In re Marcus J.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 107, Sept. Term, 2007.,107, Sept. Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 950 A.2d 787,405 Md. 221 |
| Parties | In re MARCUS J. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Mary Ann ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen.), on brief, for petitioner.
Peter F. Rose, General Counsel (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender), on brief, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J.,* RAKER, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned) and CATHELL (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In the present case, Marcus J. excepted to a master's finding that he was in possession of a handgun, and thus a delinquent child, but his exceptions were dismissed by a Circuit Court Judge for Baltimore City. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the Circuit Court and held that Marcus J. was entitled to a de novo hearing on all findings, conclusions and recommendations of the master. We granted certiorari to answer the following question:
Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly overturn the juvenile court's dismissal of Marcus J.'s exceptions to the juvenile master's recommendations in his case, where the juvenile court held that Marcus J. failed to comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 11-111 and Section 3-807(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and the juvenile court's policy implementing those provisions?[1] We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and conclude that Marcus J. was entitled to a de novo hearing as to all the matters decided by the master.
At about 10:30 p.m. on August 24, 2006, in Baltimore City, fourteen year-old Marcus J. was approached by officers in a patrol car who asked him to "come here"; Marcus J. began to run and threw something away as he was running. The police discovered a gun in the yard nearby, which Marcus J. denied was his.
He was subsequently charged as a juvenile with one count of carrying a handgun, one count of concealing a dangerous or deadly weapon,2 and one count of possession of a firearm while under the age of 21. On the day of the adjudicatory hearing before a master, the State requested a postponement in order to obtain an operability report on the handgun, as well as a fingerprint analysis,3 both of which were not yet available. The postponement was denied. As a result, the State called Officer Charles Thompson who testified, over a defense objection, regarding whether the handgun was operational:
The master made a finding of facts sustained,4 finding specifically that "[t]he testimony of witnesses supported the sustained counts," and that "[c]onflicting testimony concerning the sustained counts was resolved in favor of the witness[ ] for the State." A disposition hearing5 was held in November of 2006, after which the master recommended that Marcus J. be found to be "a delinquent child" and further recommended that he be placed on probation for an indefinite period, subject to various conditions, including substance abuse outpatient counseling, mandatory school attendance, community service and participation in a mentor program.
Within five days, Marcus J. filed a Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing, in which he stated:
Pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 3-815(c) and Rule 11-111(c) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, please be advised that the Respondent excepts to the findings and proposed orders of [the master], on the 3rd day November, 2006, in the above-captioned petition(s) and requests that the matter be set for a hearing de novo, before the Judge of this Honorable Court and in support of the exception, notes these errors:
Respondents [sic] counsel is excepting to [the master's] findings at the adjudicatory hearing held on 10/6/06 and the disposition hearing on 11/3/06. [The master] erred in her admission of an non experts [sic] testimony on the operability of a handgun over Respondents [sic] council [sic] objection. Moreover, [the master] erred in her facts and findings in the adjudicatory and disposition hearing.
During the exceptions hearing, Marcus J.'s attorney stated, in response to the Judge's statement that she did not comply with the exceptions policy of the Baltimore City Circuit Court when exercising its juvenile jurisdiction,6 that she "did file the exception and the exception does specifically state what I'm excepting to." Marcus J.'s attorney continued:
Your Honor, I filed my exceptions, the law i[s] very clear that my Client is allowed an exception de novo hearing based on filing [ ] the exceptions with the Clerk's office, which was properly done within the five days. That is the law. The law that my Client is entitled to an exception de novo, as long as I file the exception within five days. That is what the law states.
The Judge, nonetheless, dismissed Marcus J.'s exceptions.
Marcus J. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, in which he posed the single question of whether the Circuit Court erred in dismissing his exceptions. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court vacated the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a hearing "as to all matters decided by the master." In re Marcus J., 175 Md.App. 703, 716, 931 A.2d 1146, 1154 (2007). The court iterated that, "[b]ecause a juvenile is, in fact, entitled to elect a de novo hearing on exceptions, and is entitled to file exceptions to `all of the master's findings, conclusions, and recommendations,' we view the exceptions filed by Marcus as sufficiently specific to communicate his election to avail himself of that right," and that "the circuit court erred in basing its dismissal of the exceptions on the juvenile's alleged failure to comply with a local `exception policy' that — as applied in this case — purportedly imposed requirements beyond those set forth in Rule 11-111 and CJP § 3-807(c)." Id. at 712, 715-16, 931 A.2d at 1151-52, 1154.
The State petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. In re Marcus J., 402 Md. 355, 936 A.2d 852 (2007). We shall hold that, under Section 3-807(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), and Maryland Rule 11-111, Marcus J. was entitled to a de novo hearing as to all matters decided by the master.
The State acknowledges to the extent Marcus J. specifically excepted to the police officer's non-expert testimony on the operability of the handgun, that an exceptions hearing as to that exception would be appropriate. The State, nonetheless, argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that Marcus J. had a right to a de novo hearing on all of the masters findings, conclusions and recommendations under Section 3-807(c)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), and Maryland Rule 11-111(c).
In response to the State's argument, Marcus J. contends that the intermediate appellate court was correct in concluding that Marcus J. complied with the statute and Rule governing the filing of exceptions and the request for a de novo hearing. Marcus J. argues that he was entitled to have his case heard before a qualified circuit court judge and that Section 3-807(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), and Maryland Rule 11-111 provide him with the option of a de novo hearing on all matters.
We utilize masters in many jurisdictions in various types of proceedings, such as domestic relations cases, general civil matters and, most importantly for the present case, in juvenile causes, including shelter care and delinquency. In State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 714 A.2d 841 (1998), we had occasion to explore the role of masters:
A master is not a judicial officer, and the Maryland Constitution does not vest a master with any judicial powers. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 106, 321 A.2d 516 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 2399, 44 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975); see also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 209, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 2703, 57 L.Ed.2d 705 (1978) (); Lemley v. Lemley, 102 Md.App. 266, 277, 649 A.2d 1119 (1994) (); Sensabaugh v. Gorday, 90 Md.App. 379, 390, 600 A.2d 1204 (1992) (...
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