., Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Com., etc., 64 Pa.Cmwlth. 410, 440 A.2d 679, 681 (1982) () with Fisher v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 69 N.C.App. 758, 318 S.E.2d 322, 323 ( 1984) (). We conclude that the statute is ambiguous. We therefore "review legislative history to aid in our analysis." Appeal of Routhier, 143 N.H. 404, 406, 725 A.2d 665 (1999) (quotation omitted). "[O]ur goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme." Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Transportation, 143 N.H. 358, 360, 724 A.2d 1284 (1999) (quotation omitted).
Prior to 1983, the applicable provision denied eligibility as follows:
(d) With respect to weeks of unemployment beginning after December 31, 1977, benefits for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if he performs services in the employ of a public or other non-profit educational institution described in subparagraphs (b) or (c) in the period immediately before such vacation period or holiday recess and there is a reasonable assurance that he will perform any such services in the employ of such an educational institution in the period immediately following such vacation period or holiday recess.
RSA 282-A:31, II(d) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). In 1983, section II was amended to its present form, which contains the "services for" rather than the "in the employ of" language.
"Ordinarily, any material change in the language of the original act ... is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights." Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 36, 592 A.2d 506 (1991) (quotation omitted). Thus, we presume that the "services for" language in the amended statute means something different from "in the employ of" and therefore reject the claimants' argument that the statute applies only to employees of educational institutions.
The legislative history reveals that the amendment was introduced at the request of the University of New Hampshire to deal with employees that it...
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