In re Marriage of Ikeler

Decision Date25 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06SC664.,06SC664.
Citation161 P.3d 663
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF Melodee IKELER, n/k/a Melodee Crawford, Petitioner and Douglas Eves Ikeler, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Willoughby & Eckelberry, L.L.C., John L. Eckelberry, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Loper and Virnich, P.C., Sean H. Virnich, Amy Therese Loper, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this case, we address whether a court can review a waiver of attorney's fees in a valid marital agreement for unconscionability at the time of enforcement under the Colorado Marital Agreement Act ("CMAA"), sections 14-2-301 to -310, C.R.S. (2006).1 We hold that a waiver of attorney's fees in a marital agreement is subject to review for unconscionability, and therefore we reverse the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Melodee Ikeler ("Wife") and Douglas Ikeler ("Husband") were married on November 18, 2000. Wife gave birth to triplets on April 12, 2002. In 2004, Wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. During the course of the dissolution proceedings, Wife filed a motion requesting an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 14-10-119, C.R.S. (2006). Husband subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of attorney's fees, citing a marital agreement the parties signed shortly before the marriage. Article IV of the marital agreement states in relevant part:

The Parties recognize that under Colorado law a court could consider the award to either of them of spousal maintenance or alimony in the event of dissolution of marriage, divorce or legal separation. Both Parties are able to provide for their own support and both Parties hereby waive any right to receive spousal maintenance or alimony on either a temporary or permanent basis at any time in the future. The Parties also agree that each will pay their own attorneys fees in any dissolution or separation proceedings.

Wife did not dispute the validity of the marital agreement, but rather argued that the court could review the waiver of maintenance and attorney's fees for unconscionability at the time of dissolution. Husband agreed that under subsection 14-2-307(2), C.R.S. (2006),2 the court could review the waiver of maintenance for unconscionability, but argued that there was no statutory basis for the court to review the waiver of attorney's fees. Subsection 14-2-307(2) provides that an otherwise enforceable marital agreement "is nevertheless unenforceable insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement ... relate to the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance and such provisions are unconscionable at the time of enforcement of such provisions." Husband argued that by the plain language of this subsection, only provisions of a marital agreement that pertain to maintenance are reviewable for unconscionability at the time of enforcement. Therefore, Husband concluded, the court could not review the waiver of attorney's fees for unconscionability.

The trial court denied Husband's motion for summary judgment. The court first stated that at common law waivers of both maintenance and attorney's fees were unenforceable if unconscionable at the time of enforcement. The court consequently framed the question as being whether passage of the CMAA abrogated the common law with regard to attorney's fees. Noting that the CMAA makes no mention of attorney's fees, the court concluded it did not abrogate the common law. The court further concluded that attorney's fees "relate to" the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance for purposes of subsection 14-2-307(2). Following a hearing, the court determined that the waiver of attorney's fees was unconscionable3 and awarded Wife attorney's fees in its Permanent Orders.4

Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment and in awarding Wife attorney's fees. The court of appeals agreed and therefore reversed the trial court. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 148 P.3d 347, 353 (Colo.App. 2006). In conducting its analysis, the court of appeals looked no further than subsection 14-2-307(2). Id. Relying on the plain language of that subsection, the court of appeals concluded that "the only provision in a marital agreement that may be reviewed for unconscionability is maintenance." Id. We granted certiorari to review this decision, and we now reverse.5

II. Standard of Review

We review the court of appeals' interpretation of the CMAA de novo. In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 54 (Colo. 2005). Our main task in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id.; People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). We begin with the plain language of the statute to ascertain the General Assembly's intent. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. If the plain language is ambiguous or conflicts with other provisions of the statute, we may look beyond the language of the statute to other factors. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo. 2002); Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d 112, 117 (Colo.1998). To reasonably effectuate the General Assembly's intent, moreover, a statute must be read and considered as a whole. Buckley, 968 P.2d at 117; Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. We will interpret a statute to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. "If separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one construction but would conflict under a different interpretation, the construction which results in harmony rather than inconsistency should be adopted." Id.

III. Analysis

Marital agreements in Colorado are governed by the CMAA, which was passed by the General Assembly in 1986. The court of appeals' analysis in this case focused exclusively on subsection 14-2-307(2) of the CMAA, which addresses the enforcement of marital agreements. Ikeler, 148 P.3d at 353. Based on this subsection, the court of appeals concluded that the CMAA's plain language limited unconscionability review of marital agreements to those provisions regarding spousal maintenance. Id. By reading subsection 14-2-307(2) in isolation rather than considering the CMAA as a whole, however, the court of appeals failed to consider that subsection 14-2-307(2) conflicts with the CMAA's provisions regarding the content of marital agreements. Because of this conflict in the plain language of the CMAA's provisions, we must look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended for a waiver of attorney's fees to be reviewable for unconscionability.

A. The CMAA's Conflicting Provisions

The content of marital agreements is controlled by section 14-2-304 of the CMAA, which lists those subjects to which parties may validly contract in a marital agreement. For example, the CMAA specifically provides that parties may contract to "[t]he determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance." § 14-2-304(1)(d), C.R.S. (2006). The CMAA does not, however, specifically mention attorney's fees. § 14-2-304; Ikeler, 148 P.3d at 354 (Davidson, C.J., specially concurring). The only statutory basis for parties to contractually waive an award of attorney's fees is therefore the catch-all provision, which allows parties to contract to "[a]ny other matter, including the personal rights or obligations of either party, not in violation of public policy or any statute imposing a criminal penalty." § 14-2-304(1)(i), C.R.S. (2006) (emphasis added). Under this subsection, if a waiver of attorney's fees violates public policy it cannot be enforced by the court because it is not a valid contract term.

When we turn to subsection 14-2-307(2), upon which the court of appeals relied, we find that the CMAA states that an otherwise enforceable marital agreement "is nevertheless unenforceable insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement ... relate to the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance and such provisions are unconscionable at the time of enforcement of such provisions." § 14-2-307(2) (emphasis added). This subsection therefore purports to limit unconscionability review to maintenance provisions, seemingly to the exclusion of a waiver of attorney's fees. The conflict between this and subsection 14-2-304(1)(i), however, is apparent. Unconscionable contract provisions, particularly in the context of marital agreements, are unconscionable precisely because they violate public policy. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734-36 (Colo.1982) (holding that maintenance provisions in a premarital agreement are reviewable for unconscionability at the time of the dissolution based on public policy principles); Richard A. Lord, 8 Williston on Contracts § 18:7 (4th ed. 1998) ("[W]here there is a strong public policy against a particular practice, a contract or clause inimical to that policy will likely be declared unconscionable and unenforceable unless the policy is clearly outweighed by some legitimate interest in favor of the individual benefited by the provision.").

We therefore find a conflict in the CMAA between subsection 14-2-307(2), which on its face only allows unconscionability review of marital agreement provisions that relate to maintenance, and subsection 14-2-304(1)(i), which prohibits the parties from contracting to terms that violate public policy. To ascertain the General Assembly's intent with regard to attorney's fees, therefore, we must look beyond the CMAA's language.6 We consider such factors as legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a particular construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme in attempting to ascertain legislative intent. Luther, 58 P.3d at 1015; § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (2006). Our task is to choose a construction that gives effect to the legislature's intent and that serves the purpose of the overall ...

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