In re Marriage of Lewis, No. 01CA0013.

• Docket Nº: No. 01CA0013.
• Citation: 66 P.3d 204
• Case Date: February 13, 2003
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

66 P.3d 204

In re the MARRIAGE OF Cleone LEWIS, Appellee, and
Alen Drue Lewis, Appellant

No. 01CA0013.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

February 13, 2003.

Law Office of Suzan Trinh Almony, Suzan Trinh Almony, Broomfield, Colorado, for Appellee.

Friednash & Hannigan, P.C., Douglas J. Friednash, Michelle T. Hannigan, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.

Opinion by Judge ROY.

Alen Drue Lewis (husband) appeals from the permanent orders entered in connection with the dissolution of his marriage to Cleone Lewis (wife). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

The parties had been married twenty-five years, and at the time of the final orders they had two principal assets, the family home and husband's retirement plan. The court found that the fair market value of the family home was $167,000, with an equity of $20,000, and awarded it to wife. The court divided husband's pension equally by means of a qualified domestic relations order.

66 P.3d 205

During the marriage, wife received a substantial inheritance from her family. The trial court found that much of that inheritance had been gifted to the marriage and spent by the parties. The trial court further found that in 1978 and 1979, husband had executed demand promissory notes to wife for other portions of her inheritance in the principal amounts of $2,650 and $39,817.25, which were not gifts to the marriage. Wife testified that no payments had been made on the promissory notes. The trial court entered judgments on the promissory notes in favor of wife for the outstanding principal and accrued interest through the date of the permanent orders hearing in the amounts of $8,862.42 and $207,990.14

The trial court further ordered husband to name the parties' children as beneficiaries of a substantial life insurance policy on wife's life and also ordered him to obtain a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $250,000, with wife as the beneficiary to secure the judgment on the promissory notes. Finally, the court ordered husband to pay $5,000 of wife's then outstanding attorney fees.

I.

Husband asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the judgments on the two promissory notes in favor of wife were barred by the statute of limitations. Wife counters that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be first raised in the trial court. Whatever the merit of the parties' arguments, we conclude that the entry of judgment was contrary to the public policy of this state, and therefore we vacate the judgments and related orders.

Wife filed a petition for a legal separation requesting a decree of legal separation, custody or allocation of parental responsibilities and child support with respect to the unemancipated child, maintenance, equitable distribution of the marital property and debt, attorney fees and costs, and "all other and further Orders this Court deems appropriate." Husband was served with process and filed a response seeking dissolution of the marriage.

Proceedings for dissolution of marriage or legal separation under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act are statutory and equitable in nature. See § 14-10-101, et seq., C.R.S.2002; H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 15.1 (2d ed.1987).

The purposes of the Act include promotion of amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between the parties. Section 14-10-102(2)(a), C.R.S.2002. The Act specifically authorizes, inter alia, the courts to dissolve the marriage, enter protective orders and injunctive relief, determine the allocation of parental responsibilities, determine child support and maintenance, divide the marital property, award attorney fees, and resolve postdecree disputes. See §§ 14-10-106, 14-10-113, C.R.S.2002. These are the matters normally resolved in a dissolution proceeding.

An action to collect a promissory note is a civil action at law. While many of the technical distinctions between law and equity have been abolished, C.R.C.P. 2, some differences remain. For example, a party to an action in which money is claimed to be due on a contract is entitled to trial by jury. C.R.C.P. 38(a). All issues raised or presented in a dissolution proceeding are to be resolved by the court in equity sitting...