In re Marriage of Best

• Decision Date: 20 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 104002.,104002.
• Citation: 228 Ill.2d 107,886 N.E.2d 939
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Steven Richard Devore BEST, Appellant, and Angela K. Farlow Best, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

886 N.E.2d 939

228 Ill.2d 107

In re MARRIAGE OF Steven Richard Devore BEST, Appellant, and

Angela K. Farlow Best, Appellee.

No. 104002.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 2008.

Schiller, Du Canto & Fleck LLP, Lake Forest (Charles J. Fleck, Celia G. Gamrath, of counsel), for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Kathryn D. Farmer, Chicago (Paul F. Feinstein, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Chapter, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

In this opinion, we first consider whether the appellate court erred by sua sponte reversing the trial court's declaratory judgment order addressing the validity and effect of a premarital agreement because the second prong of the declaratory judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2004)), requiring the termination of some part of the parties' controversy, was not met. We hold that the second prong of the statute was met even though a final dissolution order had not been entered and, therefore, reverse in part the appellate court judgment. Next, because the appellate court's ruling precluded its review of the trial court's construction of the premarital agreement provision waiving the parties' rights to attorney fees, we remand that issue to the appellate court. Finally, we examine the appellate court's conclusion that the spousal support and insurance coverage waivers in the premarital agreement apply only if the parties are legally separated, affirming that interpretation.

I. FACTS

Before their marriage in 2002, Steven and Angela Best entered into a premarital agreement covering a wide variety of financial and property issues, including the parties' rights to attorney fees, insurance coverage, and spousal support. They had a son in 2003, and in 2004, Steven filed for dissolution of the marriage in Lake County circuit court. He later filed a motion for declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling on the validity and construction of the couple's premarital agreement. After Steven filed an amended declaratory judgment motion, an evidentiary hearing was held, and the Lake County circuit court ruled the agreement valid and enforceable. The court also determined that section 19 of the agreement, waiving the parties' rights to attorney fees, did not apply to custody-related matters. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)), the declaratory judgment order stated that it "is final and appealable and there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal."

Angela then filed an emergency petition in the dissolution proceeding, requesting reinstatement as an insured on Steven's health insurance policy, at his expense. Steven responded with a motion to strike and dismiss, arguing that the valid premarital agreement waived all rights to support and insurance. The trial court disagreed and ordered Steven to reinstate Angela's health insurance "until she qualifies for her employer provided policy or completion of this matter." The order also required Angela to "make every effort to obtain medical coverage from an employer."

Steven filed a motion to vacate the insurance order, arguing that it violated section 8 of the premarital agreement, waiving all spousal support "[i]n the event the parties separate or the marriage is dissolved." The trial court rejected Steven's argument, interpreting the waiver to apply only if the parties were legally separated. Steven appealed separately from the orders allowing attorney fee awards and refusing to vacate the prior order reinstating Angela's health insurance coverage. While the underlying dissolution proceeding was still pending, the appeals were consolidated.

The appellate court reversed the declaratory judgment order sua sponte because it believed that the requirements of the declaratory judgment statute had not been met. The court found that the declaratory judgment was improperly entered before entry of a final dissolution order and failed to satisfy the "termination-of-controversy" requirement in the declaratory judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2004)). 369 Ill.App.3d 254, 258, 262, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173. Based on this holding, the appellate court did not reach the substantive issue of whether the declaratory judgment properly allowed the parties to seek attorney fees for custody-related matters.

In Steven's appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the order reinstating Angela's health insurance coverage, the court held the insurance order was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)) as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction. 369 Ill. App.3d at 263, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173. On the merits of the appeal, the court found an ambiguity in section 8 of the agreement, barring spousal support "[i]n the event the parties separate or the marriage is dissolved." The court noted the word "separate" could reasonably be construed to require either a legal separation or simply the parties' decision to live apart. 369 Ill.App.3d at 267, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173.

To resolve the ambiguity, the appellate court relied primarily on the rule of construction disfavoring any interpretation of a premarital agreement that denies marital rights in the absence of a "clearly apparent" intent. The court also noted that another rule of construction placed the risk of an unresolved ambiguity on Steven, as the drafter of the agreement. Applying those rules, the court determined that the term "separate[d]" required the parties to be legally separated before spousal support was waived. 369 Ill. App.3d at 270, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order requiring Steven to reinstate Angela on his health insurance policy.

We allowed Steven's petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315). We also allowed the Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of Steven, addressing the propriety of the appellate court's bar on declaratory judgment orders before the entry of final dissolution orders. 210 Ill.2d R. 345. Angela did not file an appeal, a cross-appeal, or a responsive brief in this cause.

II. ANALYSIS

In this case, we are asked to address three main issues, whether: (1) the appellate court erroneously held that the second prong of the declaratory judgment statute, requiring that the order terminate at least some part of the controversy, was not met and, thus, entry of the order was improper; (2) the trial court improperly interpreted section 19 of the parties' premarital agreement to allow attorney fee awards for custody-related issues; and (3) the appellate court erroneously upheld the injunctive order requiring Steven to reinstate Angela on his health insurance policy, contrary to section 8 of the parties' agreement.

A. Appeal of the Declaratory Judgment

1. The Appellate Court Decision

Steven first argues that the appellate court erred by concluding that the entry of a declaratory judgment addressing the validity of the parties' premarital agreement was improper before entry of a final dissolution order. To address the propriety of the appellate court's conclusion, we first examine the basis of that opinion.

After carefully considering that portion of the opinion in its entirety, we believe the court's core analysis was that:

(1) it had appellate jurisdiction;

(2) the declaratory judgment request raised a claim separate from claims for nondeclaratory relief relating to the same right (369 Ill.App.3d at 259, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173), making it appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill.2d R. 304(a)) (369 Ill. App.3d at 257, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173);

(3) entry of declaratory judgment is improper if the order fails to satisfy the statutory requirements (369 Ill.App.3d at 262, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173);

(4) the termination-of-controversy requirement in the statute was not satisfied here because, in the absence of an order in the dissolution proceeding, the declaratory judgment did not resolve any actual claim for fees and support (369 Ill.App.3d at 262, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173); and

(5) the improper entry of the declaratory judgment could not be overcome by the inclusion of the Rule 304(a) language that otherwise would have permitted interlocutory review of the trial court's interpretation of the premarital agreement (see 369 Ill.App.3d at 258-59, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173).

We discuss the propriety of these conclusions as necessary to review the issue raised on appeal.

2. Supreme Court Rule 304(a) and Leopando

In discussing the suitability of appealing the declaratory judgment under Rule 304(a), the appellate court examined whether the declaratory judgment request raised a claim separate from the pending dissolution claim. The court held that here it did despite the contrary result reached in In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill.2d 114, 119, 70 Ill.Dec. 263, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983). See 369 Ill.App.3d at 259, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173. We agree that this case is appealable under Rule 304(a) and distinguish Leopando.

In Leopando, the trial court entered an order dissolving the parties' marriage, followed by a separate order awarding permanent custody of the couple's child to the father. The only statute at issue was the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 101, now 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2006)). The custody order included a finding of "no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal" under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)). The custody order also expressly reserved the issues of maintenance, property division, and attorney fees. Affirming the appellate court's reversal of the custody order as not appealable under Rule 304(a), this court explained that custody is not a separate claim in a dissolution case but rather...