In Re Marriage Of Susan Lynn Baumgartner

• Decision Date: 20 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 109047.,109047.
• Citation: 930 N.E.2d 1024,237 Ill.2d 468,341 Ill.Dec. 510
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Susan Lynn BAUMGARTNER, Appellee,andCraig Baumgartner, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

237 Ill.2d 468

930 N.E.2d 1024

341 Ill.Dec. 510

In re MARRIAGE OF Susan Lynn BAUMGARTNER, Appellee, and Craig Baumgartner, Appellant.

No. 109047.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 2010.

Andrea M. Tirva, park Ridge, for appellant.

Richard B. Kirk, Loves Park, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

In their judgment for dissolution of marriage, Susan Lynn Baumgartner (Susan) and Craig Baumgartner (Craig) agreed to contribute to the postsecondary education expenses of their son, Maxwell Baumgartner (Max). The circuit court of Cook County terminated Craig's obligation to contribute to Max's postsecondary education expenses. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the order of the circuit court. 393 Ill.App.3d 297, 332 Ill.Dec. 296, 912 N.E.2d 783. This court allowed Craig's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the order of the circuit court, and we remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

In April 1998, the circuit court dissolved the marriage of Susan and Craig. They had one child, Max, who was 10 years old at the time of the dissolution. A marital settlement agreement was incorporated into the judgment for dissolution of marriage. Pursuant to the agreement, Susan and Craig were awarded joint custody of Max, who would reside with Craig and have liberal visitation with Susan.¹

The marital settlement agreement also addressed Max's postsecondary education expenses as follows:

“2.16 CRAIG and SUSAN shall be responsible for post high school educational expenses for their child as provided by the applicable section of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act in force when Max is ready to incur these expenses. CRAIG shall continue to maintain the Florida Pre-Paid tuition and dorm college account with combined deposits currently valued at $4000.00. The Parties' obligation for college educational expenses will be reduced by the value of this account when Max begins his post high school education.

2.17 The Parties' obligation in this regard shall only be conditioned upon the ability to pay these expenses when incurred, and the child's desire and ability to further his education.”

Also, section 2.18 provided: “Both parties shall maintain a life insurance policy paying death benefits to the surviving parent, as trustee for Max, of not less than $50,000.00, until such time as he has finished college or graduate school. This obligation shall not continue beyond Max's twenty-fifth birthday.”

In January 2008, Craig filed a motion to amend the dissolution judgment pertaining to Max's postsecondary education expenses. In April 2008, Susan filed an answer to Craig's motion, in which she admitted the following allegations by Craig. Max was born on July 23, 1987. He graduated from high school in June 2005. Thereafter, Max attended one or two semesters at Oakton Community College. Max was convicted of one count of criminal sexual abuse, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-15(a)(2), (d) (West 2008)) and one count of indecent solicitation of a child, also a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/11-6(a-5) (West 2008)). He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on each count. Max had been incarcerated since October 2007, his projected parole date was April 9, 2009, and his projected discharge from parole was on April 9, 2010. Further, as a condition of Max's sentence, he will be required to register as a sex offender.

However, Susan denied Craig's remaining allegations. Craig alleged that Max graduated at the bottom of his high school class and received failing or poor grades while enrolled in the community college. Also, as a result of his conviction and sentence, Max will be prohibited from being in the vicinity of any public park and any public or private school. Craig alleged that Max's incarceration was a change of circumstances from the time of the entry of the original dissolution judgment. According to Craig, given section 2.17 of the dissolution judgment, in which the parties' obligation for postsecondary education expense is conditioned “on the child's desire and ability to further his education,” coupled with Max's poor academic performance and his three-year incarceration, it was unlikely that Max would pursue any form of postsecondary education prior to age 23. Craig concluded that it was “no longer in the best interest of this family to enforce Section [s] 2.16 and 2.17.” Craig requested that “both parties be relieved of any and all obligations under 2.16 and 2.17.”

Craig also alleged that “the life insurance provision in Section 2.18 was intended to provide for Maxwell's college education if one or both of his parents dies prior to graduation from college and were thus incapable of fulfilling their obligations under Section 2.16 regarding college education expenses.” Further, according to Craig, “although [he] has faithfully maintained a life insurance policy in the amount of $50,000.00 in compliance with Section 2.18, the continued payment of the policy premium is onerous and no longer in the best interests of the family in light of Maxwell's lengthy incarceration.” Susan denied these allegations. Craig requested an order that section 2.18 of the dissolution judgment be eliminated.

On April 25, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on several post-dissolution matters, including Craig's motion to relieve the parties of their obligation for Max's postsecondary education expenses. The parties argued whether Max's incarceration constituted a sufficient change of circumstances as to require amending the dissolution judgment as Craig requested. The court did not hear any testimony or receive any evidence on Craig's motion. Rather, the circuit court sua sponte ruled that “the child's incarceration is a full emancipation of that child; and therefore any future obligation on the part of Mr. [Craig] Baumgartner to pay for college is abated as of this time.” The circuit court denied Susan's motion for reconsideration.

A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the order of the circuit court. 393 Ill.App.3d 297, 332 Ill.Dec. 296, 912 N.E.2d 783. The appellate court concluded: “We find no authority to support the argument that Illinois would recognize incarceration as a self-emancipating event * * *. Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered the termination of Craig's obligation to contribute to Max's education expenses solely on the basis of Max's incarceration.” 393 Ill.App.3d at 301, 332 Ill.Dec. 296, 912 N.E.2d 783. The dissenting justice concluded that Max's felony convictions constituted his abandonment of “any pursuit of a higher education.” 393 Ill.App.3d at 301, 332 Ill.Dec. 296, 912 N.E.2d 783 (Wolfson, J., dissenting).

Craig appeals to this court. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues.

ANALYSIS

The “Argument” section of Craig's petition for leave to appeal consists of one double-spaced, 10-line paragraph. We take this opportunity to remind appellants who allow their petitions for leave to appeal to stand as their appellants' briefs that “[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.” Pecora v. Szabo, 109 Ill.App.3d 824, 825-26, 65 Ill.Dec. 447, 441 N.E.2d 360 (1982). However, despite the paucity of Craig's submission, we can discern the question sought to be resolved. Moreover, Susan has not objected to Craig's petition for leave to appeal. Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion in this matter and address this issue on the merits. See e.g., People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette, 5 Ill.2d 303, 305, 125 N.E.2d 473 (1955); People v. Jung, 192 Ill.2d 1, 12-13, 248 Ill.Dec. 258, 733 N.E.2d 1256 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Miller and McMorrow, JJ.); Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill.App.3d 735, 736-37, 239 Ill.Dec. 785, 714 N.E.2d 1082 (1999).

Craig contends that the circuit court correctly ruled that incarceration, as a matter of law, emancipated Max, thereby terminating Craig's postsecondary education expense obligation. Craig posits that additional evidence is not needed. In response, Susan contends that incarceration is not an emancipating event that would terminate a parent's child support obligation.

In the present case, the circuit court ruled that Max's incarceration, by itself, constituted a “full emancipation,” which relieved Craig of his obligation to contribute to Max's postsecondary education expenses. The appellate court reversed, finding “no authority to support the argument that Illinois would recognize incarceration as a self-emancipating event such as marriage or military service.” 393 Ill.App.3d at 301, 332 Ill.Dec. 296, 912 N.E.2d 783. The appellate court correctly recognized that this is a matter of first impression in Illinois.² We acknowledge that: “Increasingly, courts are hearing cases concerning the issue of ‘emancipation’ in the parent-child relationship.” Note Don't Come Cryin' to Daddy! Emancipation of Minors: When Is a Parent ‘Free at Last’ From the Obligation of Child Support?, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 927 (1995). The analyses of the lower courts, and the arguments of counsel before this court, require a thorough discussion of the pertinent Illinois statute and case law from Illinois and foreign jurisdictions.

Statutory Provisions Governing Child Support

The provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) “do not extend the parental obligation for support beyond minority except in limited statutory situations * * * [or] unless otherwise agreed in writing or by court order.” Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill.2d 317, 326, 43 Ill.Dec. 12, 410 N.E.2d 12 (1980). In the present case, the dissolution judgment provided that Susan and Craig would be responsible for Max's...